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Para Pilar, con Amor. 
"For the purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become- like the pirate and the slave trader before 
him- hostis humani, an enemy of all mankind."' 
Filarliga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F. 2d 876 (1980), at 890, per Judge Kaufman. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Without a remedy, a right may be but an empty shell. 
Transnational Human Rights Litigation for Acts of Torture 
Committed in a Foreign Jurisdiction 
Following the successful establishment o f a body of international human rights law 
since the Second World War, recent international attention has focused on how these 
norms may effectively be enforced. Developments in this area have largely been in 
the criminal domain whereby several States have now ratified the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court and domestic legal systems are beginning to be used in 
bringing prosecutions under the various multilateral criminal treaties. However, 
despite these significant advancements in international criminal law, any successful 
prosecution brought against the person responsible for the act complained of wil l not 
provide reparation to the victim for the harm caused. Effective accountability thus 
seems to require not only that those responsible for committing violations of 
internationally protected human rights be punished for their conduct, but also that 
redress be provided to the victim. In this regard, redress for the purposes of providing 
adequate reparation to victims of gross violations of human rights would entail that 
both financial compensation and ful l medical rehabilitation be received for the harm. 
Where victims have fled the State in whose territory the violation of the 
human right was committed, foreign States may provide the financial compensation 
necessary to the victim under compensation schemes which they have in place. 
However, the use of such schemes to provide financial compensation by third States 
may be criticised on the basis that the primary responsibility for providing civil 
Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It, 1994, GUP, at p. 99. 
redress is on the individual responsible for the violation.^ With there being no legal 
justification for a State which is not implicated in the violation in providing financial 
redress,^ it is thus asked whether international law permits States to use their legal 
systems to allow civil actions to be brought against the alleged offender. 
Other than holding the individual responsible for the violation directly 
accountable for their conduct, civil litigation of this kind is recognised as having 
numerous benefits. Firstly, it has been suggested that victims of gross human rights 
violations find declaratory judgements that provide truth and stigmatises the conduct 
as more important than financial redress.'' Secondly, civil actions have greater 
advantages than their criminal counterparts in that there is a lower burden of proof 
and victims may initiate proceedings independent to the prosecutorial discretion of the 
State. 
This paper seeks to determine whether international law permits domestic 
legal systems to provide forums for civil actions seeking redress for acts of torture 
committed in a foreign jurisdiction by non-nationals of the forum State against other 
non-nationals. Such transnational human rights litigation of the kind envisaged in this 
paper is currently recognised by the United States following the Court of Appeal for 
the Second Circuit's seminal decision in Fildrtiga v. Pena-Irala.^ 
The discussion of the paper is divided into three main chapters which examine 
in detail each of the potential difficulties that such litigation would encounter. Chapter 
2 wi l l determine whether international law permits States to exercise universal civil 
jurisdiction over torture and make such conduct a civil offence within their domestic 
legal systems. The chapter wi l l begin by outlining the universal principle and then 
consider whether conventional or customary international law provides a legal basis 
for universal civil jurisdiction. Chapter 3 wi l l next examine whether States are under 
an international obligation to accord immunity in civil proceedings which seek redress 
for acts of torture committed in a foreign jurisdiction. Once having explored State 
practice on this matter, the doctrinal legitimacy of the legal arguments that granting 
immunity in civil proceedings for acts of torture violates the right of access to a civil 
^ International Law Association Human Rights Committee, "Report on Civil Actions in the English 
Courts for Serious Human Rights Violations Abroad" [2001] E H R L R 129, at p. 132. 
^ Ibid., at p. 133. 
Bianchi, Serious Violations of Human Rights and Foreign Stale's Accountability, in Vohrah et al, 
(eds.), Man's Inhumanity to Man: Essays in International Law in Honour of Antonio Cassese, 2003, 
Kluwer Law International, at pp. 178-81. 
' 630 F.2d 876 (1980). 
court and is inconsistent with the peremptory status of the prohibition on torture will 
then be assessed in detail. Finally, chapter 4 wil l briefly address the two procedural 
issues that a domestic court involved in transnational human rights litigation must 
consider before it may deal with any issues concerning substantive liability. In this 
regard, the discussion wil l consider the UK rules on private international law as to 
when a domestic court has jurisdiction to hear civil actions in tort, and the system of 
law that wi l l be applied when adjudicating such disputes. In the conclusion of the 
paper it wil l be determined whether the current state of international law permits 
domestic legal systems to provide forums for civil actions seeking redress for acts of 
torture committed in a foreign jurisdiction, and recommendations for domestic legal 
systems to be used in such a way wil l be made. 
Chapter 2 
JURISDICTION 
The lawmaker's power [extends] over all person and property present in the State... The law does not 
extend over other States and their subjects.' 
General Principles of Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction and the Sovereign Equality of States 
At its simplest, the term jurisdiction is used to describe a sovereign administering 
law.^ More specifically, jurisdiction is concerned with the rules of international law 
which regulate the competence o f a State that exercises sovereign authority over all 
aspects of the legal process, particularly where the conduct regulated has a 
transnational aspect.^  
' de Martens, Precis du droit des gem modernes de I'Europe fonde sur les traites et I'usage, 1831, Vol. 
I, at paras. 85-86. 
^ On jurisdiction see generally: Akehurst, "Jurisdiction in International Law" (1972) 46 B Y I L 145; 
Bowett, "Jurisdiction: Changing Problems of Authority over Activities and Resources" [1982] 53 
B Y I L 1; Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, (i^ ed., 2003, OUP, chapters 14-15; 
Cassese, International Law, 2"'' ed., 2005, OUP, pp. 46-55, [hereinafter referred to as Cassese 
{International Law)]; Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 6* ed., 2004, Sweet and 
Maxwell, chapter 6; Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It, 1994, 
OUP, chapter 4; Jennings, "Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust Laws" [1957] 
33 B Y I L 146; Jennings and Watts, Oppenheim's International Law, 9* ed., 1992, London, pp. 456-
498; Lowe, Jurisdiction, in Evans, (eds.). International Law, 2"'' ed., 2006, OUP, chapter U ; Mann, 
"The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law" (1964) 111 Hague Recueil, reprinted in Mann, 
Further Studies in International Law, 1990, Oxford: Claredon Press, [hereinafter referred to simply as 
Mann]; Mann, "The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law Revisited After Twenty Years" 
(1984) 186 Hague Recueil 9, [hereinafter referred to as Mann (Revisited)]; Maier, Jurisdictional Rules 
in Customary International Law, in Messon, (eds.). Extraterritorial Jimsdiclion in Theory and 
Practice, 1996, Kluwer Law International; and Shaw, International Law, 2003, 5"" ed., CUP, chapter 
12. 
^ The present discussion will focus exclusively on the jurisdiction of States in international law. 
The jurisdictional limits of States are set by both conventional and customary 
international law, and the precise scope of these limits are largely influenced by the 
principle of sovereign equality which has been described as the basic constitutional 
doctrine of the international legal system."* This principle recognises that the 
sovereignty of all States are to be equal with one another, and is established by them 
enjoying a horizontal relationship in the legal order. 
Two related principles may be deduced from the sovereign equality of States 
doctrine.^ Firstly, the very notion of sovereignty entails that a State has an absolute 
jurisdiction over all matters arising within its territory. In The Schooner Exchange, the 
US Supreme Court commented that: 
The jurisdiction of tiie nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It 
is susceptible to no limitations not imposed by itself. Any restriction would imply a 
diminution of sovereignty to the extent of the restriction.'' 
International law has afforded due recognition to this in the territorial principle of 
jurisdiction whereby all States enjoy a general competence to exercise authority over 
conduct occurring within their territory. 
As a corollary to the first principle that a State has an absolute jurisdiction 
within its own territory, is that, secondly, a State must not seek to regulate any of the 
internal affairs arising in another State.'' Thus, according to this second principle. 
States are under a duty not to intervene in the domestic jurisdiction of another State. 
The decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice^ in the Lotus case 
formally recognised that international law no longer governed a legal order where 
States were truly independent from one another: 
It does not, however, follow that international law prohibits a State from exercising 
jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of any case which related to acts which have taken 
place abroad... Such a view would only be tenable if international law contained a general 
prohibition on States to extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts 
to persons, property and acts outside their territory... But this is certainly not the case under 
4 Brownlie, supra n. 2, at p. 287. 
' See, further, on this doctrine: Brownlie, ibid., at chapter 14; and Cassese {International Law), supra n. 
2, at pp. 48-53. 
* The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 1 Cranch. 116 (1812), at 136, per Marshall CJ. 
' Brownlie, supra n. 2, at pp. 287 and 290-2; Shaw, supra n. 2, at p. 574-6. 
^ Hereinafter referred to as either the Permanent Court or the PCIJ. 
international law as it stands at present. Far from laying down a general prohibition to the 
effect that States may not extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their 
courts to persons property and acts outside their territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide 
measure of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules.' 
As the dictum of the Permanent Court suggests, on certain occasions international law 
permits a foreign State to exercise regulatory competence over events occurring 
outside of its borders. Significantly, this dictum accepted that the exercise of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction per se would not amount to an illegitimate interference 
with another State's territorial sovereignty.'° 
The principle of sovereignty has been weakened further following the 
development of international human rights law since 1945. In the aftermath of the 
serious abuses that had been committed during the Second World War, territorial 
integrity was no longer regarded as the supreme value o f the legal order and 
limitations where placed upon the competence of States with regard to their treatment 
of individuals." Despite the partial demise of State sovereignty, particularly where 
human rights are concerned, the principle nonetheless still retains great importance in 
influencing developments in modern international law.''^ 
The Different Species of Jurisdiction 
International law recognises three different manifestations in which a State may 
exercise regulatory competence over persons, property or events. 
Prescriptive jurisdiction, otherwise referred to as legislative jurisdiction, 
describes the competence o f States under international law to assert the applicability 
of their laws.''' As a general rule, and as a reflection of sovereignty, States enjoy the 
competence to assert their laws over persons, property or events within their territory. 
Moreover, in certain circumstances international law permits States to extend their 
laws over conduct beyond their territorial jurisdiction where they are recognised as 
having a sufficiently close connection with the state of affairs. 
' The Lotus case {France v. Turkey), 1927 PCIJ, Ser. A, No. 10, at 19. 
'° See further on this point: Akehurst supra n. 2, at p. 182; and Maier, supra n. 2, at pp. 66-67. 
" See further on this point, Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism, 2003, GUP, at 
p. 229. 
Maier, supra n. 2, at pp. 64-69. 
" On prescriptive jurisdiction see generally: Akehurst, supra n. 2, at pp. 179-212; and Mann, supra n. 
2, at pp. 15-110. 
Enforcement jurisdiction is concerned with the way in which a State may 
enforce its prescriptive rules.''' As a basic principle reflecting the sovereign equality 
of States, no State may exercise its enforcement jurisdiction in the territory of another 
State unless that State consents otherwise.'^ This stringent limitation on enforcement 
jurisdiction may impose significant practical constraints on the exercise of 
extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction. 
The enforcement jurisdiction of a State may be carried out by way of 
adjudicative or executive means, thereby creating two sub-divisions of this specie of 
jurisdiction.'^ Adjudicative jurisdiction, more commonly referred to as judicial 
jurisdiction, concerns the competence of States to apply their prescribed rules through 
their courts or other legal institutions.'^ Although international law only permits a 
State to judicially enforce its prescribed laws through its own courts, this does not 
prevent it from using its domestic courts to exercising adjudicative jurisdiction over 
extraterritorial conduct. In the Lotus case, the Permanent Court stated that 
international law does not, "[lay] down a general prohibition to the effect that States 
may not extend the... jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside 
their territory".'* 
Executive jurisdiction refers to the ability of States to enforce their prescribed 
laws by way of non-judicial means.'^ These non-judicial means range from 
administrative acts, such as gathering evidence and arresting alleged perpetrators of 
crimes, to ensuring that judgements are complied with through coercive means. As a 
specie of enforcement jurisdiction, a State's competence to perform executive acts is 
confined to its territorial jurisdiction unless it receives consent from a foreign State 
suggesting otherwise.^° 
On enforcement jurisdiction see generally: Mann, ibid., at pp. 110-139; and Mann (Revisited), supra 
n. 2, at pp. 34-46. 
The Lotus case, 1927 PCIJ, Ser. A, No. 10, at 18-19; the Separate Opinion of President Guillaume, in 
the Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium), 
ICJ Report, 2002, p. 3, at para 4; and the Joint Separate Opinions of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and 
Buergenthal in the Arrest Warrant case, at para. 54. 
" There is no consensus amongst academic scholars with regard to the distinction between the different 
species of jurisdiction. Thus, for example, Mann, supra n. 2, is of the opinion that there are only two 
categories of jurisdiction and regards both executive and adjudicative jurisdiction as a single form of 
enforcement jurisdiction. In contrast, Akehurst, supra n. 2, draws a distinction between all three 
categories. For the suggestion that adjudicative jurisdiction is a form of prescriptive jurisdiction see, 
further, O'Keefe, "Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concepts" (2004) 2 JICJ 735, at p. 737. 
" On adjudicative jurisdiction see generally, Akehurst, supra n. 2, at pp. 152-178. 
" 1927 PCIJ, Ser. A, No. 10, at 18. 
" On executive jurisdiction see generally, Akehurst, supra n. 2, at pp. 145-151. 
Attorney General of the Government of Israel v. Eichmann (1962) 36 ILR 277. 
The Relationship Between the Different Species of Jurisdiction 
Despite suggesting that a rigid distinction may be drawn between the different forms 
of jurisdiction, it is significant to note that this is somewhat artificial and numerous 
academics have contended that the concept of jurisdiction, "ought to be regarded as a 
unitary phenomenon categorised by different stages of [an] exercise of authoritative 
power".^' Concerning the reason why a significant distinction should not be drawn 
between the different species of jurisdiction, they note that one form of jurisdiction is 
a function of the other.^^ Accordingly, Bowett has rightly claimed that, "there can be 
no enforcement jurisdiction unless there is [also] prescriptive jurisdiction".^^ 
In addition, State practice similarly does not draw a rigid distinction between 
the different forms of jurisdiction. When States make diplomatic protests to excessive 
assertions o f jurisdiction performed by another State, they are not protesting to a 
particular form of jurisdiction that was excessive, but instead to the fact that a State 
has exercised power which exceeded its permissible limits. Thus, what matters from 
the perspective of international law is not the underlying prescription o f law, nor that 
it was enforced, but that there was an excessive exercise of State power.^'' As 
Reydams has noted: 
The [Permanent] Court in the Lotus case did not consider whether the Turkish statute on 
which the prosecution was based accords with international law (legislative jurisdiction) or 
whether the Turkish court was competent under international law to hear the case (judicial 
jurisdiction). It confined itself to the question of whether jurisdiction did or did not exist.^' 
Although it has been suggested that the limits which international law imposes 
upon the different species of jurisdiction wi l l not essentially be different from one 
'^ Maier, supra n. 2, at p. 78. 
Brownlie, supra n. 2, at p. 308. 
Bowett, supra n. 2 at p. 1. Despite Bowett himself suggesting, ibid., that, "there may be prescriptive 
jurisdiction without the possibility of an enforcement jurisdiction"; it is to be noted that any enactment 
of rules by a State will carry with it a presumption of future enforcement. See, further, on this point: 
Maier, supra n. 2, at p. 78; and Mann, supra n. 2, at p. 7. Moreover, Akehust, supra n. 2, at pp. 187-8, 
notes that it is permissible for a State to protest as soon as legislation is enacted or even when official 
proposal for such legislation are made. 
Reydams, Universal Jurisdiction: International and Municipal Legal Perspectives, 2003, OUP, at p. 
26. 
^'Ibid 
another,^^ it wi l l be seen below that where such a contention may be true in the 
criminal field of law in that the limits which international law places on prescriptive 
and adjudicative jurisdiction are the same, the different manifestations of State power 
may be governed by separate regimes in the civil field of law.^^ 
The Limits of Extraterritorial Prescriptive Jurisdiction 
The Lotus case and the Requirement of a Sufficiently Close Connection 
Although the Lotus case confirmed that the prescriptive jurisdiction of a State is 
primarily territorial, the Permanent Court recognised that international law does not 
prohibit States, per se, from legislating over extraterritorial matters. The Permanent 
Court emphasised that the competence of States to extend their laws was not 
unlimited when commenting that, "international law [does] place limitations... upon 
jurisdiction";^^ however, the Court did not enter into any discussion concerning the 
precise scope of these jurisdictional limits. Instead, the Court laid down the doctrinal 
framework upon which State jurisdiction is to operate under within international law: 
The first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that- failing the 
existence of a permissive rule to the contrary- it may not exercise its power in any form in the 
territory of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be 
exercised by a State outside its teiritory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from 
international custom or from a convention. 
According to the Permanent Court, States are free to assert jurisdiction, in its three 
different forms, within their own territory unless a prohibitory rule of international 
law prevents them from doing so; and outside of their territory, a jurisdictional claim 
Brownlie, supra n. 2, at p. 308. 
'^ See the discussion infra at n. 112-6. 
1927 PCIJ, Ser. A, No. 10, at 18. A similar statement was made earlier by the Permanent Court in the 
Case of Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco, 1921 PCIJ, Ser. B No. 4, at 23-24, when the Court 
stated that, "jurisdiction... is limited by rules of international law". 
^''Ibid.,at 18-19. 
must be supported by a permissive rule, derived from either custom or convention, 
which allows for the exercise of jurisdiction.^*' 
Great academic attention has long been given to the contentious issue of the 
circumstances in which international law permits a State to prescribe its laws over 
persons, property or events in a foreign jurisdiction.^' The most authoritative work 
written on the doctrine of jurisdiction in international law is provided by Mann's 
Hague Recueil lectures. After reviewing both academic literature and judicial opinion, 
Mann has suggested that international law permits a State to legislate, both 
territorially and extraterritorially, over subject matter that it has a sufficiently close 
connection with.^^ More specifically, and with regard to the instances when a State 
wil l be said to have a sufficiently close connection, Mann has claimed that: 
The conclusion, then, is that a State has legislative jurisdiction if its contact with a given set of 
facts is so close, so substantial, so direct, so weighty, that legislation in respect of them is in 
harmony with international law and its aspects (including the practice of States, the principle 
of non-intervention and reciprocity and the demands of inter-dependence). A merely political, 
economic, commercial or social interest does not in itself constitute a sufficient connection. 
Mann's formulation of when a State may exercise legislative jurisdiction has 
been read with a great degree of academic approval.^'' However, it must be noted that 
'° This dictum of the Court has received widespread academic discussion. A similar reading of the 
Lotus case is made by Maier, supra n. 2, at p. 83; however, Dixon, Textbook on International Law, S**" 
ed., 2005, GUP, at p. 133, has read it as suggesting that the prescriptive jurisdiction of a State is, 
"virtually unlimited by international law, save only that it may have accepted specific international 
obligations limiting its competence... In essence, the jurisdiction to prescribe comprises a generally 
unfettered power to claim jurisdiction over any matter". Both Higgins, supra n. 2, at p. 77, and Lowe, 
supra n. 2, at pp. 334-5, have criticised instances where the Lotus case has been cited as authority for 
the proposition that a State may lawfully exercise extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction unless its 
exercise is prohibited by an international rule. Finally, Cassese {International Law), supra n. 2, at p. 50, 
has read the dictum as suggesting that enforcement jurisdiction "cannot be exercised by a State outside 
its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule". 
" Mann (Revisited), supra n. 2, at p. 27, traces the discussion back to the n " " century. 
Mann, supra n. 2, at pp. 36-37. 
" Ibid., at p. 39. 
See, for example, Mann (Revisited), supra n. 2, p. 28, at ft. 29, listing the academics who have 
approved his findings. Similarly, Brownlie, supra n. 2, at p. 309, claims that, "extraterritorial acts can 
only lawfully be the object of jurisdiction if... [there is] a substantial and bona fide connection between 
the subject matter and the source of jurisdiction". Moreover, Lowe, supra n. 2, at p. 336, states that, 
"the best view is that it is necessary for there to be some clear connecting factor, of a kind whose use is 
approved by international law, between the legislating State and the conduct that it seeks to regulate". 
See, further, the Separate Opinion of Judge Padilla Nervo in the Case Concerning Barcelona Traction, 
Light and Power Co. Ltd. {Belgium v. Spain), ICJ Reports, 1970, p. 3. C/Maier, supra n. 2, at p. 90, 
who very slightly refines Mann's formulation, and states that, "the author's personal inference from a 
survey of sectoral studies, which persuasively reviews contemporary practice, is that international 
customary law makes the legality of extraterritorial jurisdictional claims dependant on the existence of 
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his formulation is one of general application in that it only provides an objective test. 
Indeed, it seems that this may not, in itself, be a criticism since the instances where 
international law permits a State to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction appears to be 
incapable of any precise formulation. Mann himself has recognised that it would be a 
"formidable criticism" i f legislative jurisdiction were to be defined with certainty;^^ 
and that international law could only, "for the time being, offer [a] general 
formulae".^^ Such a view that the limhs on prescriptive jurisdiction are incapable of 
any precise definition is supported by the fact that the law in this area is "still rather 
unsettled [and] is developing"^^ in light of new international concerns. Therefore, it 
appears that any precise formulation that brings certainty to the doctrine may be 
incapable of withstanding the test of time. 
The following discussion wil l consider the limits which international law 
places on a State's extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction in both the criminal and 
civil fields of law. The discussion wil l begin by briefly identifying the criminal bases 
of jurisdiction which custom has recognised as bearing a sufficiently close connection 
between the prescribing State and the impugned conduct. Once having dealt with this 
matter, the discussion wil l then consider the extent to which customary international 
law permits a State to prescribe its civil laws over persons, property or events in a 
foreign jurisdiction. 
The Criminal Bases of Jurisdiction 
International law recognises several bases of criminal jurisdiction whereby the 
prescribing State asserting the applicability of its criminal laws is recognised as 
having a sufficiently close connection over the impugned conduct performed by an 
i n d i v i d u a l . A t present there exists no universal consensus regarding the exact 
number of criminal bases recognised by custom; however. State practice appears to 
an effective and significant connection between the regulating State and the activity in fact to be 
regulated. A connection can be held to be significant when it is perceived as such by the same States in 
international practice. Contrary to pervious theories that focus on factual links... the novelty of this 
approach is that the effectiveness and the significance of a connection are entirely determined in the 
light of State practice in a given area". (Original emphasis). 
" Ibid., at p. 28. 
'"Ibid 
" Brownlie, supra n. 2, at p. 297. 
For an early comprehensive study on criminal jurisdiction see, generally. Harvard Research in 
International Law, "Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime" 29 AJIL 435 (1935). 
have widely accepted five: the territorial principle; the nationality principle; the 
passive personality principle; the protective principle; and the universal principle.^^ 
The first four jurisdictional bases will each be briefly considered in turn before 
a detailed examination is made with regard to the universal principle. In short, the 
universal principle provides that a State may extend its laws over conduct performed 
in a foreign jurisdiction by a non-national against another non-national, and thus its 
examination is of great significance for the concerns of the paper. 
The Territorial Principle 
The territorial principle provides that a State may criminalize conduct which is 
performed within its territory. The territorial principle has an extraterritorial 
dimension in that it encompasses not only conduct where all of the consfituent 
elements of the offence are committed within the territory of the State, but also 
conduct where parts o f the offence are committed extraterritorially.'"^ The 
extraterritorial dimensions of this principle of jurisdiction are expressed in both the 
objective and subjective territorial principles; whereby the objective territorial 
principle provides that a State may exercise prescriptive jurisdiction over offences 
which are completed within its territory, and the subjective territorial principle 
provides that a State may exercise prescriptive jurisdiction over offences which 
commence within its territory. 
The Nationality Principle 
The nationality principle, sometimes referred to as the active personality principle, 
provides that a State may criminalize the conduct performed by one its nationals 
regardless of whether the conduct was performed in a foreign jurisdiction. 
The Passive Personality Principle 
" Three further bases of criminal jurisdiction were identified, after reviewing the literature on this 
matter, by the European Court of Human Rights in Bankovic v. Belgium (2001) 11 B H R C 435, at para. 
59: the diplomatic and consular relations principle; the principle of the flag; and the effects doctrine. 
The Lotus case, 1927 PCIJ, Ser. A No. 10. 
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The passive personality principle provides that a State may criminalize the conduct of 
a non-national who performs an act that is harmful to a national o f the prescribing 
State. Unlike the nationality principle, which focuses on the identity of the alleged 
author of the criminal offence, the concern of the passive personality principle is with 
the identity of the victim. 
The Protective Principle 
The protective principle provides that a State may criminalize the conduct of non-
nationals who commits extraterritorial offences that are recognised as injurious to the 
security or vital interests of the prescribing State. The exact scope of the offences 
which give rise to this type of jurisdiction are uncertain, but those which have been 
generally accepted include: plots to overthrow the government; counterfeiting 
currency; and illegal immigration. 
The Universal Principle 
The Definition of Universal Jurisdiction 
The Dissenting Opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert in the Arrest Warrant case stated 
that: 
There is no generally accepted definition of universal jurisdiction in conventional or 
customary international law... Much has been written in legal doctrine about universal 
jurisdiction. Many views exist as to its legal meaning.'" 
Despite this judicial statement to the contrary, it is suggested that the universal 
principle provides that a State may criminalize certain conduct performed in a foreign 
jurisdiction committed by a non-national against another non-national where the 
conduct is regarded as particularly heinous and destructive to the legal order as a 
whole.''^ This principle of jurisdiction is concerned exclusively with the nature of the 
At paras. 44-45. 
On the universal principle see generally: Akehurst, supra n. 2, at pp. 160-166; Bowett, supra n. 2, at 
pp. 11-14; Brownlie, supra n. 2, at pp. 303-5; Cassese {International Law), supra n. 2, at pp. 451-52; 
Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2003, OUP, at pp. 284-295, [hereinafter referred to as Cassese 
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conduct, and is well defined by Principle 1(1) of the Princeton Principles of Universal 
Jurisdiction: 
Universal jurisdiction is criminal jurisdiction based solely on the nature of the crime, without 
regard to where the crime was committed, the nationality of the alleged or convicted 
perpetrator, the nationality of the victim, or any other connection to the State exercising such 
jurisdiction. 
Universal Jurisdiction in absentia 
Having thus established that international law permits a State to exercise 
extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction over certain conduct which is deemed as 
particularly abhorrent under the universal principle, next comes the issue of 
establishing the circumstances in which international law permits a State to judicially 
enforce the criminalized conduct. A contentious issue surrounding international law at 
present is whether it is a requirement that the alleged offender be present in the 
territory of the prosecuting State before it may exercise a claim of universal 
adjudicative jurisdiction over him, or whether the presence of the alleged offender is 
not a requirement and that domestic courts may exercise universal jurisdiction in 
absentia. The Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal 
in the Arrest Warrant case commented that, "considerable confusion surrounds this 
topic";'''' and this confusion has been noted further by the International Law 
Association in its Final Report on the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction in Respect of 
Gross Human Rights Offences: 
(International Criminal Lcnv)]; Higgins, supra n. 2, at pp. 56-65; Inazumi, Universal Jurisdiction in 
Modern International Law, 2005, Intersentia; Jennings, supra n. 2, at p. 156; Lowe, supra n. 2, at pp. 
348-9; Macedo, (eds.). Universal Jurisdiction, 2004, University of Pennsylvania Press; Mann, supra n. 
2, at pp. 80-81; O'Keefe, stdpra n. 16; Randall, "Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law" 66 
Tex L Rev 785 (1988); Reydams, supra n. 24; Shaw, supra n. 2, at pp. 592-604. 
Princeton Principles of Universal Jurisdiction, Princeton, 2001. [Hereinafter referred to as the 
Princeton Principles]. 
At para. 54. 
14 
The only connection between the crime and the prosecuting State that may be required is the 
physical presence of the alleged offender within the territory of that State/' 
The contentious issue of universal jurisdiction in absentia was recently 
brought before the International Court of Justice''^ in the Arrest Warrant case/^ The 
facts of the case arose out of an investigating judge in Belgium issuing an 
international arrest warrant in absentia against Mr. Yerodia charging him, firstly, with 
offences constituting grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions 1949 and its 
Additional Protocols, and, secondly, with crimes against humanity. The international 
arrest warrant issued by Belgium was based upon a 1993 Belgian law, as amended in 
1999, which had been adopted to implement the Geneva Conventions into domestic 
law.'*^ Article 7 of the Belgian law provided that, "the Belgian courts shall have 
jurisdiction in respect of the offences provided in the present law, wheresoever they 
may have been committed"."*^ At the time when the arrest warrant was issued, Mr. 
Yerodia, a Congolese national, was the incumbent Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 
Congo. 
The Democratic Republic of Congo brought an application before the 
International Court on two legal grounds. It claimed, firstly, that the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction in absentia by Belgium had violated the principle of sovereign 
equality in that no State may exercise its authority in the territory of another State. 
Secondly, it claimed that the non-recognition of the immunity of an incumbent 
International Law Association, "Final Report on the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction in Respect of 
Gross Human Rights Offences", in Report of the 69* Conference of the International Law Association, 
London, (2000), 403, at p. 404. (Emphasis added). [Hereinafter referred to as ILA Report on Universal 
Jurisdiction]. 
Hereinafter referred to as either the International Court or the ICJ. 
Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of II April 2000 {Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium), 
ICJ Report, 2002, p. 3. For a case comment see: Cassese, "When may Senior State Officials be Tried 
for International Crimes? Some Comments on the Congo v. Belgium case" (2002) 13 EJIL 853, 
[hereinafter referred to as Cassese (Senior State Officials)]; Orakhelashvili, "Arrest Warrant of 11 
April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium)" 96 AJIL 677 (2002); Wickremasinghe, 
"Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 {Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium), Preliminary Objections 
and Merits, Judgement of 14 February 2002" [2003] ICLQ 775; Wirth, "Immunity for Core Crimes? 
The ICJ's Judgement in the Congo v. Belgium case" (2002) 13 E J I L 877; and Wouters, "The 
Judgement of the International Court of Justice in the Arrest Warrant case: Some Critical Remarks" 
(2003) 16 Leiden Journal of International Law 253. 
Loi Relative a la Repression des Violations Grave du droit International Humanitaire, Montieur 
Beige 23 March 1999. For a comment see Ratner, "Belgium's War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem" 97 
AJIL 888 (2003). An English translation of the Belgian law is published in (1999) 38 I L M 918. 
In addition. Article 5(3) of the Belgian law further provided that, "immunity attaching to the official 
capacity of a person shall not prevent the application of the present law". 
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Foreign Affairs Minister was contrary to customary international law. The 
Democratic Republic of Congo subsequently abandoned its first argument in its 
memorial and final oral proceedings. Consequently, the Court decided that it could no 
longer rule on the issue of whether it is a precondition for the assertion of universal 
jurisdiction that the accused be within the territory of the State.^° Although the Court 
gave no consideration to universal jurisdiction in its judgement, several judges, 
however, deemed that it was necessary to do so in their Separate and Dissenting 
Opinions. 
Of those Judges which commented on the Belgian court issuing an arrest 
warrant in absentia, all found that international law did not impose the precondition 
that the alleged offender be present in the territory of the prosecuting State before it 
exercise an adjudicative claim under the universal principle.^' The Joint Separate 
Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal used the term "universal 
jurisdiction properly so called" when referring to universal jurisdiction in absentiaf'^ 
and President Guillaume described it as the "true" form of universal jurisdiction in his 
Separate Opinion.^^ 
Having concluded that the presence of the alleged offender is not a 
requirement for an exercise of universal adjudicative jurisdiction, the Judges 
continued and found that, "universal jurisdiction in absentia is unknown to 
international conventional law".^ "* Conventions which are based on the aut dedere aut 
judicare principle provide that a State is under an obligation to arrest an individual 
found within its territory alleged to have committed the conduct criminalized by the 
convention and then either prosecute or extradite the individual. Such conventions, by 
definition, envisage the presence of the suspect within the territory of the State,^ ^ and 
none of them have, "contemplated establishing jurisdiction over offences committed 
abroad by foreigners against foreigners when the perpetrator is not present in the 
The Court thus based it decision entirely on the question of immunity. This aspect of the judgement 
is considered in detail in the chapter 3 at n. 46-51. 
'^ See the Separate Opinion of President Guillaume; the Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, 
Kooijmans and Buergenthal; the Separate Opinion of Judge Koroma; the Separate Opinion of Judge 
Rezek; the Separate Opinion of Judge Ranjeva; and the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Van den 
Wyngaert. 
" At para. 45. 
" At para. 12. 
The Separate Opinion of President Guillaume, at para. 9. A similar comment is made by the Joint 
Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, at para. 41. 
" The Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, at para. 57. 
territory of the State in question".^^ The Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, 
Kooijmans and Buergenthal commented that as a result of a "loose use of language" 
conventions based on the aut dedere aut judicare principle had come to be referred to 
as universal jurisdiction^^ when, more accurately, the obligations they impose should 
be described as, "a duty to establish a territorial jurisdiction over persons for 
exterritorial events".^^ In contrast, President Guillaume described such conventions as 
establishing subsidiary universal jurisdiction.'^ 
The Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, 
similar to the other Separate and Dissenting Opinions in the Arrest Warrant case, 
specifically held that there is no rule of international law which makes illegal 
universal jurisdiction in absentia.^^ Recent State practice has endorsed this finding 
that universal jurisdiction in absentia is not precluded by international law made in 
the Arrest Warrant case. The decision of the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal in the 
Guatemalan Genocide case, '^ which overturned the decision of the Spanish Supreme 
Tribunal,^^ recently held that universal jurisdiction in absentia could be exercised 
over alleged acts of genocide perpetrated by individuals residing in Guatemala. 
Moreover, the Belgian Court of Cassation in H.S.A. et al v. S.A.,^^ rejected the 
findings made by the Appeal Court and held that it is not a requirement for the 
initiation of criminal proceedings under the universal principle that the accused be 
present in the forum State. Finally, academic opinion has similarly suggested that 
States may lawfially exercise universal jurisdiction in absentia^^ 
The Separate Opinion of President Guiliaume, at para. 9. See, further, the similar comment made at 
para. 12. 
" At para. 41. 
Ibid., at para. 42. 
'^ At para. 7. 
At para. 58. However, any exercise of such jurisdiction may raise issues under general human rights 
law where fair trials standards are not guaranteed. The Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, 
Kooijmans and Buergenthal, at para. 56, commented that, "if it is said that a person must be within the 
jurisdiction at the time of the trial itself, that may be a prudent guarantee for the right to a fair trial but 
has little to do with bases of jurisdiction recognised under international law". 
(2005) Judgement No. STC 237/2005. For a case comment see: Ascensio, "The Spanish 
Constitutional Tribunal's Decision in Guatemalan Generals" (2006) 4 JICJ 586; and Roht-Arriaza, 
''Guatemalan Genocide case" 100 AJIL 207 (2006). 
" (2003) 42 ILM 683. For a comment on the Supreme Tribunal's decision see, Ascensio, "Are Spanish 
Courts Backing Down to Universality? The Supreme Tribunal's Decision in Guatemalan Generals" 
(2003) 1 JICJ 690. 
" 12* February 2003, No. P.02.1I39.F. For a case comment see, Cassese, "The Belgian Court of 
Cassation v. The International Court of Justice: The Sharon and others case" (2003) 1 JICJ 437. 
^ Bowett, supra n. 2, at p. I I ; Cassese (Senior State Officials), supra n. 47, at p. 857; Higgins, supra n. 
2, at pp. 58 and 64; Shaw, supra n. 2, at pp. 592-593 and 597-599. Similarly, Principle 13 of the 
Brussels Principles Against Impunity and for International Justice states that, "[Universal] jurisdiction 
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Offences which are Subject to Universal Criminal Jurisdiction 
The universal principle allows each and every State to exercise jurisdiction over 
certain abhorrent offences regardless of where the conduct was committed or the 
nationality of the victim or perpetrator. By virtue of their very nature, the number of 
offences that are regarded as particularly destructive to the legal order wi l l be very 
few.^^ As has already been mention above, the Separate and Dissenting Opinions in 
the Arrest Warrant case found that universal jurisdiction is unknown to conventional 
international law and thus offences which are subject to universal jurisdiction wil l 
only be recognised by custom.^*' 
It is widely accepted that customary international law has for many centuries 
recognised universal jurisdiction over the crime of piracy.^^ The recognition that all 
States have competence to apprehend pirates on the high seas and prosecute them for 
their acts is based upon two rationales. Firstly, since the offence of piracy can only be 
committed on the high seas, pirates fall outside the ambit of other principles of 
jurisdiction and therefore evade being brought to justice. Secondly, the nature of the 
crime is regarded as particularly serious, and a pirate is recognised as a hostis humani 
generis by all States. 
In addition to piracy, it is also widely accepted that customary international 
law recognises universal jurisdiction over war crimes.^^ In the aftermath of the 
Second World War, national courts of the Allied States prosecuted war crimes 
alongside the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo. Several of 
the domestic trials conducted by the Allied States were based upon the universal 
is exercisable...regardless of whether or not the presumed author is present on the territory of the 
forum State, cyinazumi, supra n. 42, at p. 27, who maintains throughout her monograph on universal 
jurisdiction that, "the concept of universal jurisdiction has long been understood in association with the 
presence of a suspect [in the prosecuting State]". 
Mann, supra n. 2, at p. 81. 
" See particularly the Separate Opinion of President Guillaume, at para. 9. 
" Re Piracy Jure Gentium [1934] A C 586; the Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, 
and Buergenthal, at para. 61; the Separate Opinion of President Guillaume, at paras. 5 and 12; 
Princeton Principle 2(1); The Third Restatement of the Law: Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States, 8 404. [Hereinafter referred to as the Third Restatement]. See further: Higgins, supra n. 2, at p. 
58; Lowe, supra n. 2, at p. 348; Shaw, supra n. 2, at pp. 593-4. Cf Cassese (Senior State Officials), 
supra n. 47, at pp. 857-858. 
The Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal, at para. 60. See further, 
the I L A Report on Universal Jurisdiction, supra n. 45, at pp. 408-9; Princeton Principle 2(1); (; 404 of 
the Third Restatement. Cf the Separate Opinion of President Guillaume who held, at para. 5, that, 
"customary international law... [only] recognises one case of universal jurisdiction, that of piracy". 
principle of jurisdiction in instances where reliance could not be placed upon other 
jurisdictional ground.^^ Inazumi has rightly commented that because these trials were 
conducted after an extraordinary event, they cannot, in themselves, be regarded as 
conclusive on whether customary international law recognises war crimes to be 
subject to universal jurisdiction.^" However, since these post-war trials, judicial 
precedents have been set by the decisions of Eichmann'^ and Demjanjuk'^ where it 
was held in both cases that customary international law recognises war crimes to be 
subject to universal jurisdiction. In addition, a strong consensus o f academic opinion 
supports this conclusion." 
Beyond the offences of piracy and war crimes, both State practice and opinio 
juris is highly ambiguous as to whether other crimes, i f any at all, are subject to 
universal jurisdiction. 
In the Arrest Warrant case. President Guillaume was of the belief that i f 
customary international law were to recognise universal jurisdiction for offences other 
than piracy this would: 
Risk creating total judicial chaos. It would also be to encourage the arbitrary for the benefit of 
the powerful, purportedly acting as agents for an ill-defined 'international community'. 
Contrary to what is advocated by certain publicists, such a development would represent not 
an advance in the law but a step backwards. 
On this basis he held that the international arrest warrant issued in absentia by the 
Belgian court against Mr. Yerodia charging him with grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions and crimes against humanity found no jurisdictional basis in customary 
international law and was thus illegal.^^ 
See Randall, supra n. 42, at pp. 807-810, who considers several cases in detail where the prosecuting 
State assumed jurisdiction under the universal principle. See, further, on this State practice, Bianchi, 
"Immunity versus Human Rights: The Pinochet case" (1999) 10 EJIL 237, at pp. 251-2. Cf IncEumi, 
supra n. 42, at pp. 55-57. 
'° Ibid., at p. 57. 
Attorney General of the Government of Israel v. Eichmann (1962) 36 ILR 277. 
Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (1985). 
" Akehurst, supra n. 2, at p. 160; Baxter, "The Municipal and International Law Basis of Jurisdiction 
over War Crimes" (1951) 28 B Y I L 382; Bowett, supra n. 2, at p. 12; Cowles, "Universality of 
Jurisdiction over War Crimes" 33 California LR 177 (1945); Higgins, supra n. 2, at p. 59; Lowe, supra 
n. 2, at p. 348; Mann, supra n. 2, at p. 81; Randall, supra n. 42, at pp. 800-815; Shaw, supra n. 2, at pp. 
594-597. 
At para. 15. 
" Ibid, at para. 17. Both the Separate Opinion of Judge Rezek and the Separate Opinion of Judge 
Ranjeva arrived at the same conclusion. 
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The Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal 
found that it was undeniable, after reviewing both national legislation and case law, 
that there was no State practice demonstrating an exercise of universal jurisdiction 
properly so called. However, they held that this lack of State practice on the exercise 
of universal jurisdiction was neutral since a State is not required to legislate up to the 
full scope of jurisdiction permitted by international law, and there was no opinio juris 
suggesting the illegality of such jurisdiction." The Joint Separate Opinion then 
reviewed the customary limits of jurisdiction and found that: 
The only prohibitive rule (repeated by the Permanent Court in the Lotus case) is that criminal 
jurisdiction should not be exercised, without permission, within the territory of another 
State.'' 
From this they held that because the Belgian arrest warrant envisaged the arrest of Mr. 
Yerodia in Belgium, or the possibility of his arrest in a third State at the discretion of 
the State concerned, it violated no existing prohibitory rule of customary international 
law.^^ In addition, the Joint Separate Opinion held that universal criminal jurisdiction 
could be exercised over the most heinous crimes,^'' and that crimes against humanity 
fell within this small category of offences.^' Accordingly, the international arrest 
warrant issued in absentia against Mr. Yerodia was not an exercise of universal 
jurisdiction that was precluded by international law.^^ 
The Joint Separate Opinion, however, stressed that i f a State were to exercise 
universal criminal jurisdiction in absentia, then it would have to do so subject to a 
number of conditions that were designed to prevent abuse and not jeopardize the 
stable relations between States.*^ The safeguards specified by the Joint Separate 
Opinion include: that immunities from jurisdiction be respected; that the prosecuting 
State offer the national State of the accused the opportunity to prosecute the 
At para. 45. 
" Ibid. CyReydams, supra n. 24, at p. 230, who finds State practice to be not all that neutral. 
Ibid., at para. 54. 
''Ibid 
'" Ibid, at para. 60. 
Ibid., at paras. 61-5. 
Ibid., at para. 65. The Dissenting Opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert, at para. 58, similarly held that 
neither conventional nor customary international law prohibited the exercise of universal jurisdiction in 
absentia over crimes against humanity. 
" Ibid., at para. 59. 
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individual first; that charges be brought by fully independent prosecutors; and that 
jurisdiction only be exercised over the most heinous crimes.^ "* 
One commentator has suggested that: 
It is one of the big questions which to date remains unresolved whether universal jurisdiction 
exists for all offences which the international community has taken to calling 'international 
crimes'. 
Following the Arrest Warrant case, the divided views amongst the Separate and 
Dissenting Opinions concerning which offences are subject to universal criminal 
jurisdiction still leaves this matter formally unresolved. Although a majority of the 
Judges who commented on the issue were of the opinion that the universal principle 
has expanded beyond the traditional offences of piracy and war crimes to cover 
international crimes,^^ there existed a sizable minority suggesting otherwise.^^ 
International crimes are, by definition, conduct made criminal by customary 
international law. As such, the criminalized offence exists in the international legal 
system, and an individual accused of such a crime may be prosecuted before a 
competent international t r i b u n a l . I f a State wishes to domestically prosecute an 
individual for such an offence then it necessary that it prescribe this conduct, whose 
definition already exists internationally, as criminal within its legal system.^^ It is 
Ibid., at paras. 59-60. These findings of the Joint Separate Opinion have been welcomed by Cassese 
(Senior State Officials), supra n. 47, at p. 857. 
Tomuschat, supra n. 11, at p. 275. 
The Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, at para. 59; the Separate 
Opinion of Judge Koroma, at para. 9; and the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert, at para. 
67. A large number of academics have similarly advanced the suggestion that universal jurisdiction 
exists over international crimes: Aceves, "Liberalism and International Legal Scholarship: The 
Pinochet case and the move towards a Universal System of Transnational Law Litigation" 41 Harv 
Int'l L J 129 (2000), at p. 165; Bassiouni, "Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes" V J I L 1114 
(2001); Brownlie, supra n. 2, at pp. 303-305; George, "Defining Fildrtiga: Characterising International 
Torture Claims in United States Courts" 3 Dick J Int'l L I (1984), at p. 26; Kobruk, "The ex post facto 
Prohibition and the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction Over International Crimes" 87 Columbia L R 
1515 (1987); Randall, supra n. 42, at pp. 829-831; Van Alebeek, "The Pinochet Case: International 
Human Rights Law on Trial" [2000] 71 B Y I L 29, at pp. 33-35. See also the judgement of Lord Millet 
in R. V. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte {No 3) [1999] 2 
WLR 825, at 911. 
" The Separate Opinion of President Guillaume, at para. 16; the Separate Opinion of Judge Rezek, at 
para. 10; the Separate Opinion of Judge Ranjeva, at para. 12. 
See further on this point, Warbrick, Salgado and Goodwin, "The Pinochet cases in the United 
Kingdom" (1999) 2 Y B Int' 1 Hum L 91, at p. 107. 
" See, further, on this point, Kress, "Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes and the Institut 
de Droit International" (2006) 4 JICJ 561, at p. 564. One possible exception to this noted by Warbrick 
et al, ibid., is where customary international law is incorporated directly into domestic law. 
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therefore suggested that, as a legal concept, international crimes say nothing about 
whether a States wi l l be permitted to criminalize this conduct on a universal basis: 
The criminalization of certain conduct under international law does not necessarily coincide 
with the existence of a right of States to universal jurisdiction; the latter must still be proven 
with respect to each crime under international law concerned... It is [therefore] possible to 
conceive of crimes under international law which are not covered by the universality 
principle.™ 
It is suggested, however, that offences deemed by customary international law 
as international crimes do in fact have some relevance with regard to the universal 
principle. As has already been mentioned above, one of the definitional requirements 
of the universal principle is that jurisdiction may only be exercised over conduct 
recognised as particularly heinous and destructive to legal order as a whole. 
Accordingly, whether customary international law recognises the severity of certain 
conduct as warranting it to be recognised as an international crime may therefore be 
of relevance when determining whether customary international law recognises such 
conduct to be subject to universal jurisdiction.^' The better view on whether 
international crimes are subject to universal jurisdiction may therefore be that of Lord 
Slynn in Pinochet (No 1): 
It does not seem... that it has been shown that there is any State practice or general 
consensus... that all crimes against international law should be justiciable in national courts 
on the basis of the universality of jurisdiction... The fact even that an act is recognised as a 
crime under international law does not mean that the courts of all States have jurisdiction to 
try it... there is no universality of Jurisdiction for crimes against international law.'^ 
The Limits of Prescriptive Civil Jurisdiction 
'° Kress,/Wrf., at pp. 572-3. 
" Cf the Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, at para. 58, who 
comment that, "the underlying purpose of designating certain acts as international crimes is to authorise 
a wide jurisdiction to be asserted over persons committing them". See, further, the similar argument 
presented infra at n. 236-50 with regard to whether violation of a jus cogens norm gives rise to 
universal jurisdiction. 
R. V. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte {No. J) [1998] 3 
WLR 1456. This obiter comment has been read with approval by President Guillaume, at para. 12, in 
his Separate Opinion. 
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At present great uncertainty surrounds the extent to which international law permits a 
State to extend its civil laws over matters occurring in a foreign jurisdiction. Indeed, 
one reason why such uncertainty exists may be because of a lack of diplomatic 
protests to exercises of extraterritorial civil jurisdiction when compared to that of 
criminal jurisdiction.^^ Another reason for this uncertainty is that most of the doctrinal 
attention given to jurisdiction has tended to focus on criminal rather than civil law, 
and this trend is noticeably reflected in the academic literature written on the topic. 
However, the leading works on jurisdiction written by Akehurst and Mann provide a 
significant exception to this trend;^ "* yet despite their detailed considerations regarding 
the limits which international law imposes on a State when exercising prescriptive 
civil jurisdiction, the matter still remains largely unresolved since each scholar 
reaches a different conclusion to the other. 
The Requirement of a Sufficiently Close Connection 
Brownlie has noted that international law does not draw a major distinction between 
the principles that limit extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction in the different fields of 
law.^^ In all instances, a State must keep within the jurisdictional limits imposed by 
international law i f the exercise of jurisdiction is to be lawful. Thus, he is of the 
opinion that, "the exercise of civil jurisdiction...presents essentially the same 
problems as the exercise of criminal jurisdiction".'* 
It wi l l be recalled that Mann has suggested that international law only permits 
a State to exercise jurisdictional competence in instances where it has a sufficiently 
close connection with the subject mat te r .This formulation proposed by Mann has 
Shaw, supra n. 2, at pp. 578-9. Note, however, the strong protests by European States to the 
extraterritorial application of anti-trust law, which is partly civil, by the United States. See, further, on 
this point: Lowe, "Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The British Protection of Trading Interests Act 
1980" 75 AJIL 256 (1981); and Lowe, "US Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The Helms Burton and 
D'Amato Acts" [1997] 46 ICLQ 378. 
Mann, supra n. 2, at pp. 60-69; Mann (Revisited), supra n. 2, at pp. 67-77; Akehurst, supra n. 2, at 
pp. 179-187. Other work found to discuss civil jurisdiction includes: Bowett, supra n. 2, at pp. 1-4; 
Brownlie, supra n. 2, at p. 298; Shaw, supra n. 2, at p. 578-9; and George, supra n. 67, at pp. 18-21. 
However, this latter work is too generalised and any discussion on civil jurisdiction often makes no 
clear distinction between prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction. Surprisingly, not a single author in 
Scott's collected essays in Torture as Tort: Comparative Perspectives on the Development of 
Transnational Human Right Litigation, 2001, Hart Publishing, gave any consideration to the 
international limits of prescriptive civil jurisdiction. 
Supra n. 2, at p. 308. 
''Ibid 
" See the discussion supra at n. 32-37. 
23 
been claimed to be one of general application. Accordingly, and regardless of the field 
of law, the same question of whether there exists a sufficiently close connection 
between the State and the subject matter that it seeks to regulate is applicable in all 
instances when assessing the legality of a State's exercise of prescriptive 
jurisdicfion.^^ 
I f Mann's formulation that there must be a sufficiently close connection 
between the State and the subject matter that it seeks to regulate is correct;^^ then the 
conclusion thus follows that international law must impose some limits on a State 
when exercising legislative civil jurisdiction in the same way it does with criminal 
jurisdiction. Indeed, such a conclusion is consistent with the principles derived from 
the sovereign equality of states doctrine which still underpins modern international 
law. 
Defining the Limits International Law Imposes on Prescriptive Civil Jurisdiction 
Having suggested that international law does impose limitations on a State when 
exercising prescriptive civil jurisdiction i f it is to pay due respect to the sovereignty of 
States, next comes the issue of defining the precise contours of these jurisdictional 
limits. It is this issue where the opposing schools of thought are encountered in the 
academic literature. 
Some academics have advanced the view that international law draws no 
distinction between the regulation of criminal and civil jurisdiction; and as a result of 
this view, they have, therefore, suggested that the clearly defined customary bases of 
criminal jurisdiction apply equally to civil jurisdiction.'"^ Reydams has claimed that: 
It should be... that what applies for criminal jurisdiction applies to some extent mutatis 
mutandis for civil jurisdiction, because the latter is considered less intrusive. The presumption 
is that if universal criminal jurisdiction is permissible under international law, [then] universal 
civil jurisdiction is also permissible (qui peut le plus puet le mains, the greater includes the 
lesser)."" 
Mann (Revisited), supra n. 2, at p. 29. 
^ See, the commentary supra at ft. 34 citing the great academic and judicial support that this 
formulation has received. 
'°° Strictly speaking, the two academics that advance this view refer to the concept of jurisdiction 
generally and make no distinction between its different forms. Therefore, it is assumed that their 
argument is made in relation to both prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction. 
Reydams, supra n. 24, at pp. 2-3. 
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While it cannot be denied that civil jurisdiction is considered to be less intrusive than 
its criminal c o u n t e r p a r t , i t is submitted that this statement cannot, in itself, be 
treated as a principle of international law. Criminal and civil law are entirely separate 
bodies of law and are founded upon different rationales. International law has 
recognised this distinction between the two and found that what applies to the 
criminal law wi l l not automatically apply to the civil law. One example of this may be 
provided by the rules governing State immunity where the scope of immunity from 
criminal jurisdiction is not the same as the scope of immunity from civil jurisdiction. 
I f the greater infringement to sovereignty includes the lesser were a principle of 
international law, as Reydams indeed suggests, then it would thus follow that the 
scope of criminal immunity would apply to civil immunity. This however is simply 
not the case. 
The same opinion that, "the scope of jurisdiction in civil matters is 
coterminous with criminal jurisdiction" is taken by D i x o n . I n his work, Dixon 
draws the conclusion that: 
The better view is that the heads of jurisdiction... can apply equally to civil and criminal 
matters.'"^ 
What is significant to note about Dixon's conclusion is that it appears to be 
inconsistent with other statements that he makes when discussing civil jurisdiction. 
He comments that: 
There is an argument that civil jurisdiction should depend on some sort of real and direct link 
between the State asserting jurisdiction and the substance of the civil proceedings, but there is 
little convincing authority to support this.'"' 
I f there is, as he states, "little convincing authority" to support the view that there 
should be a substantial connection between the State and the subject matter in civil 
proceedings, then how can the criminal heads of jurisdiction, which are said to be 
based upon a substantial connection between the State and the subject matter. 
'"^  See Reydams' own detailed argument for drawing this conclusion, ibid., p. 3, at ft. 14; and, further, 
Shaw, si4pra n. 2, at pp. 578-9. 
Supra n. 30, at p. 134. 
'°Ubid.,atp. 135. 
Ibid.,aXpp. 134-5. 
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therefore be said to apply to civil jurisdiction? Surely, i f the argument that there is no 
requirement that there should be a substantial connection in civil jurisdiction were 
correct, then logic would dictate that the criminal heads of jurisdiction should not 
apply to civil jurisdiction. 
It is therefore submitted that the academic suggestions claiming that the 
customary bases of criminal jurisdiction are also the limits which international law 
places on civil jurisdiction must be called into question. Not only is Dixon's work 
self-contradicting, but his opinion that there is no jurisdictional requirement of a 
substantial connection between a State and the subject matter in civil law runs counter 
to the above discussion which suggests that there is such a requirement. Moreover, 
both works advancing these views are largely underdeveloped since they make no 
reference to State practice nor other academic opinion in support of their 
conclusions.'"^ 
Mann's work draws two conclusions when discussing the limits that 
international law imposes on legislative civil jurisdiction, one of which, significantly, 
would clearly reject the view that the bases of jurisdiction apply equally to both 
criminal and civil law. As already noted, Mann has suggested that the same overriding 
question of whether there exists a substantial connection between the State and the 
subject matter is applicable in the different fields of law. When considering the 
jurisdictional limits in each of the different fields, he notes that: 
The process of weighing [the interests will not] be the same in each field of law. Thus 
criminal law, civil procedure, taxation and bankruptcy, nationality or restrictive practices each 
involve and demand the consideration of different aspects. In each case the overriding 
question is: does there exist a close connection to justify, or make it reasonable for, a State to 
exercise legislative jurisdiction? We know that in certain field other than the conflicts of laws 
such rules have been developed. Criminal law is perhaps the most prominent example where 
one speaks of the theory of universality or the objective principle and so forth. Perhaps in the 
course of time similar rules applicable to other fields will emerge."" 
""^  Reydams' monograph on universal jurisdiction was a detailed study concerned solely with criminal 
law, and dealt with civil law in just one paragraph. Strangely, Redyams, si4pra n. 24, p. 3, at ft. 15, cites 
Akehurst's leading work on the doctrine of jurisdiction, and recognises that Akehurst himself would 
reject the conclusion which he drew. 
Mann (Revisited), supra n. 2, at p. 29. Similarly, Maier, supra n. 2, at p. 76, has suggested that the 
"jurisdictional issues deeply diverge from one another depending on the particular field in which they 
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Therefore, according to Mann, the jurisdictional limits imposed by international law 
on a State's legislative jurisdiction are not the same in the different fields of law since 
each field weighs different interests. 
The second conclusion that may be drawn form Mann's work on civil 
jurisdiction relates to the precise boundaries that international law imposes. Clearly, 
Mann is of the belief that jurisdictional limits do exist when stating that the exercise 
of prescriptive civil jurisdiction by a State, "cannot claim international validity except 
and in so far as it keeps within the limits which public international law imposes"."^^ 
Indeed, such an opinion is consistent with his sufficiently close connection formula. 
When Mann turns to the issue of defining the jurisdictional limits imposed on a State 
wishing to extend its civil laws, he notes, as the passage cited above suggests, that 
they are insufficiently developed unlike their criminal counterparts and are, therefore, 
incapable of being clearly defined. 
Despite recognising that these limits which international law imposes on 
prescriptive civil jurisdiction are insufficiently developed, Mann makes a few general 
observations on the matter. He finds that the jurisdictional limits governing civil law 
are more strongly influenced by the principle o f State sovereignty than any other field 
of law.'°^ The reason he suggests that these jurisdictional limits have remained more 
firmly rooted in territoriality than other branches of the law is because a greater 
degree o f certainty and foreseeability is required by civil jurisdiction."° Although 
noting that the territorial doctrine of jurisdiction has been strongly criticised as being 
incapable of meeting the demands of modern international law, Mann recognises that 
the relaxation o f the territorial doctrine that has occurred in other fields may certainly 
occur in the field of civil law. However, and after making a comparative survey of 
civil jurisdiction, he concludes that civil law does not require the same degree of 
flexibility that others do. '" 
In conclusion, what may be deduced from Mann's work on civil jurisdiction is 
that there must be a sufficiently close connection between the State and the subject 
matter that it seeks to regulate. The instances when it may be said that a State has a 
sufficiently close connection with the subject matter are insufficiently developed by 
Mann, supra n. 2, at p. 61. 
Ibid., p. 62; Mann (Revisited), supra n. 2, at p. 67. 
''"Ibid. 
'''Ibid. 
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customary international law; however, these jurisdictional bases are more firmly 
rooted in the territorial principle than other fields of law. 
Defining the Limits of Prescriptive Civil Jurisdiction by Regarding Jurisdiction as a 
Unitary Concept 
It has already been suggested above that an overly rigid distinction between the 
different forms of jurisdiction should not be drawn, and that jurisdiction ought to be 
more properly regarded as a unitary concept."^ In the criminal field of law, it is 
widely accepted that the limits which customary international law imposes on 
prescriptive jurisdiction are the same which it imposes on adjudicative jurisdiction."^ 
Accordingly, courts wi l l be permitted to take jurisdiction over matters in so far as the 
State has legislated for them. However, asking whether international law imposes the 
same limits on prescriptive civil jurisdiction as it does on adjudicative civil 
jurisdiction produces different academic conclusions. 
Throughout his work on the doctrine of civil jurisdiction, Mann often overlaps 
his discussion of prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction thereby suggesting that the 
concept of civil jurisdiction should similarly be regarded as a unitary phenomenon. 
Furthermore, when discussing civil jurisdiction he, significantly, comments that: 
The international jurisdiction to adjudicate is... not a separate type of jurisdiction, but merely 
an emanation of the international jurisdiction to legislate: a State's right of regulation is 
exercised by legislative jurisdiction which includes adjudication. It follows that both aspects 
of jurisdiction are co-extensive."'' 
Although he does not explicitly state the point in his work, i f one specie of 
jurisdiction is an emanation of the other, then it thus follows that the limits which 
international law imposes on adjudicative civil jurisdiction are the same limits which 
it imposes on prescriptive civil jurisdiction. 
A contrary conclusion is, however, drawn by Akehurst. Akehurst finds that in 
civil law, "a State may legislate for cases which fall beyond the jurisdiction of its 
See the discussion supra at n. 21-25. 
See, for example, Akehurst, supra n. 2, at p. 179. 
"'' Mann (Revisited), supra n. 2, at p. 67. A similar comment was made by Mann, supra n. 2, at p. 61, 
in his earlier work on civil jurisdiction: "A judgement, viz. a command conveyed through the courts, is 
not essentially different from a command expressed by legislative or administrative action". 
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courts"."^ Accordingly, he thus submits that, "legislative and judicial jurisdiction do 
not necessary coincide" in civil law."^ 
As a result of these conflicting views, the issue of whether the limits that 
international law imposes on a State's adjudicative civil jurisdiction are the same 
limits that it imposes on prescriptive civil jurisdiction remains unresolved. Moreover, 
even i f it could be concluded that customary international law did in fact impose the 
same limits on the different forms of civil jurisdiction, next would come the difficult 
task of determining the customary limits of adjudicate civil jurisdiction. 
State Practice: International Law Imposes no Limits on Prescriptive CivilJurisdiction 
Akehurst's work on the limits which international law places on the legislative civil 
jurisdiction of a State reaches a different conclusion to that drawn by Mann."^ 
Akehurst begins his analysis by citing Mann's argument that a State may only 
legislate over persons, property or events that it has a sufficiently close connection 
with."^ He continues by finding that Mann's view is rejected by some academics who 
maintain that international law imposes no limits on the legislative jurisdiction of a 
State over private law relationships."^ Akehurst then cites a number of domestic 
decisions which demonstrate States applying their civil law to disputes where there 
was no real connection between the facts of the case and the forum where the dispute 
was h e a r d . I n light of this State practice he concludes that: 
These cases in which the lex fori is applied to facts which have little or no real connection 
with the State of the forum may not be very frequent or desirable, but they are too numerous 
to be disregarded. They are certainly far more numerous than the very rare instances of other 
States protesting against the application of the lex fori. The overwhelming preponderance of 
the relevant State practice therefore suggest that there are no rules of international law limiting 
the legislative jurisdiction over States in questions of what might loosely be described as 
'private law'. ™ 
Akehurst, supra n. 2, at p. 179. 
'''Ibid 
'" Ibid.,atpp. 181-7. 
''^ Ibid., at p. 182. 
Ibid. In this regard he cites, Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1949), at 
pp. 41 and 71. 
at pp. 182-7. 
Ibid., at p. 187. 
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Thus, according to Akehurst, the fact that States do not protest when other States 
extend their civil laws to facts which bear no close relationship with that State 
suggests that international law does not place any limits on prescriptive civil 
jurisdictions. 
Conclusion 
The conclusion that international law places no limits on a State's prescriptive civil 
jurisdictions contradicts the principle of sovereign equality that the legal order was 
founded upon which still remains a central tenant of modem international law. 
Although it appears that State practice rejects Mann's argument that a State may only 
legislate over persons, property or events that it has a sufficiently close connection 
with, it is submitted that there is not an opinio juris to this effect. The very function of 
jurisdiction is to regulate competence between sovereign States in a horizontal legal 
system. Accordingly, international law must prescribe some limits i f State jurisdiction 
is not to be unfettered. It is suggested that Mann's work on civil jurisdiction, which 
finds that international law does in fact place limits on the legislative civil jurisdiction 
of a State and that these limits are not the criminal bases of jurisdiction but instead 
other less well defined limits, is to be preferred to that of Akehurst. 
Universal Civil Jurisdiction over Torture 
As wi l l be recalled, the seminal dictum from the Lotus case provided that a State may 
not exercise its jurisdictional competence within the territory of another State unless 
supported by a permissive rule of intemafional law.'^^ The following discussion will 
consider in detail whether international law permits a State to exercise civil 
jurisdiction over acts of torture which are committed in a foreign territory by a non-
national against another non-national, for whom the legislative State bears no 
international responsibility.'^^ 
See the discussion on the Lotus case supra at n. 28-30. 
This discussion proceeds on the assumption, contrary to the uncertainty identified above, that the 
universal principle is in fact a recognised base of civil jurisdiction. 
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In order to answer this question the discussion wil l fall in two parts. The first 
part wi l l examine whether conventional international law allows a State to exercise 
universal civil jurisdiction over acts of torture. Specifically, this part of the discussion 
wil l consider in detail the jurisdictional scope of the obligation to provide civil redress 
contained in Article 14 of the Convention against Torture 1984,'^ '* and then the 
legality of both the Torture Victim Protection Act 1991''^^ and the Alien Tort Claims 
Act 1789.'^* The second part of the discussion wil l remain in the same vein to that of 
the first and consider whether customary international law permits a State to exercise 
universal civil jurisdiction over acts of torture. A detailed analysis wi l l be made of the 
relationship in international law between jus cogens norm, obligations erga omnes 
and universal jurisdiction. 
Conventional International Law: The Convention against Torture 1984 
An Overview of the Criminal Framework of the Torture Convention 
The United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment was drafted by the General Assembly so as to 
make more effective the struggle against torture.'^^ Recognizing the previous efforts 
made to combat torture, including Article 5 of the Universal Declaration on the 
Protection of Human Rights'^^ and Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights,'^^ both of which provide that no one shall be subjected to torture, 
the Torture Convention develops the obligations of this substantive right much 
further. 
The Convention against Torture was adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by 
General Assembly Resolution 39/46, U.N. GAOP, 39''' Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 
(1985), of 10* December 1984, and entered into force on id^ June 1987 in accordance with Article 
27(1) C A T . [Hereinafter referred to as the Torture Convention or the CAT] . 
'^ ^ 28 use § 1350. [Hereinafter referred to as the TVPA] . 
Judiciary Act 1789, Ch. 20, s. 9(b); codified at 28 USC § 1350. [Hereinafter referred to as the 
A T C A ] . 
For the most extensive literature on the Torture Convention see generally: Burgers and Danelius, 
The United Nations Convention against Torture, 1988, Kluwer Academic Publishers; and Boulesbaa, 
The UN Convention on Torture and Prospects for Enforcement, 1999, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
The Universal Declaration was adopted by General Assembly Resolution 217A (111), U.N. GAOR, 
3d Sess. Resolutions, Part 1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) on 10* December 1948. [Hereinafter 
referred to as the Universal Declaration or the UDHR]. 
™ The International Covenant was adopted by General Assembly Resolution 2200 (XXI) , UN GAOR, 
21" Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) on le* December 1966, and entered into force on 
23"* March 1976. [Hereinafter referred to as the International Covenant or the ICCPR]. 
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Article 1 of the Torture Convention provides the definition of torture and 
reads: 
1. For the purposes of this Convention, torture means any act by which severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes 
as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act 
he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or 
coercing him or a third person or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when 
such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not 
include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. 
2. This Article is without prejudice to any international instrument or national legislation 
which does or may contain provisions of wider application. 
The significant features of the definition of torture contained in Article 1 are that the 
pain or suffering must be severe, that it must be intentionally inflicted to accomplish 
one of the specified purposes, and that it can only be inflicted by a State through the 
acts or under the direction of its officials. 
The Torture Convention contains detailed provisions governing the 
assumption and exercise of criminal jurisdiction.'^^ Article 4 CAT imposes the 
obligation on contracting States to ensure that all acts of torture, as defined by Article 
1, are criminal offences within their domestic legal systems. Article 5(1) CAT then 
establishes the duty for States to take jurisdiction over alleged offenders on the 
grounds of territoriality, nationality and passive personality. Finally, Article 5(2) 
requires each State to either prosecute alleged offenders found within their territory or 
to extradite them to a State meeting the Article 5(1) CAT jurisdictional criteria. This 
latter obligation may require States to prosecute acts of torture which are committed 
in a foreign territory where neither the offender nor the victim is a national of the 
prosecuting State. 
The Obligation to Provide Civil Redress: Article 14 of the Torture Convention 
For a detailed study of the criminal jurisdiction under the Convention see, generally. Institute for 
International Law of the K . U . Leuven Group, "Universal Criminal Jurisdiction over Torture: A State of 
Affairs" Working Paper No. 66 (revised August 2005). 
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The principal objective of the Torture Convention is to establish a widely ratified 
treaty under which States are obliged to criminalize torture so as to prevent alleged 
torturers from finding safe havens where they could avoid prosecution. In conjunction 
with the comprehensive criminal obligations established by the Torture Convention, 
the Convention contains a substantive provision which establishes civil liability. 
Article 14 CAT provides: 
1. Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act torture obtains 
redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation, including the means 
for full rehabilitation as possible. 
2. Nothing in this Article shall affect any right of the victim or other person to compensation 
which may exist under national law. 
From the text of Article 14 CAT it is thus clear that States are under an obligation to 
provide civil redress to victims of torture. However, two issues that are left 
unresolved by the treaty text concern, firstly, what constitutes redress for the purposes 
of the Convention, and, secondly, the jurisdictional scope of the redress which a State 
is to provide. 
Article 14 CAT does not impose an obligation of result but instead one of 
means whereby each contracting State is to ensure that its legal system provides 
victims of torture with the means to obtain redress.'^' The term redress is considered 
in paragraph 14(1) and states that victims of torture shall be provided with both 
"adequate compensation and ful l rehabilitation". Compensation for acts of torture 
may be provided by either a State compensation scheme,'^^ or by a private right of 
action for punitive damages against the alleged offender. Where a State provides 
compensation by way of a civil cause of action, it is uncertain whether Article 14 
CAT requires the State to recognise torture as a civil wrong in their domestic legal 
system in the same way in which Article 4 requires them to recognise torture as a 
crime. However, given the absence of any express stipulation that torture be 
recognised as a civil wrong by the Torture Convention, it is suggested that it is 
Hyland, International Human Rights Law and the Tort of Torture, in Scott, (eds.), Torture as Tort, 
2001, Hart Publishing, p. 406, at ft. 27. 
Victims of torture are compensated in the UK under the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme. 
On the arrangements made for compensation under this Scheme see, further, the Initial Report of the 
United Kingdom to the Committee against Torture, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/9/Add.6 and 10, (1991), at paras. 
107-118. 
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unlikely that it imposes such an obligation. In addition, many States make use of the 
traditional torts of trespass to the person, which include assault and battery, unlawful 
imprisonment and negligence, as the means to provide a private law cause of action 
for acts torture. Significantly, the Committee against Torture, the body established by 
Article 19 CAT to receive and monitor reports from State parties on the measures they 
have taken to give effect to the undertaking of the Torture Convention, has not yet 
expressed the view that States need introduce a tort of torture in situations where it 
already recognises other torts which provide an incidental cause of action for such 
harm. Furthermore, even in situations where the traditional torts of trespass to the 
person have failed to provide substantial redress for the harm caused by an act of 
torture, the Committee has not yet made a recommendation to the effect that a tort of 
torture be recognised.'^'' 
Unlike the criminal provisions of the Torture Convention, which clearly 
stipulate the situations when both territorial and extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction is 
to be exercised over acts of torture, the jurisdictional scope of its civil counterpart is 
left uncertain by the treaty text. Article 14 CAT is simply silent with regard to 
whether a State is only obliged to provide civil redress to victims who have been 
tortured within their territory, or whether they are obliged to provide redress for all 
acts of torture including those which have been perpetrated extraterritorially over 
which they bear no international responsibility.'^'' 
As has already been noted above. Article 14 CAT regards the concept of 
redress to include both adequate compensation and ful l rehabilitation, whereby 
compensation may be provided by a statutory scheme or by a private right action 
against the alleged offender, and ful l rehabilitation includes psychiatric and medical 
assistance. It is suggested that were a State to offer a victim of torture either 
rehabilitation or compensation through its statutory scheme it is somewhat unlikely 
The Committee against Torture in its Concluding Comments on the First Report of Namibia, U.N. 
Doc. A/52/44, (1997), at para. 240, merely expressed "concern" when finding that traditional torts were 
inadequate, and in many cases ineffective, to provide redress for torture because they did not provide 
redress in situations where physical or mental injury had been caused to the complainant. See, further, 
on this point, Byrnes, Civil Remedies for Torture Committed Abroad, in Scott, (eds.). Torture as Tort, 
2001, Hart Publishing, p. 542, at ft. 15. 
'^ ^ Where State officials have committed extraterritorial acts of torture in a foreign jurisdiction, the 
Committee against Torture has found that the responsible State is to provide civil redress pursuant to 
Article 14 CAT. See, further on this point, the Committee's recommendation to the UK that 
compensation be provided for torture committed by its military officials in Afghanistan and Iraq in its 
Concluding Obsen'ations on the Fourth Periodic Report of the United Kingdom, U.N. Doc. 
CAT/C/CR/33/3, (2004), at para. 4(b). 
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that such an act would receive protest from the State where the acts of torture were 
carried out. In contrast, however, it is likely that protest may be received i f a State 
were to allow its domestic legal system to be used in bringing a civil action for torture 
that was committed in a foreign jurisdiction. As wil l be recalled, the definition of 
torture provided by Article 1 stipulates that torture can only be inflicted by a State, 
and thus any action for damages brought in a foreign jurisdiction would be regarded 
as interfering with the territorial sovereignty of that State by seeking to regulate its 
internal affairs.'^^ 
Resolving the Jurisdictional Scope of Article 14 CAT 
With it being uncertain from the text of Article 14 CAT whether this provision creates 
universal civil jurisdiction over torture, recourse wil l be made to the rules on treaty 
interpretation contained in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties \969^^^ in an attempt to resolve the ambiguity surrounding the jurisdictional 
scope of this provision.'^' 
Article 31(1) VCLT lays down the general rule of treaty interpretation, and 
can be taken to be reflective of custom.'^^ It provides that: 
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given 
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose. 
The International Court has commented that, "the first duty of a tribunal which 
is called upon to interpret and apply the provisions of a treaty is to endeavour to give 
effect to them in their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they 
occur".'•'^ Accordingly, preference is to be given to the ordinary meaning of the 
agreement over other methods of interpretation. 
In Jones v. Ministry of the Interior of tire Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Lieutenant-Colonel Abdul 
Aziz; Mitchell '. Walker and Sampson v. Ibrahim Al-Dali and Others [2004] E W C A Civ. 1394, it was 
argued in both the Court of Appeal and the High Court (unreported) by Saudi Arabia that the English 
court did not have jurisdiction to hear the claim. Both courts, however, focused their judgements 
exclusively on the issue of immunity. 
1115 UNTS 332, (1969) 8 I L M 679. [Hereinafter referred to as the Vienna Convention or V C L T ] . 
See, extensively, on this point, Byrnes, supra n. 131, at pp. 537-550. 
Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), ICJ Reports, 1994, p. 6; Maritime Delimitation and Territorial 
Questions (Qatar v. Bahrain), ICJ Reports, 1995, p. 6. 
Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations case ICJ 
Reports, 1950, p. 4, at p. 8. 
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In the recent decision of Jones v. Saudi Arabia, concerning two separate 
actions brought before an English court seeking damages for torture which the 
applicants had allegedly suffered while in official custody in Saudi Arabia, Lord 
Bingham held that: 
The natural reading of... [Article 14 CAT] is that it requires a private right of action for 
damages only for acts of torture committed in the territory under the jurisdiction of the forum 
State.'^ " 
How Lord Bingham found that the natural and ordinary meaning of Article 14 CAT 
only requires States to provide a private right of action for territorial acts of torture is 
unknown. An analysis of the actual words contained in the text of Article 14 simply 
does not indicate the jurisdictional scope of this treaty provision. The silence of 
Article 14 with regard to its jurisdictional application must be contrasted with other 
provisions in the Torture Convention. The clearly drafted Articles 4 and 5 CAT 
expressly detail the precise situations when extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction is to 
be both assumed and exercised. Moreover, the text of Articles 11 to 13 CAT stipulate 
that the obligation which this substantive provision imposes is only applicable to 
"territory under it jurisdiction". 
It is submitted, therefore, that the better view is that no conclusion can be 
drawn from the text of Article 14 as to whether it requires a State to provide a cause 
of action for acts of torture committed in a foreign jurisdiction.''" In Bouzari v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, the Court of Appeal for Ontario held that, "the text of the 
Convention itself simply provides no answer to the question".'''^ 
Articles 31(3)(a) and (b) VCLT provide that any subsequent agreement and 
practice between the parties relating to the application of the treaty may be used as an 
aid to treaty interpretation. No State has interpreted Article 14 CAT as requiring it to 
provide a private right of action for acts of torture committed in a foreign 
[2006] U K H L 26, at para. 25. 
'•" A similar conclusion is drawn by Adams, In Search of a Defence of the Transnational Human 
Rights Paradigm, in Scott, (eds.). Torture as Tort, 2001, Hart Publishing, at p. 262. C/Orakhelashvili, 
Peremptory Norms in International Law, 2006, OUP, at pp. 310-11, who finds that it is clear from the 
text of Article 14 that it establishes universal civil jurisdiction. 
'"^  [2004] OJ No. 2800, at para. 76, per Goudge JA. 
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jurisdiction.'''^ When the United States ratified the Torture Convention it entered the 
following understanding: 
It is the understanding of the United State that Article 14 requires a State Party to provide a 
private right of action for damages only for acts of torture committed in territory under the 
jurisdiction of the State Party. 
This understanding provoked no dissent from other States party to the Torture 
Convention, nor, more significantly, from the Committee against Torture when the 
understanding was subsequently repeated by the United States in its Initial Periodic 
Report}^^ 
The Committee against Torture has long maintained the view that Article 14 
CAT does not require civil redress to be provided to victims of torture who have come 
from abroad. In the relatively few instances where States have provided either 
medical rehabilitation or a private right of action to victims of torture committed in a 
foreign jurisdiction, the Committee has "welcomed" such efforts thereby suggesting 
that the State has gone beyond the duty imposed by Article 14.''** 
Recently, however, the Committee has twice considered the issue of whether a 
State should provide a private right of action to victims of torture who have been 
allegedly been tortured abroad by foreign State officials. When considering the United 
Kingdom's Fourth Periodic Report, the Committee asked whether there had been any 
143 
Similarly, no State has interpreted Article 14 C A T as requiring it to provided medical rehabilitation 
to victims of torture committed in a foreign jurisdiction, and when such rehabilitation has been 
provided the State has made it clear that it is goes beyond the duty imposed by Article 14. See the 
Second Periodic Report of Germany to the Committee against Torture, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/29/Add.2, 
(1997), at para. 39. 
Appendix A to the Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate Exec. Rep. No. 30, lOT' 
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1990), at II (3). For an assessment of the various reservations, declarations and 
understandings entered by the United State see further: Magee, "The United Nations Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment: The Bush 
Administration's Stance on Torture" 25 Geo Wash J Int'l L & Econ 807 (1992); and Stewart, "The 
Torture Convention and the Reception of International Criminal Law within the United States" 15 
Nova L Rev 449(1991). 
Initial Report of the United Slates of America to the Committee against Torture, U.N. Doc. 
CAT/C/28/Add.5, (2000), at para. 285. 
On the Committee's position of States that provides medical rehabilitation to victims of torture who 
have come from abroad see: Concluding Observations on the Third Periodic Report of Denmark, U.N. 
Doc. A/52/44, (1997), at para. 177; Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report of 
Germany, U.N. Doc. A/53/44, (1998), at para. 183; and Concluding Observations on the Second 
Periodic Report of New Zealand, U.N. Doc. A/53/44, (1998), at para. 174. On the Committee's 
position of a State which provides a private right of action to victims of torture committed in a foreign 
jurisdiction see the Concluding Observations on the First Periodic Report of the United States of 
America, U.N. Doc. A/55/44 (2000), at para. 178(b). See, further, on this latter point, Byrnes, supra n. 
131, at pp. 544-545. 
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civil suits brought before an English court for acts of torture that had been committed 
in a foreign jurisdiction.''*^ Similarly, the Committee asked Canada whether Article 14 
required it to provide a civil cause of action to all victims of torture during 
consideration of it's Fourth and Fifth Periodic Report}^^ In its Concluding 
Observations, the Committee noted as a "subject of concern" Canada's lack of 
effective measures to provide civil compensation to all victims of torture,''*^ and 
recommended that it should review its position under Article 14 to ensure that a 
provision of compensation be available to all victims.'^'' In Jones, Lord Hoffmann 
found that why Canada had been singled out in this way remained unclear, and 
regarded the Committee's interpretation of Article 14 as a statement of international 
law to have no value.'^' More emphatically. Lord Bingham commented that: 
1 would not wish to question the wisdom of this recommendation, and of course I share the 
Committee's concern that all victims of torture should be compensated. But the Committee is 
not an exclusively legal and not an adjudicative body; its power under Article 19 is to make 
general comments; the committee did not, in making this recommendation, advance any 
analysis or interpretation of Article 14 of the Convention; and it was no more than a 
recommendation. Whatever its value in influencing the trend of international thinking, the 
legal authority of this recommendation is slight.''^ 
Despite this recommendation of the Committee against Torture, it is submitted 
that there is a broad State practice reflecting a common understanding that Article 14 
CAT only requires a State to provide a cause of action for torture committed within its 
territorial jurisdiction.'^^ 
Finally, Article 32 VCLT provides that where the interpretation of a treaty 
provision is ambiguous or obscure, or leads to a manifestly absurd or unreasonable 
result, recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation. These means 
UNCAT Hearing: Provisions of Lists of Issues to State Parties, Second Session, (2004), at pp. 14-
15. 
'••^ Consideration of the Fourth and Fifth Periodic Report of Canada, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/SR.643 and 
646 (2005). 
'•^ Concluding Obsen'ations on the Fourth and Fifth Periodic Reports of Canada, U.N. Doc. 
CAT/C/CR/34/CAN, (2005), at para. 4(g). 
""/Wt/., at para. 5(f). 
[2006] U K H L 26, at para. 57. 
Ibid., at para. 23. 
The Court of Appeal for Ontario reached the same conclusion in Bouzari [2004] OJ No. 2800, at 
para. 79. 
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include both the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its 
conclusion. 
During the 1981 negotiation session of the Torture Convention it was decided 
to include the phrase "committed in any territory under its jurisdiction" in an early 
draft of Article 14.'^ '* However, these words were subsequently omitted from the final 
version of the text. On the one hand, it has been suggested that the omission of this 
important phrase from the final text of Article 14 was on the grounds of being 
superfluous since the territorial limitation is already implicit in the treaty provision.'^^ 
On the other hand, the removal of this phrase may even suggest that the provision was 
not intended to be limited territorially.'^^ However, neither the preparatory work, nor 
the commentary on the drafting of the Torture Convention offered by Burgers and 
Danelius, gives any indication as to why this phrase was omitted. Therefore, in light 
of the fact o f there being no clear indication as to why the phrase was omitted, the 
better conclusion may be that of the United States who suggest that it could only have 
been deleted by mistake.'^^ 
The principle of effectiveness is a further canon of treaty interpretation. 
Although it is not referred to by the Vienna Convention it is used often when 
interpreting human rights treaties, most notably the European Convention on Human 
Rights.'^^ According to this principle, human rights treaties are regarded as living 
instruments'^^ and thus a more dynamic and purpose-orientated approach is used so 
that the provisions o f the treaty are interpreted in a way to make the object and 
purpose of it both practical and effective.'^° Most significant under this method of 
interpretation is that the treaty may be construed in a way well beyond what may have 
been originally envisaged by the drafters. Despite the Committee against Torture 
recently making the recommendation that Canada provide civil redress to all victims 
of torture, it is important to emphasise that this recommendation stands alone and has 
not been repeated in subsequent Concluding Observations as a matter of principle. At 
Report of the informal open-ended working group on a Draft Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L.1576, at paras. 40-4. On 
the drafting history of the Convention see, further, Burgers and Danelius, supra n. 127, at p .74. 
Bouzari [2004] OJ No. 2800, at para. 80, per Goudge JA. 
Byrnes, supra n. 131, at p. 546. 
Initial Report of the United Slates of America to the Committee against Torture, supra n. 145, at 
para. 268. A similar conclusion is drawn by Stewart, supra n. 144, at p. 459. CJOrakhelashvili, supra 
n. 141, at p. 312. 
213 UNTS 221 (1950). [Hereinafter referred to as either the European Convention or the E C H R ] . 
Selmount v. France (2000) 29 E H R R 403. 
"^°Soeringv. United Kingdom {]9S9) 11 EHRR 439; Z,o;>Wo« v. 7-^^^(1996) 23 EHRR513 . 
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present, therefore, it appears that the Committee has chosen not to interpret Article 14 
CAT in an expansive manner beyond the text of the provision. 
Concluding on Whether Article 14 CAT Creates Universal Civil Jurisdiction for 
Torture. 
The text of Article 14 CAT simply does not indicate whether this provision creates a 
duty to provide a private cause of action for acts of torture committed in a foreign 
jurisdiction. However, after reviewing this treaty provision in relation to the others in 
the Torture Convention, State practice to date, and the drafting history of this 
provision, the conclusion is drawn that Article 14 does not create universal civil 
jurisdiction for acts of torture. This conclusion is consistent with the two decisions 
that have considered the jurisdictional application of Article 14 to date. In Bouzari, 
the Court of Appeal for Ontario held that, "Canada's treaty obligation pursuant to 
Article 14 does not extend to providing the right to a civil remedy against a foreign 
State for torture committed abroad".'^^ Similarly, in Jones, Lord Bingham held that, 
"Article 14 of the Torture Convention does not provide for universal civil 
jurisdiction";'^^ and Lord Hoffmann held that. Article 14 is "plainly concerned with 
acts of torture within the jurisdiction of the State concerned".'^'* 
Having concluded that the Torture Convention does not require State parties 
to provide a civil cause of action for acts of torture committed in a foreign 
jurisdiction, the argument has been made that neither does the Convention prohibit 
such a remedy.'^^ Article 14(2) CAT is a disclaimer to Article 14(1) and provides that, 
"nothing in this Article shall affect any right of the victim or other person to 
compensation which may exist under national law". Clearly, the disclaimer envisages 
the possibility of provisions for civil redress that are wider in application than those 
required by Article 14(1) being available in domestic legal systems. Although the 
CyOrakhelashvili, supra n. 141, at pp. 310-6. 
[2004] OJ No. 2800, at para. 81, per Goudge JA. Similarly, in the Superior Court of Justice [2002] 
OJ No. 1624, at para. 54, it was held by Swinton J. that, "the [Torture] Convention creates no 
obligation on Canada to provide access to the Courts so that a litigant can pursue an action for damages 
against a foreign State for torture committed outside of Canada. Rather, Article 14 requires States like 
Canada, who are signatories, to provide a remedy for torture committed within their jurisdiction". 
[2006] U K H L 26, at para. 25. 
Ibid., at para. 46. 
Byrnes, supra n. 131, at p. 543; Orange, Torture, Tort Choice of Law and Tolofson, in Scott, (eds.). 
Torture as Tort. 2001, Hart Publishing, at p. 305. 
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preparatory work is silent as to why this provision was drafted, it is likely that it 
would have been drafted so as to not preclude the availability of domestic remedies in 
the United States that allow a victim of torture committed abroad to seek civil 
redress.'^^ 
When Jones was heard in the Court of Appeal, Lord Justice Mance approved 
the argument that the Article 14(2) CAT disclaimer does not prohibit universal civil 
jurisdiction over torture, but went further to claim that Article 14(2) grants permission 
for a State to establish universal civil jurisdiction over such acts: 
Article 14(1) is dealing with (no more than) a right of redress in the legal system of the State 
(State A ) . . . . State A is, in short, the responsible State and it must ensure proper civil redress. 
Article 14(1) is not designed to require every other State (State B) to provide redress in its 
civil legal system for acts of torture committed in State A, although under Article 14(2) it 
remains permissible for State B to provide redress in State B for acts of torture committed 
(either in State A or elsewhere) by officials, etc., of State A."'' 
In effect. Lord Justice Mance has concluded that because Article 14(2) CAT does not 
prohibit States from providing a civil cause of action for acts of torture committed in a 
foreign jurisdiction, then the Torture Convention must be read as permitting States to 
provide such redress. 
It is suggested that this reasoning of Lord Justice Mance has misunderstood 
the framework upon which jurisdiction is said to operate under within international 
law established by the Permanent Court in the Lotus case. The better view of Article 
14 is that it does not preclude a State from providing a civil cause of action for acts of 
torture committed in a foreign jurisdiction; however, while not prohibiting such an 
exercise of universal jurisdiction, it does not provide the permissive rule of 
international law supporting such an exercise of jurisdiction.'^^ Accordingly, it is thus 
concluded that the Torture Convention neither prohibits States from exercising 
universal civil jurisdiction over acts of torture, nor does it creates such jurisdiction. I f 
such unilateral assertions of jurisdiction are to be lawful under international law then 
Byrnes, ibid., at p. 543. See the discussion, infia at n. 169-223, regarding these civil remedies 
available in the United States and the legality of these unilateral assertions of jurisdiction. 
[2004] E W C A Civ. 1394, at para. 21. (Original emphasis). Orange, supra n. 165, at p. 305, makes 
the same claim. 
As stated above, both Higgins, supra n. 2, at p. 77, and Lowe, supra n. 2, at pp. 334-5, have 
criticised instances where the Lotus case has been cited as authority for the proposition that a State may 
lawfully exercise extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction unless its exercise is prohibited by an 
international rule. 
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they must find a legal basis in either other provisions of conventional international 
law or custom. 
The Torture Victim Protection Act 1991 
In recognising that there were between 200,000-400,000 refugees and asyless living 
in the United States who had been victims of torture that had been committed in a 
foreign territory,'*^ the United States enacted the Torture Victim Protection Act 
1991.'™ The TVPA creates an express federal cause of action against any individual 
who subjects another individual to torture in a foreign jurisdiction. S. 2 TVPA 
provides: 
An individual, who under, actual or apparent authority, or colour of law, of any foreign 
nation...subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that 
individual.'" 
For an action in damages to be successfully brought under the TVPA against an 
alleged offender the victim must show that they were subjected to torture, that the 
offender acted under authority of law, and that they had exhausted all adequate and 
available remedies. 
Was the TVPA Enacted so as to Meet the Demands of Article 14 CAT? 
The United States ratified the Torture Convention on October 27"^  1990, one year 
before enacting the TVPA. Indeed, the legislative history of the TVPA reveals that 
comments were made in both Congress and the Senate stating that one of the reasons 
for enacting the TVPA was to fu l f i l the obligations imposed by the Torture 
Initial Report of the United States of America to the Committee against Torture, supra n. 145, at 
para. 285. 
The academic literature on the TVPA is vast, and for the most insightful commentary see generally: 
Gery, "The Torture Victim Protection Act: Raising Issues of Legitimacy" 26 Geo Wash J Int'l L & 
Econ 597 (1993); Haffke, "The Torture Victim Protection Act: More Symbol than Substance" 43 
Emory L J 1469 (1994); and Schwartz, "'And Tomorrow?' The Torture Victim Protection Act" 11 Ariz 
J In t ' l&CompL271 (1994). 
In addition, s. 2 TVPA creates a cause of action against any individual who subjects another 
individual to extrajudicial killing. 
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Convention.'^^ However, it is strongly submitted that the TVPA does not implement 
any obligations imposed by the Torture Convent ion; 'and when President Bush 
senior signed the TVPA, he expressed words to this effect: 
The TVPA does not help to implement the [Torture Convention] and does present a number of 
potential problems about which the Administration has expressed concern in the past."'' 
The TVPA establishes universal civil jurisdiction over torture. In contrast, it 
has been suggested that Article 14 CAT only requires States to exercise civil 
jurisdiction over territorial acts of torture. Accordingly, opponents of the TVPA have 
thus argued that the Act is not demanded by the Torture Convention,'^^ and often cite 
the understanding entered by the US when ratifying the Convention, providing that 
Article 14 is limited territorially, as authority for this point.'^^ Furthermore, when the 
United States submitted its Initial Report to the Committee against Torture, it 
regarded the TVPA as an "additional right and remedy under United States law", 
rather than one required by Article 14.'^ ^ At one point in the Report, the United States 
commented that: 
[United States] law currently provides rights which are potentially broader than those required 
by Article 14 with respect to obtaining redress for acts of torture occurring outside of the 
United States territory."' 
Significantly, the Committee against Torture, when responding in its Concluding 
Comments, "particularly welcomed" this broad legal recourse to compensation for 
victims of torture,'™ thereby suggesting that the TVPA does indeed go further than 
what is required by Article 14 CAT. 
S. Rep. No. 249, 102d Cong., l " sess., (1991). [Hereinafter referred to as the Senate Report]. H.R. 
Rep. No.367, 102d Cong., 1" Session, pt. 1 (1991). [Hereinafter referred House Report]. The House 
Report, at p. 2, stated that the Torture Convention "obligates State parties to adopt" legislation such as 
the TVPA. In addition, Drinan and Kuo, "Putting the World's Oppressors on Trial: The Torture Victim 
Protection Act" (1993) 15 HRQ 605, at p. 607, have claimed that, "the TVPA carries out the intent of 
the Torture Convention by providing redress to victims of torture". 
Gery, supra n. 170, at p. 609, makes the same submission. 
"" 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) 91. 
" ' See the statement of Mr McGinnis, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Senate Report, supra n. 172, 
at 13. 
Gery, supra n. 170, at pp. 611-612; Stewart, supra n. 144, at pp. 459-460. 
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™ Ibid., at para. 268. 
Concluding Comments on the First Report of the United States, U.N. Doc, A/55/44, (2000), at para. 
Supra n. 145, at paras. 277-286. 
 
m 
178(b). 
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Despite the statements made to the contrary, it is suggested that the TVPA 
does not implement any obligation imposed by Article 14 CAT. Such a conclusion is 
drawn on the basis that the TVPA is itself inconsistent with the demands of Article 14 
since it only provides a remedy for acts of torture committed in a foreign jurisdiction 
and not one for those acts which are committed territorially. 
The Legal Status of the TVPA as an Exercise of Universal Civil Jurisdiction 
The private cause of action provided by the TVPA, enabling a torture victim to use 
US Federal Courts as a forum to seek civil redress, is a unilateral assertion of 
jurisdiction that no other State has matched in scope. Both Congress and the Senate 
relied on the international doctrine of universal jurisdiction as the legal basis for the 
enactment of the TVPA.'^° More specifically, the Senate Report cited § 404 of the 
Third Restatement, which provides that: 
A State has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for certain offences recognised by 
the community of nations as of universal concern. 
When faced with the view that international law does not require States to provide 
universal civil jurisdiction over acts of torture, but instead only universal criminal 
jurisdiction,'^' the Senate Report cited the Third Restatement again: 
In general, jurisdiction on the basis of universal jurisdiction has been exercised in the form of 
criminal law, but international law does not preclude the application of non-criminal law on 
this basis, for example by providing a remedy in tort or restitution for victims of piracy."^ 
Senate Report, supra n. 172, at p. 5; House Report, supra n. 172, at p. 55. 
See the statement of Mr McGinnis, supra n. 175, at p.13. 
§ 404, cmt.b. 
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Although the Third Restatement correctly recognises that international law does not 
preclude the application of universal civil law,'^^ the authoritativeness of this claim, 
however, must be read with a degree of caution since it cites no legal authority to 
support such an application of jurisdicfion.'^'' 
The legal status of the TVPA has never been formally considered before either 
an international or domestic judicial body.'^^ As a result of this, academic opinion on 
the lawfulness of the TVPA appears to be divided. Drinan and Kuo have made the 
most far-reaching comments in support of the TVPA and claimed that, "the [Act] 
codifies international law principles that have already been universally accepted in 
numerous human rights instruments".'^* Despite several international human rights 
treaties prohibiting torture, none of them, however, appear to support universal civil 
jurisdiction as a means of combating torture.'*^ Significantly, Drinan and Kuo's work 
fails to elaborate and explain this claim. In contrast, opponents of the TVPA have 
found the Act to be legally unwarranted, and Stewart has suggested that, "absent [of] 
a treaty providing for such jurisdiction, there would seem to be little justification for 
such overreaching".'^^ 
The Alien Tort Claims Act 1789 
The Scope and Meaning of the ATCA 
The Alien Tort Claim Act,'^'^ enacted by the first United States Congress in 1789, 
provides that: 
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of any nations or a treaty of the United States. 
Higgins, supra n. 2, p. 58, at ft 5. 
Donovan and Roberts, "The Emerging Recognition of Universal Civil Jurisdiction" 100 AJIL 142 
(2006), at p. 146. 
Lord Hoffmann commented, obiter dicta, in Jones [2006] U K H L 26, at para. 58, that the TVPA "is 
not required and perhaps not permitted by customary international law". 
Supra n. 172, at p. 622. See also the comments made at pp. 621 and 624. Similarly, Schwartz, supra 
n. 170, at p. 284, has commented that, "the TVPA is anything but a bold arrogation of power by the 
US. It is well within the bounds of modern thinking in international law". 
On this point see further the discussion infra at n. 224-8 concerning both the E C H R and the ICCPR. 
C^Orakhelashvili, supra n. 141, at p. 316. 
'^ ^ Stewart, supra n. 144, at p. 460. 
See, generally, on the A T C A , Steinhardt and D'Amato, (eds.), The Alien Tort Claims Act: An 
Analytical Anthology, 1999, Transnational Publishers. 
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The Act remained largely dormant until revisited by the US Court of Appeal for the 
Second Circuit in its landmark decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.^'^^ The case of 
Fildrtiga concerned a Paraguayan national invoking the ATCA in order to bring an 
action for damages in a district court of the US against a Paraguayan State official for 
acts of torture that had been committed in that State. Judge Kaufman, handing down 
the only judgement of the Court, held that where an alleged offender had been served 
with process within the US, the ATCA conferred subject matter jurisdiction on a 
court. In addition, he held that the ATCA created a civil cause of action for a 
"violation of the law of nations", and that official acts of torture constituted such a 
violation. Following this innovative decision, victims of gross violations of human 
rights could use the United States' legal system as a forum for bringing civil actions 
in cases where the violations had occurred abroad and had no connection with the 
forum State. 
In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,^^^ Israeli survivors and representatives 
of persons murdered in an armed attack on a civilian bus in Israel filed suit against 
Libya and the Palestine Liberation Organization. Judge Bork noted the lack of 
reasoning supporting the conclusions drawn by Fildrtiga, and held that the ATCA 
was purely a jurisdictional statue that did not create a civil cause of action.'^^ I f a 
plaintiff were to bring a claim under the ATCA then, according to Judge Bork, they 
would have to show that they had an existing cause of action that had been expressly 
created. Since neither international law nor a statutory provision had expressly created 
such a cause of action, any claim brought under the ATCA would thus fail.'^^ Judge 
630 F. 2d 876 (1980). On the large academic literature available on Filartiga see, inter alia: Blum 
and Steinhardt, "Federal Jurisdiction over International Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims 
Act after Fildrtiga v. Pena-Irala" 22 Harv Int'l LJ 53 (1981); Danaher, "Torture as Tort in Violation of 
International Law: Fildrtiga v. Peha-Irald" 33 Stan L Rev 353 (1981); George, supra n. 67; Hassan, 
"A Conflict of Philosophies: The Fildrtiga Jurisprudence" [1983] 32 ICLQ 205; and Paust, "Litigating 
Human Right: A Commentary on the Comments" 4 Hous J Int'l L 81 (1981). 
726 F.2d 774 (1984). 
The other members of the court dismissed the claim for lack of a cause of action, but on different 
grounds to those of Judge Bork. Senior Judge Robb held that the case was non-jusficiable due to the 
polifical issues involved, and Judge Edwards held that the law of nations did not impose any liability 
on non-state entities that cause human rights violations. 
'^ ^ The passage of the TVPA was in part a response to the doubts raised that the A T C A did not create a 
cause of acfion. In the House of Representatives, Republican Fascell, 135 Cong. Rec. H6423, H6424 
(1989), commented that, the TVPA "will clarify and expand existing human rights law" to make 
explicit that victims of torture can bring a federal cause of action. 
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Bork's findings have received strong academic criticism'^'' and subsequent tort claims 
involving foreign violations of human rights have successfully been brought in the 
United States under the ATCA.'^^ 
The recent decision of Sosa v. Alvarez-MachaW^^ was the first time in which 
the United States Supreme Court analysed the meaning and scope of the ATCA in 
detail. The case of Sosa concerned a Mexican national being abducted and detained 
arbitrarily in Mexico for less than one day before being brought to the US to stand 
trial for torture and murder. After being acquitted of these charges, he proceeded to 
bring a civil action against the Mexican nationals who had been involved in his 
abduction and arbitrary detention under the ATCA. The Court of Appeal for the Ninth 
Circuit held that he had suffered a violation of his right under the law of nations 
which gave rise to liability under the ATCA.'^^ 
The decision was appealed to the Supreme Court where it was argued, inter 
alia, that abduction and arbitrary detention did not breach the law of nations, and that 
the ATCA merely provides subject matter jurisdiction and does not create a 
substantive cause of action. Delivering the majority opinion of the Court, Justice 
Souter endorsed the first conclusion that had been drawn in Fildrtiga, and held that 
the ATCA was a jurisdictional statue which granted federal courts jurisdiction to hear 
civil claims over conduct that amounted to a violation of the law of nations.'^^ 
However, unlike Fildrtiga, he held that the ATCA did not create a private cause of 
action. Instead, it was the common law that gave rise to the cause of action necessary 
for a claim under the ATCA since it incorporates violations of the law of nations.'^' 
Concerning which offences the common law provided a cause of action for. Justice 
Souter held that the common law, when the ATCA was enacted in 1789, would have 
recognised a cause of action for only piracy, violations of safe conduct, and an 
D'Amato, "What does Tel-Oren Tell Lawyers? Judge Bork's Concept of the Law of Nations is 
Seriously Mistaken" 79 A J I L 92 (1985); Quigley, "Judge Berk is Wrong" 71 Wash U L Q 1087 
(1993). C/Rubin, "Professor D'Amato's Concept of Jurisdiction is Seriously Mistaken" 79 AJIL 105 
(1985). 
Forti V. Suarez-Mason, 672 F.Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987). For an overview of the jurisprudence 
that has developed posX-Filartiga see, Stephens and Ratner, International Human Right Litigation in 
US Courts, 1996, Transnational Publishers. 
124 S. Ct 2739 (2004). For a case comment see: Berkowitz, "Sosa v. Alvarez- Machain" 40 Harv 
C R C L L Rev 289 (2005); Norberg, "The US Supreme Court Affirms the Fildrtiga Paradigm" (2006) 4 
JICJ 387; and Roth, "Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain" 98 AJIL 798 (2004). 
Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 266 F.3d 1045 (9"" Cir. 2001). 
124 S. Ct 2739 (2004), at 2754-5. 
[bid., at 2761. 
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infringement of the rights of ambassadors?'^ '' Accepting that the ATCA was not 
enacted against a backdrop of modern international law, Justice Souter held that the 
First Congress which enacted the ATCA would have intended for federal courts to 
have identified further international norms as actionable in the future.^"' He 
emphasised that federal courts should exercise restraint when recognising new causes 
of action,^"^ and held that contemporary norms would only be recognised as 
actionable when they were definable, obligatory, specific and un iversa l .Apply ing 
this standard to the facts of the case, Justice Souter concluded, after citing a large 
body of international and domestic material on the matter, that a single illegal 
detention of less than one day, followed by a transfer of custody to lawful authorities 
and a prompt arraignment, violates no norm of customary international law so well 
defined as to support the creation of a federal remedy.^ ""* Thus, on the grounds that 
there was no common law cause of action upon which to bring the claim, the decision 
of the Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit was overturned. 
The Supreme Court's decision significantly affirms that foreign individuals 
may continue to bring civil actions in the United States for gross violation of human 
rights committed abroad under the ATCA. However, by finding that the ATCA is 
purely jurisdictional in nature, and that the common law only recognises a cause of 
action for a limited number of violations, the scope of claims brought under the 
ACTA has been reduced. The decision has been criticised for failing to establish a 
clear standard of which international legal norms the common law wil l provide a 
cause of action for.^''^ However, it can readily be assumed that the common law will 
provide a cause of action for torture, slavery, genocide and crimes against 
humanity.^"^ 
The Legal Status of the ATCA as an Exercise of Universal Civil Jurisdiction 
Ibid., at 2756. 
Ibid., at 2765. Rehquist CJ. , Scalia J. and Thomas J. all dissented on this point, and held that the 
common law did not create private causes of action for violations of contemporary international norms. 
^"^Ibid., at 2761. 
Ibid., at 2765-6. 
Ibid., at 2769. 
Berkowitz, supra n. 196, at pp. 290 and 295. 
Norberg, supra n. 196, at p. 395. 
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Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Sosa, very little consideration had been given 
to the legal status of the ATCA as a statute exercising civil jurisdiction over a foreign 
disputes bearing no connection with the United States.^ *^ ^ In the few instances where 
the matter had been raised, the lower courts simply cited § 404 of the Third 
Re statement but failed to question whether the Third Restatement did in fact 
provide a valid legal basis for the Act. Sosa presented the Supreme Court with an 
opportunity to consider whether litigation arising under the ATCA infringed the 
sovereignty of other States, and two of the amici curiae briefs submitted to the 
Supreme Court addressed, inter alia, whether the Act was in fact consistent with 
international law. 
The amici curiae brief submitted by Australia, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom claimed that international law only recognises universal criminal 
jurisdiction in a few cases involving the most heinous crimes and does not recognise 
universal civil jurisdiction at all.^°^ Accordingly, the ATCA was said to be 
inconsistent with international law.^"' These broad exercises of jurisdiction made 
under the ATCA interfered with the sovereignty of other States by undermining 
policy choices that they had made with regard to the proper vindication of rights and 
redressing civil wrongs.^" Recognising the potential disharmony that this could lead 
to in the international arena,^'^ the amici curiae brief suggested that the Supreme 
Court should restrict litigation under the ATCA significantly so as to minimise these 
conflicts of jurisdiction. 
Taking a slightly different approach to that of the sovereign States, the amici 
curiae brief submitted by the European Commission claimed that because universal 
civil jurisdiction had received less attention than its criminal counterpart, its existence 
and scope was not very well established under international law.^'^ However, to the 
extent that universal civil jurisdiction was recognised by international law, it applied 
Donovan and Roberts, supra n. 184, at p. 146. 
™^ See, for example, Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (CA, 2 Cir. 1995), at 240; Beanal v. Freeporl-
McMoRan Inc., 969, F.Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997), at 371. See also Jugde Edwards' concurring opinion 
in Tel-Oren. 
Brief of The Governments of The Commonwealth of Australia, The Swiss Confederation and The 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioner, 
Sosa V. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct 2739 (2004), at p. 6. 
Ibid., at p. 2. 
^" Ibid. Moreover, it was claimed, at p. 10, that there was also a substantia! risk that such broad 
exercise of civil jurisdiction would disrupt trade and investment in a global economy. 
Ibid., ax pp. 9-10. 
Brief of Amicus Curiae of The European Commission in Support of Neither Party, Sosa v. Alvarez-
Macliain, 124 S. Ct 2739 (2004), at p. 17. 
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to only a narrow category of cases that are consistent with the rationale of universal 
principle.'^''* The amici curiae brief suggested that domestic courts could be used as 
forums to hear civil claims arising from disputes in foreign jurisdiction, but this 
should be limited only to disputes where there was no reasonable prospect of redress 
in other States bearing a closer jurisdictional connection with the events.^ 
Disappointingly, the Supreme Court's majority opinion in Sosa did not 
directly address the legality o f the ATCA. However, the Concurring Opinion o f 
Justice Breyer did consider whether "the exercise of jurisdiction under the [ATCA] is 
consistent with those notions of comity that lead each nation to respect the sovereign 
rights of other nations"/'^ Justice Breyer found that there existed a procedural 
agreement within the international community to prosecute a limited set o f norms 
under the universal principle.'^'^ The fact that there existed this procedural consensus, 
he claimed, suggested that recognition of universal jurisdiction wi l l not threaten the 
practical harmony that comity seeks to protect.^'^ However, this consensus existed 
with regard to criminal jurisdiction. Justice Breyer nonetheless endorsed the principle 
of universal civil jurisdiction on the grounds that, firstly, universal civil jurisdiction is 
no more threatening than its criminal counterpart, and, secondly, because many 
nations permit civil claims to be filed as an adjunct to a criminal prosecution: 
Criminal jurisdiction necessarily contemplates a significant degree of civil tort recovery as 
well.^" 
It is suggested that the reasoning offered by Justice Breyer endorsing the 
principle o f universal civil jurisdiction is somewhat underdeveloped and cannot be 
taken as conclusive of the matter. To simply recognise universal civil jurisdiction on 
the basis that it is no less intrusive than universal criminal jurisdiction clearly fails to 
take into consideration the fact that it is only universal criminal jurisdiction that has 
been accepted by the international community. In effect, Justice Breyer has 
concluding that because States in the international community have willingly limited 
the sovereignty of their criminal law by recognising universal jurisdiction as a means 
^^Ubid., at p. 5. 
^'Ubid., at pp. 22-26. 
124 S. Ct 2739 (2004), at 2782. 
^"/Wt/., at 2783. 
'''Ibid. 
'"/W^/., at 2784. 
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of repressing the most serious crimes, then they have done so also with regard to civil 
law as this would represent no greater an infringement to their sovereignty. This is 
clearly not the case. The amici curiae brief submitted by Australia, Switzerland and 
the United Kingdom in Sosa demonstrates, for the first time,^^'' States challenging 
these broad unilateral assertions of universal civil jurisdiction made under the ATCA 
as undermining their sovereignty in the civil field of law. Moreover, the Joint 
Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, similarly noted in 
the Arrest Warrant Case that most States have not supported the exercise of universal 
civil jurisdiction made under the ATCA: 
In civil matters we are already seeing the beginning of a very broad form of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, the United States... has asserted a jurisdiction 
both over human rights violations and over major violations of international law, perpetrated 
by non-national overseas.... While this unilateral exercise of the function of guardian of 
international values has been much commented on, it has not attracted the approbation of 
States generally. 
The protests made by the States in the amici curiae brief, as well as the comments 
made by the Joint Separate Opinion, are significant as they strongly suggest that 
litigation under the ATCA may not be reflective of customary international law. 
Justice Breyer also endorsed the principle of universal civil jurisdiction on the 
basis that the legal systems of many States combine criminal and civil proceedings. 
Although it is correct that criminal and civil proceedings are combined in many legal 
systems,^ ^^ it must be emphasised that there are substantive differences between the 
two, and that this distinction is more significant in cases involving a transnational 
dimension. When criminal proceedings are initiated, the public prosecutor may take 
into consideration whether another State has a greater interest in exercising 
jurisdiction over the events under the doctrine of international comity. Similarly, in 
civil proceedings national courts have a discretion to decline the adjudication of a 
civil claim under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. However, the amici curiae 
Cassese, {Internatiortal Criminal Law), supra n. 42, pp. 290-1, at ft. 29, writing before the Sosa 
decision, commented that States had previously acquiesced to these assertions of universal civil 
jurisdiction made by US courts under the ATCA. 
221 
See, further, on this point, Van Schaack, "In Defense of Civil Redress: The Domestic Enforcement 
of Human Rights Norms in the Context of the Proposed Hague Judgements Convention" 42 Harv Int'l 
At para. 48. 
, f rt er, 
 i  
LJ 141 (2001), at pp. 145-147. 
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brief submitted by the European Commission noted that the discretion to decline 
adjudication in civil proceedings is more limited than that of the public prosecutor 
when bring a criminal prosecution.^^^ Recognising universal civil jurisdiction on the 
basis that some legal systems combine domestic criminal litigation with civil 
litigation may, therefore, run into practical difficulties when universal civil claims are 
brought in those legal systems that do not combine the two. 
Justice Breyer's rather limited reasoning upholding the legality of the ATCA 
merely provides a thin veneer of principle behind which great uncertainty on the 
matter still remains. The protests made in the amici curiae brief submitted by 
Australia, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, present a strong argument in favour 
of regarding unilateral exercises of civil jurisdiction as contrary to international law. 
General Human Rights Treaties and Universal Civil Jurisdiction 
Article 3 ECHR is the substantive provision in the European Convention that 
prohibits the use of torture and reads: 
No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
The text of this provision is noticeably silent with regard to civil redress that may be 
provided by States when committing acts of torture. Nonetheless, Strasbourg has 
interpreted Article 3 ECHR, in conjunction with both the auxiliary right to an 
effective remedy contained in Article 13 and the right to determine civil disputes 
before a domestic court contained in Article 6(1), to require that a civil remedy be 
available before the domestic courts of States party to the European Convention 
where it is alleged that an individual has been tortured.^^'' However, in situations 
where an individual has brought a civil action for acts of torture that have been 
committed outside the jurisdiction of a State party to the European Convention, and 
the forum State bears no international responsibility over the acts,'^ ^^  Strasbourg has 
"'5M / 7 r an . 213, at p. 22. 
Aksoy V. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 553, at para. 90; Aydin v. Turkey (1997) 25 E H R R 251, at para. 
93. 
In R. (On the Application o/Al-Skeini and Others) v. Secretaiy of State for Defence [2005] EWCA 
Civ 1609, an Iraqi citizen successfully brought a civil action for damages against the United Kingdom 
before its domestic courts for violations of Articles 2 and 3 E C H R performed by British soldiers in Iraq 
at a time when the United Kingdom, along with other States, had overthrown the government and were 
temporally in effective occupation of the South Eastern part of the country. 
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held that there is no obligation under the European Convention to provide redress for 
such acts. In Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom^^^ the applicant contended, inter alia, that 
the United Kingdom had failed to secure his rights under Article 3 ECHR when 
failing to provide civil redress for acts of torture that had been committed in the 
territorial jurisdiction of a State not party to the European Convention. The European 
Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber, unanimously dismissed this 
argument under Article 3, and held that: 
In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the High Contracting Party was under a duty to 
provide a civil remedy to the applicant in respect of torture. 
Similarly, in Bouzari the applicant argued that Articles 7 and 14 ICCPR 
created an obligation on States party to the International Covenant to provide civil 
redress for acts of torture committed in a foreign jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal for 
Ontario firmly rejected this claim, and held that the International Covenant does not 
require States to provide access to its courts for acts of torture committed outside of 
its jurisdiction by a foreign sovereign."^^^ 
Concluding on whether Conventional International Law Creates Universal Civil 
Jurisdiction for Torture 
It is concluding that conventional international law, and most specifically Article 14 
CAT, does not create the permissive rule of international law allowing a State to 
exercise universal civil jurisdiction over acts of torture. Accordingly, it is thus 
submitted that any assertions of universal civil jurisdiction over torture, such as those 
made by the ATCA and TVPA, wil l be unlawful unless finding a legal basis in 
customary international law. The discussion wil l now turn to consider this matter. 
Customary International Law: Universal Jurisdiction, Torture as a Jus 
Cogens Norm and Obligations Erga Omnes 
(2001) 34 E H R R 273. 
at para. 41. 
[2004] OJ No. 2800, at para. 83. C/Orakhelashvili, supra n. 141, at p. 316, who, somewhat 
remarkably, suggests that Article 7 ICCPR does in fact create universal civil jurisdiction. 
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Numerous academics have advanced the claim that customary international law 
creates universal criminal jurisdiction over all violations of jus cogens norms.^ ^^ 
Moreover, it has been further suggested that because there is an intrinsic relationship 
between jus cogens norms and obligations erga omnes^^^ that the universal principle 
should also be seen as having a theoretical basis in the erga omnes concept.'^ '^ 
Consequently, because violations of erga omnes obligations are the concern of all 
States, it is thus suggested that the prosecution of serious international offences under 
the doctrine of universal jurisdiction is an obligation erga omnes?^'^ 
The contention that the violation of a jus cogens norms gives rise to universal 
criminal jurisdiction has received judicial endorsement at both the domestic and 
international level. In Pinochet {No. 3), Lord Millet held that: 
Crimes prohibited by international law attract universal jurisdiction under customary 
international law if two conditions are satisfied. First they must be contrary to a peremptory 
norm of international law so as to infringe a jus cogens. Secondly, they must be so serious and 
on such a scale that they can justly be regarded as an attack on the international legal order. 
Isolated offences, even if committed by public officials, would not satisfy these criteria. 
Similarly, the Trial Chamber in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia commented in Furundzija that: 
At the individual level, that is, that of criminal liability, it would seem that one of the 
consequences of the jus cogens character bestowed by the international community... is that 
every State is entitled to investigate, prosecute, punish or extradite individuals... who are 
present in territory under its jurisdiction. 
Cassese (Internalional Law), supra n. 2, at p. 208; Orakhelashvili, supra n. 141, at p. 288; Randall, 
supra n. 42, at pp. 829-831; Van Alebeek, supra n. 67, at pp. 33-35. See, further, the discussion supra, 
at n. 85-92, on whether international crimes give rise to universal criminal jurisdiction under customary 
international law. 
Bassiouni, "International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes" Law and Contemporary 
Problems 25 (1996) 63, has commented that, "jus cogens refers to the legal status that certain 
international crimes reach, and obligatio erga omnes pertains to the legal implications arising out of a 
certain crime's characterisation as a jus cogens". However, it is noted that erga omnes obligations can 
exist which are not jus cogens in character. 
Van Albeek, supra n. 67, at p. 34. 
Randall, supra n. 42, at p. 831. 
[2000] 1 A C 147, at 275. On Lord Millet's judgement see, further, O'Keefe, "Customary 
International Crimes in English Courts" [2001] 72 B Y I L 293. 
Prosecutor v. Furundzija, I T C Y Trial Chamber 11, Judgement of 10 December 1998 (Case No. IT-
95-17/1-T 10), at para. J56. 
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This extract from Furundzija has subsequently been read with approval by the ILA 
Report on Universal Jurisdiction.^^^ 
Despite the concepts of universal jurisdiction, yw^ cogens and obligations erga 
omnes enjoying a close relationship with one another in international law, it is 
suggested, however, that they are theoretically different, and that the allocation of 
jurisdiction to a domestic court does not arise following the violation of a peremptory 
norm.^^^ In order to put this argument into context, it is necessary to define the 
concepts of jus cogens and obligations erga omnes in turn before then contrasting 
them from the doctrine of universal jurisdiction. 
The Definition and Scope o/Jus Cogens Norms 
Jus cogens norms are peremptory norms of customary international law that enjoy a 
higher ranking status over all other international rules. The concept of according 
certain norms a superior status in the legal order is based upon protecting the most 
fundamental values of the international community. 
Article 53 VCLT provides the authoritative definition of jus cogens: 
A peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognised by the 
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted 
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the 
same character. 
Article 53 of the Vienna Convention then applies this definition to treaties that are in 
conflict with a peremptory norm and says that they are void at the time of their 
conclusion. Given that the Vienna Convention was limited solely to issues of treaties. 
Article 53 VCLT does not provide a comprehensive account of the legal effects of jus 
cogens outside of this context. The only other reference made to peremptory norms by 
conventional international law is found in Articles 40 and 41 of the ILC Draft Articles 
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 2001. Article 41 sets 
forth the particular consequences which arise from a breach of a peremptory norm: 
paragraph I provides that States are under a positive obligation to cooperate in 
bringing the breach to an end through lawful means; and paragraph 2 provides that all 
-^^ Supra n. 45, at p. 410. 
On this point see further Inazumi, supra n. 42, at pp. 124-7. 
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States shall refrain from recognising as lawful the situation created by a breach and 
not render any aid or assistance in maintaining the breach. Outside of these references 
made by these international texts great uncertainty at present surrounds whether any 
further legal consequences ensue from the violation of a jus cogens norm.^^^ 
Significantly, the International Court has neither mentioned nor considered the term. 
In addition, controversy exists with exactly which norms have been endowed 
with a peremptory status and there is no authoritative list on the matter.'^ '^ ^ However, 
certain standards are widely recognised as being fundamental values of the 
international community. It is suggested that the prohibition on torture represents one 
such standard given that numerous international human rights instruments have 
outlawed it.^^^ In all o f these instruments the prohibition is absolute in nature and 
there are no lawful exceptions, implied limitations, or justifications for acts of 
torture.^"" Judicial statements of the highest authority have recently articulated that the 
prohibition has now become one of the most fundamental standards of the 
international community that is now to be recognised as an established norm of jus 
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cogens. 
The Definition and Scope of Obligations Erga Omnes 
Obligations erga omnes are concerned with the consequences following a breach of 
an international rule. The International Court stated in the Barcelona Traction case 
that:^ ^^ 
^" Brownlie, supra n. 2, at p. 490. 
See, generally, D'Amato, "It's a Bird, It's a Plane, It's a J i M Cogera!" 6 Conn J Int'l L 1 (1990). 
Article 5 of the Universal Declaration; Article 7 of the International Covenant; Article 3 of the 
European Convention; Art 5(2) of the American Convention on Human Rights 1969; Article 5 of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 1981; the Torture Convention; the Inter-American 
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture 1985; the European Convention for the Prevention of 
Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1987. For a summary of the 
international prohibition on torture see, generally, Nagan and Atkins, "The International Law of 
Torture: From Universal Proscription to Effective Application and Enforcement" 14 Harv Hum Rts J 
87 (2001). 
^••^ Chahal v. United Kingdom (1997) 23 E H R R 413, at paras. 79-81. See also ICCPR General 
Comment No. 20, of 10 March 1992, UN Doc. ICCPR/A/53/44, at para. 3. 
Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom (2001) 34 EHRR 273, at para. 61; Funindiija, I T C Y Trial Chamber 
II, Judgement of 10 December 1998 (Case No. IT-95-17/1-T 10), at para. 154; Pinochet (No. 3) [2000] 
1 A C 147, at 197-8. 
Case Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), ICS Reports, 
1970, p. 3. 
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An essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the 
international community as a whole, and those arising vis-a-vis another State... By their very 
nature the former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights 
involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations 
erga omnes.^'*^ 
Violation of an erga omnes obligation permits all States that are party to the 
international rule that imposes the obligation, and not just those which have been 
affected by the breach, to invoke responsibility. 
The Court continued and said that obligations erga omnes found in 
contemporary international law include, outlawing acts of aggression and genocide, 
and protecting the basic human rights such as slavery and racial discrimination.^'*'' 
Since this early decision of the International Court it has subsequently been held by 
the ICTY in Furundzija that the prohibition on torture imposes an obligation erga 
omnes?^^ 
Does Violation of a Jus Cogens Norm give rise to Universal Criminal Jurisdiction? 
From the definitions of jus cogens and obligations erga omnes it is thus clear that jus 
cogens are primarily concerned with the invalidation of treaties, while erga omnes are 
purely concerned with the responsibility of States. According to these definitions, 
both concepts only have effects at the inter-state level and neither imposes any 
obligations on the State at the individual level. '^*^ In contrast, universal jurisdiction is 
concerned with individual responsibility and the doctrine provides a legal basis for 
holding perpetrators of serious international offences accountable for their conduct. 
Despite this important distinction drawn above, Randall has nevertheless claimed that 
the universal principle may draw support from the jus cogens and erga omnes 
concepts: 
"''/Wrf.,atp. 33. 
Ibid., at p. 34. 
245 ^jf^y Chamber 11, Judgement of 10 December 1998 (Case No. 1T-95-17/1-T 10), at paras. 
151-152. See also ICCPR General Comment No. 31, of 26 May 2004, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.l3, at para. 2. 
Cf Furundzija, ibid, at para. 156. 
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If the [Barcelona Traction] dictum supports judicial remedies against State offenders, it 
logically also supports judicial remedies against individual offenders.^'" 
It is suggested that this is an erroneous contention since the erga omnes 
concept is not concerned with criminal responsibility and does not impose any 
obligations on States to exercise jurisdiction. The use of the Barcelona Traction 
dictum as authority for universal jurisdiction has rightfully been criticised by Higgins: 
It is spoken of as if it provides guidance for the contemporary application of the principle of 
universality of jurisdiction- as if the Court was affirming universal jurisdiction in respect of 
each of theses offences. Of course, the Court was doing nothing of that kind. Its dictum was 
made in the context not of asserting jurisdiction but of an examination of the law relating to 
diplomatic protection.'^ "* 
It is concluded, then, that the fact that certain conduct may violate a 
peremptory norm, whose protection is an obligation erga omnes on all States, does 
not give rise to universal criminal jurisdiction. On this matter. Lord Bingham 
commented in Jones that: 
There is no evidence that States have recognised or given effect to an international law 
obligation to exercise universal jurisdiction over claims arising from alleged breaches of 
peremptory norms of international law, nor is there any consensus of judicial and learned 
opinion that they should.^ "" 
This indeed is correct. The partly dissenting opinion of Lord Millet in Pinochet (No. 
3) was the view of just one member of the House of Lords; the other Law Lords were 
of the belief that jurisdiction over the crime of torture was established under the 
Torture Convention. Moreover, the comments made by the ITCY in Furundzija were, 
strictly speaking, obiter since it is its statute which provides the jurisdictional basis of 
the International Tribunal to prosecute those allegedly responsible for serious 
offences. 
The suggestion identified above that jurisdiction automatically arises from the 
violation of a peremptory norm, whose exercise is an obligation on all States, may be 
the result of confusion caused from the close relationship that these concepts enjoy 
Supra n. 42, at p. 831. 
Supra n. 2, at p. 57. 
[2006] U K H L 26, at para. 27. 
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with one another in international law. A l l three represent a common concern of the 
international community in protecting its most fundamental values; however, it is 
submitted that they provide different mechanisms seeking to protect these values. 
Since the concepts share a common concern, the way in which one of the concepts 
treats a certain offence may be indicative of how the other concepts should view it. 
Thus, for example, jus cogens and obligations erga omnes may become part of the 
evidence considered indicating whether a certain crime is deemed as particularly 
destructive to the legal order as a whole- this being a requisite for the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction.'^^" Yet the fact that certain offences may have satisfied the 
definitional requirements of one concept does not mean that it satisfies the definitional 
requirements of the others concepts per se. 
Does Violation of a Jus Cogens Norm give rise to Universal Civil Jurisdiction? 
If, contrary to what has been concluded above, the violation of a jus cogens norm 
does in fact gives rise to universal criminal jurisdiction- as some academics and 
judicial authority indeed presume- then it must be considered whether the violation of 
a jus cogens norm gives rise to universal civil jurisdiction as well. In the recent 
decision of Ferrini v. Federal Republic of Germany^^^ the Italian Court of Cassation 
drew such a conclusion. 
The case of Ferrini concerned an Italian national bringing a civil action 
against Germany after being deported from Italy where he was forced to work in the 
German war industry. The Court of Cassation held that deportation and forced labour 
were both international crimes and peremptory norms,^^^ and that it was well 
established that universal jurisdiction existed over crimes that infringe values of the 
international community.'^^^ In addition, it held that the peremptory nature of jus 
cogens gives all States the power to repress them not only under the doctrine of 
universal criminal jurisdicfion, but also under universal civil jurisdiction on the basis 
that there is no reason to doubt the applicability of the universal principle to civil 
proceedings.^^'' 
See further on this point, Inazumi, supra n. 42, at p. 126 
(Cass. Sez. Un. 5044/04) 87 Rivista du Diritto Internazionale 539 (2004). 
Ibid., at para. 7. 
Ibid., at para. 9. 
Ibid., al para 10. 
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It is suggested that the legal authority of this judicial decision may be doubted 
on two separate, but significant, grounds. Firstly, the legal reasoning with regard to 
universal civil jurisdiction is rather limited and the judgement lacks any theoretical 
insight into this highly uncertain matter. Secondly, it is unclear precisely why the 
Court considered that it was necessary to exercise universal jurisdiction over the 
events when the commission of the offence had began in the forum State and thus the 
Court could have assumed jurisdiction under the more established subjective 
territorial principle. This inherent contradiction renders the judgement somewhat 
unsatisfactory, and, in conjunction with its lack of any doctrinal reasoning, it is 
suggested that it is likely that this decision wi l l not be used as reflecting a State 
practice that violation of a jus cogens norm gives rise to universal civil jurisdiction.^^^ 
In the absence of a free-standing customary rule to the effect that universal 
civil jurisdiction is created by the violations of peremptory norm, scholars have 
advanced an alternative, and more subtle, argument. Adams has suggested that a civil 
claim for violation of a peremptory norm committed in a foreign jurisdiction may be 
brought under the universal criminal doctrine where such acts amount simultaneously 
to criminal and tortuous conduct in a legal system.'^ ^^ Accordingly, i f criminal 
proceedings for violation of a jus cogens norm may be brought under the universal 
principle, then it thus follows that civil proceedings may also be brought on the back 
of this claim. Indeed there may be some merit in this suggestion; Donovan and 
Roberts have asserted in a recent paper that, "State practice endorsing the exercise of 
universal civil jurisdiction as a permissive customary norm is beginning to 
emerge".^ ^^ Significantly, they then claim, somewhat contradictory, that this growing 
recognition of universal civil jurisdiction is not derived from State practice itself, but 
instead from breaking down the distinction drawn between criminal and civil law and 
then fusing the litigation of the two: 
It might be more accurate to characterise these developments, however, as an increasing 
recognition that the well-accepted modern rationale for exercising universal jurisdiction to 
impose criminal penalties also justifies exercising it to provide civil remedies. That is, rather 
than looking solely or primarily for separate and independent evidence of an emerging 
principle of universal civil jurisdiction, we might be better served by considering whether our 
C/Orakhelashvili, supra n. 141, at pp. 308 and 310. 
Adams, supra n. 141, at p. 264. 
Donovan and Roberts, supra n. 184, at p. 153. 
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existing understanding of universal jurisdiction encompasses a civil dimension and, if so, its 
, ,. 258 
appropriate scope and limits. 
Despite an abundance of scholarly literature available that attempts to dismantle the 
distinction drawn between criminal and civil law,^^^ it is significant to once again 
emphasis that States have only consented to their sovereignty being limited in the 
criminal domain. Since none of the literature that has assimilated transnational civil 
litigation with its criminal counterpart has provided any cogent legal reasoning which 
adequately addresses this matter, it is suggested that such litigation would, more than 
likely, be contrary to customary international law. 
Conclusion 
The conclusion is drawn that, at present, neither conventional nor customary 
international law provides a legal basis for universal civil jurisdiction over acts of 
torture. What has become most apparent after reviewing the rather limited 
jurisprudence of those domestic courts which have considered the legality of universal 
civil jurisdiction, most notably the US Supreme Court in Sosa and the Italian Court of 
Cassation in Ferrini, is that there is an assumption that because international law 
recognises universal jurisdiction in the criminal field of law then it does so 
automatically in the civil field of law. This chapter, however, has found that the 
established bases of criminal jurisdiction do not, per se, apply to civil jurisdiction. At 
present only the US unilaterally asserts universal civil jurisdiction over acts of torture, 
and thus it cannot be said that there is a widespread and consistent practice amongst 
States on this matter. Moreover, the amici curiae brief submitted by Australia, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom in Sosa significantly provides clear evidence of 
States protesting to such assertions of jurisdiction. 
Ibid 
259 See, inter alia, on this point: Friedman, "Beyond the Tort/Crime Distinction" 76 B U L Rev 103 
(1996); Hall, "Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts" 43 Colum L Rev 759 (1943); Stephens, 
"Conceptualising Violence Under International Law: Do Tort Remedies Fit the Crime?" 60 Alb L Rev 
579 (1996). 
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Chapter 3 
IMMUNITY 
It is a basic principle of international law that one sovereign State (the forum State) does not adjudicate 
on the conduct of a foreign State. The foreign State is entitled to procedural immunity from the process 
of the forum State. This immunity extends to both criminal and civil liability.' 
General Principles of Immunity 
The Doctrine of State Immunity and its Relationship with Jurisdiction 
The doctrine of State immunity serves as a bar to a claim of jurisdiction and is granted 
so as to preserve orderly relations within the international community.^ Although the 
doctrine may be invoked to bar proceedings before international tribunals, it has been 
said that its main significance relates to its effects upon the jurisdiction of national 
' R. V. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte {No. 3) [2000] 1 A C 
147, at 20\,per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. [Hereinafter referred to as Pinochet (No. J)]. 
^ On immunity see generally: Badr, State Immunity, 1984, The Hague; Brohmer, State Immunity and 
the Violation of Human Rights, 1997, The Hague; Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 6* 
ed., 2003, OUP, chapter 16; Cassese, International Law, 2"'' ed., 2005, OUP, chapter 6, [hereinafter 
referred to as Cassese (International Law)]; Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2003, OUP, chapter 
14, [hereinafter referred to as Cassese (International Criminal Law)]; Fox, International Law and the 
Restraints on the Exercise of Jurisdiction by National Courts of States, in Evans, (eds.). International 
Law, 2"'' ed., 2006, OUP, chapter 12, [hereinafter referred to as Fox (Restraints on the Exercise of 
Jurisdiction)]; Fox, The Law of State Immunity, 2004, OUP, [hereinafter referred to as Fox (State 
Immunity)]; Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 6* ed., 2004, Sweet and Maxwell, 
chapter 6; Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It, 1994, OUP, chapter 
5; Jennings and Watts, Oppenheim's International Law, 9* ed., 1992, London, at pp. 339-79; Schreur, 
State Immunity: Some Recent Developments, 1988, Cambridge; Shaw, International Law, 5* ed., 2003, 
CUP, chapter 13; Simbeye, Immunity and International Criminal Lcnv, 2004, Aldershot: Ashgate; 
Watts, "The Legal Position in International Law of Heads of States, Heads of Governments and 
Foreign Ministers" 247 HR 1994 111 13; and Wickremasinghe, Immunities Enjoyed by Officials of 
States and International Organisations, in Evans, (eds.). International Law, 2"'* ed., 2006, OUP, 
chapter 13. 
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courts.^ A successful plea of immunity before a national court wi l l prevent a State 
from exercising adjudicative jurisdiction over a dispute that involves a foreign State. 
The grant of immunity to a foreign State does not act as a defence to absolve the 
substantive liability of that State, but instead as a procedural bar to prevent the 
substantive issues from being heard by a domestic court. 
Despite the concepts of jurisdiction and immunity being described as 
"inextricably linked",'' they are, nonetheless, two separate and distinct concepts within 
international law. Jurisdiction is said to be concerned with the ability of a State to 
exercise sovereign authority over persons, property or events; whereas immunity, in 
contrast, is concerned with exceptions that are made to the rules on judicial 
jurisdiction. The International Court of Justice^ commented in the Arrest Warrant 
case that, as a matter of logic, immunity should only be addressed once there has been 
an establishment of jurisdiction.^ However, the few domestic decision which have 
been brought seeking civil redress for acts of torture committed in a foreign 
jurisdiction have focused exclusively on the issue of immunity. Consequently, and 
made evident from the discussion in chapter 2, almost no jurisprudence concerning 
universal civil jurisdiction over acts of torture has so far been developed.^ 
The Rationale of Immunity 
Two main reasons provide the rationale for domestic courts being debarred from 
adjudicating disputes involving foreign States.^  Indeed, the close relationship which 
immunity enjoys with jurisdiction is reflected in the fact that the rationales of both are 
strongly allied. Firstly, in a horizontal legal system where States of the international 
community are in an equal standing with one another, one sovereign State cannot 
claim jurisdiction over another. This principle is expressed in the maxim par in parem 
^ Fox (Slate Immunity), ibid., at p. 19. 
" The Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthaj, in the Case Concerning 
the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, {Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium), ICJ Report, 2002, p. 
3, at para. 3. 
^ Hereinafter referred to as either the International Court or ICJ. 
* ICJ Report, 2002, p. 3, at para. 46. 
' It is suggested that the reason for this may be because immunity from judicial jurisdiction is a 
preliminary plea made by a State when proceedings are commenced. 
This point is common to all of the academic literature. For the most extensive comments, and other 
rationales, see generally, Fox (State Immunity), supra n. 2, at pp. 28-33. 
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non habet imperium, and reflects the sovereign equality and independence of States.' 
In The Schooner Exchange,''^ the US Supreme Court commented: 
This perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns, and this common interest 
impelling them to mutual intercourse, and an interchange of good office with each other, have 
given rise to a class of cases in which every sovereign is understood to waive the exercise of a 
part of that complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction, which has been stated to be the attribute 
of every nation." 
The second rationale for immunity is non-intervention in the internal affairs of 
another State. Although this rationale similarly derives from notions of sovereignty, it 
does however have a more practical underlying basis. The reasons why States cannot 
have their internal disputes resolved in foreign courts is because of the factual 
impossibility of the forum State enforcing the judgement. The application of forcible 
measures by one State against another is regarded by international law as an unlawful 
act which is generally prohibited.'^ In the absence of a power of enforcement, 
domestic courts are therefore not to intervene in any of the acts committed by foreign 
sovereigns. 
From an Absolute Doctrine of Immunity to a Restrictive One 
At the time when the international community was established in the early 18* 
century, States applied an absolute doctrine of immunity whereby all acts performed 
by a foreign sovereign would be immune from the jurisdiction of a domestic court.'^ 
By the late 19"' century States had begun to participate increasingly in commercial 
trade with private individuals and national courts soon developed a theory of 
restrictive immunity whereby they could adjudicate the commercial disputes arising 
between the two. According to the theory of restrictive immunity, a distinction is 
' On the equality of States in international law see, further, Jennings and Watts, supra n. 2, at pp. 339-
70, who significantly comment, at p. 342, that, "it is doubtful whether any of these considerations 
supplies a satisfactory basis for the doctrine of immunity. There is no obvious impairment of the rights 
of equality, or independence, or dignity of a State, if it is subjected to ordinary judicial processes within 
the territory of a foreign State... The grant of immunity from suit amounts in effect to a denial of a 
legal remedy in respect of what may be a valid legal claim; as such, immunity is open to objection". 
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch. 116 (1812). 
" Ibid., at 137, per Marshall CJ. 
Fox {State Immunity), supra n. 2, at pp. 28-9. 
For an example of the absolute doctrine of immunity being applied by a U K court see, Le Parlement 
Be/ge(1880) 5 Prob. Div. 197. 
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drawn between the acts o f a State that are performed in the exercise of a pubHc or 
sovereign function, acta de jure imperii, and those acts which are performed by a 
State in a private capacity, acta de jure gestiontis. Immunity from judicial jurisdiction 
will only be granted with respect to the former acts, and denied with respect to the 
latter. 
The restrictive doctrine of immunity has been widely accepted by numerous 
States; however, it must be emphasised that some States still apply the absolute 
doctrine.''' Brownlie has identified twenty States whose national courts apply a 
restrictive approach to immunity,'^ and another eleven who support this restrictive 
approach in principle.'^ In addition, eight common law jurisdictions have enacted 
domestic legislation which codifies the restrictive doctrine of immunity.'^ Moreover, 
both the European Convention on State Immunity 1972,'^ and the UN Convention on 
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property 2004,'^ similarly provide a 
comprehensive code based on the restrictive doctrine.^° Indeed, the State practice on 
the matter suggests that the restrictive doctrine of immunity is to be regarded as a rule 
of customary international law; and in her detailed study on the law of State 
immunity, Fox has drawn the conclusion that the restrictive doctrine of immunity 
should now be viewed as the prevailing doctrine.^' 
Immunity Accorded to States and its Officials 
Immunity Accorded to States 
The main adherent to the absolute rule is China. For a summary of other States who still accept the 
principle of absolute immunity see, Brownlie, supra n. 2, p. 324, at ft. 31. C/Parlett, "Immunity in 
Civil Proceedings for Torture: The Emerging Exception" [2006] E H R L R 49, at p. 53, who comments 
that, "a rule of absolute immunity no longer exists in international law". 
Ibid., p. 323, at fl. 25. 
Ibid., p. 324, at ft. 26. 
" The US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976; the U K State Immunity Act 1978; the Singapore 
State Immunity Act 1979; the Pakistan State Immunity Ordinance 1981; the South African Foreign 
State Immunities Act 1981; the Malaysian Immunities and Privileges Act 1984; the Australian Foreign 
States Immunities Act 1985; and the Canadian State Immunity Act 1985. 
" 16 May 1972, 74 E T S 3. For a comment see, Sinclair, "The European Convention on State 
Immunity" (1973) I C L Q 254. Only eight States are party to the Convention. 
" December 16 2004, UN G A Resolution 59/38. 
°^ For a historical account of the development of restrictive immunity in both common law and civil 
law jurisdictions see, generally, Sinclair, "Law of Sovereign Immunity: Recent Developments" (1980) 
167 R C 113. 
'^ Fox {State Immunity), supra n. 2, at pp. 257-8. 
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The primary beneficiary of State immunity is, as the term suggests, the State itself 
According to the restrictive doctrine of immunity, it is only the sovereign acts 
performed by a States that are immune from the adjudicative jurisdiction of a foreign 
national court. The method of distinguishing between sovereign and non-sovereign 
State acts is highly complex,^^ most particularly in borderline disputes. A substantial 
body of both judicial and academic opinion has frequently considered this matter, and 
given that this discussion is well beyond the scope of this paper no attempt shall be 
made to enter into it.^'' 
The international conventions and domestic legislation which codify the 
restrictive doctrine of immunity all follow a similar pattern based on distinguishing 
between sovereign and non-sovereign acts. They begin with a presumption in favour 
of recognising the immunity of a State and then list a number of general exceptions. 
Exceptions to State immunity which are common to all include, proceedings relating 
to contracts which are of a commercial nature, contracts of employment, immoveable 
property, personal injury, and damage to tangible property. 
Immunity Accorded to State Officials 
Although it is the State which is granted the immunity from jurisdiction by 
international law, it is through its government and public officials that the State 
exercises sovereign authority. International law similarly accords immunity to State 
officials so as to not circumvent the rationales behind the doctrine that were identified 
above. However, the immunity granted to officials is not vested in them personally, 
but instead in the State. As such, a State may waive the immunity of its officials.^' 
Customary international law recognises two forms of immunity that may be 
accorded to State officials, and the form of immunity granted is dependant upon the 
Wirth, "Immunity for Core Crimes? The ICJ's Judgement in the Congo v. Belgium case" (2002) 13 
EJIL 877, at p. 882. 
Browniie, supra n. 2, at p. 327. 
The Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal in the Arrest Warrant 
case commented, at para. 72, that the meaning of sovereign and non-sovereign acts is, "subject to 
continuously changing interpretations which varies with time reflecting the changing priorities of 
society". 
" See, In re Grand Jury Proceedings Doe No. 770, 817 F.2d 1008 (1987), concerning the Philippines 
waiving the immunity of President Marcos. 
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status that the individual holds in public office. Both forms of immunity co-exist and 
overlap to a certain degree with one another. 
Immunity Ratione Personae: Immunity Accorded to Senior State Officials 
Immunity ratione personae, otherwise known as personal immunity, is an absolute 
bar to the exercise of jurisdiction by a foreign national court. Such immunity is 
granted so as to ensure and protect the effective functional performance of certain key 
State officials who are recognised by international law as wielding significant State 
authority. Were total immunity from foreign judicial proceedings denied to these key 
State officials then the internal stability of the State, and indeed international 
relations, may potentially be severely hampered. Accordingly, immunity ratione 
personae bars jurisdiction in civil and criminal proceedings, for acts performed in 
both an official and private capacity, that may have been committed either before or 
when the individual came into public office.^^ 
In the Arrest Warrant case, the International Court had to consider which State 
officials were entitled to claim immunity ratione personae when the incumbent 
Congolese Foreign Affairs Minister was charged by a Belgium investigating 
magistrate with crimes against humanity and grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions.^^ The Court began by observing at the outset that it was firmly 
established that customary international law grants immunity ratione personae to 
Heads of State,^ ^ Heads of Government and Foreign Affairs Ministers.^^ With regard 
to the immunity of the last, the Court recognised that Foreign Affairs Ministers, who 
are in charge of a State's diplomatic activity and generally acts as their representative 
at intergovernmental meetings, performs a comparable function to that of a Head of 
*^ In the Arrest Warrant case, ICJ Report, 2002, p. 3 the International Court confirmed, at para. 58, that 
there were no exceptions in customary international law to immunity ratione personae. 
" The facts of the case are considered in detail in chapter 2 at n. 47-50. For a listing of case comments 
on this decision see chapter 2 at ft. 47. 
A similar obiter comment is made by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Pinochet (No. 3) [2000] 1 A C 147, 
at 201-2. 
ICJ Report, 2002, p. 3, at para. 51. This part of the judgement has been read with approval by 
Cassese, "When may Senior State Officials be Tried for International Crimes? Some Comments on the 
Congo V. Belgium case" (2002) 13 E J I L 853, at p. 855. [Hereinafter referred to as Cassese (Senior State 
Officials)]. In addition, Articles 29 and 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomafic Relations 1961 
accords immunity ratione personae to diplomats, and the UN Convention on Special Missions 1969 
accords immunity ratione personae to officials on special missions in foreign States. 
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State.^° In order to effectively perform this role, a Foreign Affairs Minister must be 
freely able to travel when required and must, therefore, be accorded absolute 
immunity so as to avoid the risk of being exposed to legal proceedings which may act 
as a deterrent to such international travel.^' 
The precise extent to which immunity ratione personae extends to other senior 
State officials is left uncertain following the Arrest Warrant case which was solely 
concerned with the immunity of a Foreign Affairs Minister. However, the reasoning 
that a State official who performs a comparable function to that of a Head of State is 
entitled to the same immunity ratione personae may be applied in analogous cases.^ ^ 
Recently, the UK District Courts have applied this reasoning to a Minister of 
Defence^^ and a Minister of Commerce^'' and held that both individuals were entitled 
to immunity ratione personae. 
Immunity ratione personae attaches to a senior State official by virtue of the 
position that he holds. Once the individual leaves senior public office he no longer has 
an official function to perform, and thus the need for an absolute immunity from 
foreign jurisdiction no longer exists. Although a senior State official no longer enjoys 
immunity ratione personae when leaving office, he does, however, enjoy immunity 
ratione materiae for the official acts carried out whilst in public office. 
Immunity Ratione Materiae: Immunity Accorded to all State Officials 
Immunity ratione materiae, otherwise known as functional immunity, is a partial 
immunity to the exercise of jurisdiction by a foreign domestic court. Such immunity is 
accorded to the public acts which are carried out by State officials.^^ Immunity 
ratione materiae is premised on the notion that most State officials do not enjoy 
immunity in their own right, but because public acts are performed on behalf of the 
^° Ibid., at para. 53. C/the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Al-Khasawneh, at paras. 1-2; the Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert, at para. 16; and Watts, supra n. 2, at p. 102, who comments that, 
"Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers, although senior and import figures, do not symbolise or 
personify their State in the way that Heads of State do". 
'^ at para. 55. 
" C/the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert, at para. 14, who criticised this reasoning of 
the Court. 
Mofaz, 12* Feburary 2004, unreported decision of Bow Street Magistrate. The judgement is 
reproduced in (2004) 53 I C L Q 771. 
Bo Xilai, S"" November 2005, unreported decision of Bow Street Magistrate, cited by 
Wickremasinghe, supra n. 2, at p. 409. 
" PropendFinance Pty Ltd v. Sing(\991) The Times, May 2, CA. 
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State they are, therefore, attributable to the State. So as to not indirectly circumvent 
the immunity that is accorded to foreign sovereigns, public acts which are carried out 
by State officials as part of their official functions are immune from jurisdiction. On 
the rationale for this form of immunity, Lord Justice Diplock has commented: 
A foreign sovereign government, apart from personal sovereigns, can only act through agents, 
and the immunity to which it is entitled in respect of its acts would be illusory unless extended 
also to its agents in respects of acts done by them on its behalf To sue an envoy in respect of 
acts done in his official capacity would be, in effect, to sue his government irrespective of 
whether the envoy had ceased to be 'in post' at the date of suit.^^ 
Where immunity ratione personae attaches to a State official by virtue of 
holding a senior governmental post, immunity ratione materiae, in contrast, attaches 
to the public acts performed by State officials. Immunity ratione materiae is therefore 
determined by reference to the nature of the act in question rather than by reference to 
the office held by the official. Shaw has found that the definition of what constitutes 
an official act for the purposes of immunity ratione materiae is somewhat unclear in 
international law.^^ In a similar vein, Parlett notes this uncertainty and suggests that, 
"the distinction applied by the restrictive theory of State immunity, that of acta de 
jure imperii and acta de jure gestionis, seems not unlike the distinction between acts 
in an official and private capacity applied when determining whether acts are covered 
by immunity ratione materiae"?^ It is suggested that Parlett's claim is indeed correct 
given that the act with respect to which the official claims immunity ratione materiae 
must be an act with respect to which the State itself may claim immunity. 
Since immunity ratione materiae attaches to the official acts performed by 
public officials on behalf of the State, the immunity wi l l be accorded to such acts 
regardless of whether the public official is in office. However, once the individual has 
left public office he no longer carries out acts on behalf of the State and thus no 
longer enjoy immunity ratione personae. 
Private acts carried out by State officials are not performed on behalf of the 
State and therefore cannot be attributed to the sovereign State. Consequently, such 
acts do not attract immunity ratione materiae. State officials wi l l be subject to the 
Zoernsch v. Waldcock [1964] 2 All ER 256. 
" Shaw, supra n. 2, at p. 658. 
' Parlett, supra n. 14, at p. 59. 
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jurisdiction of a foreign court for any private acts that they perform. However, senior 
State officials, who enjoy immunity ratione personae, wi l l only be subject to this 
jurisdiction when no longer holding their public position. This was recently confirmed 
by the International Court in the Arrest Warrant case when commenting, obiter dicta, 
that a senior State official who no longer holds office enjoys complete immunity from 
the criminal jurisdiction of another state except "for acts committed in a private 
capacity".''^ 
Immunity Accorded in Criminal Proceedings for the 
Commission of International Crimes 
Individual Criminal Responsibility and the Development of International Criminal 
Law 
International law has always rejected any notion of a State being held criminally 
responsible for the commission of an international crime, but has accepted the 
criminal liability of individuals who commit such crimes. Thus, the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg has held that those who commit international crimes 
wil l be personally accountable for their conduct: 
Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by 
punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be 
enforced."" 
Following the Nuremberg precedent, where those responsible for the atrocities 
committed in World War I I stood trial for their conduct, further developments have 
been made in the field of international criminal law. The first o f the two most 
significant developments in holding individuals accountable for their internationally 
criminal conduct is at the international level where the Ad Hoc Tribunals for the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the International Criminal Court, have been 
ICJ Report, 2002, p. 3, at para. 61. This obiter comment made by the International Court is 
unqualified with regard to whether the commission of an international crime by a State official is to be 
regarded as an act performed in an official or private capacity, and is considered infra at n. 144-153. 
''° Trials of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Vol. I, at p. 223. 
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created. Secondly, at the inter-state level, several multilateral treaties criminalizing 
international crimes have been drafted and widely ratified. This part of the discussion 
seeks to identify the current status of customary international law when according 
immunity to individuals alleged to have perpetrated international crimes in light of 
both of these developments. Given that this paper is concerned with obtaining a civil 
remedy before a domestic court, the immunities available before an international 
criminal tribunal wi l l only be considered briefly. Once having identified the status of 
immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of a domestic court in proceedings for the 
commission of an international crime, attention wil l then turn to the status of the 
doctrine in the civil field of law. 
Immunity Accorded before International Criminal Tribunals 
One of the rationales underlying the doctrine of State immunity is that one sovereign 
cannot exercise jurisdiction over another in a legal system whereby States enjoy an 
equal standing with one another.'" Accordingly, State immunity constitutes a 
procedural bar in proceedings involving a foreign sovereign brought before a 
domestic court. Such a rationale, however, is not applicable to the jurisdiction of an 
international criminal tribunal where proceedings are not conducted within a State's 
legal system. Since Nuremberg it has been accepted that official status, including that 
of a Head of State, may not be pleaded as a bar to the jurisdiction of an international 
tribunal.''^ This principle has been said to be "indisputably declaratory of customary 
international law","*^ and has been expressed recently in Article 7(2) of the Statute of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 1993, Article 6(2) of 
the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 1994, and Article 27 of 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998."'' However, the 
See the discussion supra at n. 8-10. 
Article 7 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 1945, and Article 6 of 
the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Tokyo 1945. The Special Court for Sierra Leone 
held in Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Immunity from Jurisdiction, Judgement of 31" May 2004, (Case 
No. SCSL-03-01-1), at para. 52, that, "the sovereign equality of States [doctrine] does not prevent a 
Head of State from being prosecuted before an international criminal court". 
Prosecutor v. Furundzija, I T C Y Trial Chamber II, Judgement of 10 December 1998, (Case No. IT-
95-17/1-T 10), at para. 140. 
On immunities before the international criminal tribunals see further: Akande, "International Law 
Immunities and the International Criminal Court" 98 AJIL 407 (2004); and Gaeta, Official Capacity 
and Immunities, In Cassese, Gaeta and Jones, (eds.). The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court: A Commentary, 2002, OUP. 
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International Court has held that the denial of immunity in these legal instruments is 
applicable solely to these tribunals and does not create an exception in customary 
international law to immunities available before domestic courts.''^ 
Immunity Ratione Personae from Criminal Jurisdiction for the Commission of 
International Crimes 
The International Court in the Arrest Warrant case had to consider whether 
international crimes created an exception to immunity ratione personae from the 
criminal jurisdiction of a foreign domestic court when Belgium had initiated criminal 
proceedings against the incumbent Congolese Foreign Affairs Minister for war crimes 
and crimes against humanity.'*^ In reconciling the conflicting interests of ending 
impunity and preserving harmonious relations at the interstate-level, both of which 
were accepted to be of high importance to the international community, the Court 
stated: 
That it is unable to deduce from [the State] practice that there exists under customary 
international law any form of exception to the rule according immunity from criminal 
jurisdiction and inviolability to incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs, where they are 
suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes against humanity."' 
The Court held that it was necessary for immunity ratione personae to remain 
absolute i f senior State officials were to effectively perform their function in 
international relations. In essence, the denial of immunity ratione personae in 
proceedings for international crimes would represent a greater interference to 
international relations than it would serve in protecting human rights'*^ since the 
removal of immunity would, in effect, only prevent senior officials from travelling 
abroad."*^ The International Court was keen to emphasise that the immunity ratione 
personae only bars prosecution for a certain period of time and does not exonerate the 
"' The Arrest Warrant case, ICJ Report, 2002, p. 3, at para. 58. 
"•^ /Wrf., at paras. 56-61. 
"' Ibid., at para. 58. 
"* Tunks, "Diplomats or Defendants? Defining the Future of Head of State Immunity" 52 Duke LJ 651 
(2002), at pp. 678-9. See, further, Gaeta, supra n. 44, at pp. 985-9, who submits that immunity ratione 
personae should prevail over international crimes so long as there is no risk of impunity. 
"' Akande, supra n. 44, at p. 411. 
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person from criminal responsibility.^" The Court then identified four instances where 
international law denied a senior State official immunity from criminal jurisdiction: 
where proceedings are brought in the domestic courts of their own country; where the 
State they represent has decided to waive their immunity; where the senior State 
official is no longer in office they may be tried before a foreign domestic court for 
acts committed in a private capacity whilst in office; where they are subject to 
proceedings before an international criminal tribunal.^' 
State practice has consistently reflected this trend of according immunity 
ratione personae in criminal proceedings conducted in foreign jurisdiction for 
international crimes. In Ghadaffi, the French Court of Cassation held that the Libyan 
Head of State enjoyed immunity ratione personae in criminal proceedings for acts of 
international terrorism leading to murder and the destruction of an aircraft.^^ 
Similarly, the Spanish Audiencia Nacional held in Fidel Castro that the Cuban Head 
of State was immune from the criminal jurisdiction of a domestic Spanish court.^^ 
Moreover, in Pinochet {No. 3) all of the Lords in the majority held, obiter, that a Head 
of State in office would have enjoyed immunity for the acts of torture.^'' 
Immunity Ratione Materiae from Criminal Jurisdiction for the Commission of 
International Crimes 
The Pinochet litigation concerned an attempt made by the Spanish Government to 
have Senator Pinochet extradited from the United Kingdom to stand trial in Spain for, 
inter alia, acts of torture and hostage-taking carried out whilst Pinochet was Head of 
State in Chile. It was not alleged that Senator Pinochet had personally committed any 
of these acts, but instead that these acts were carried out in pursuance of a conspiracy 
'° ICJ Report, 2002, p. 3, at para. 60. 
Ibid., at para. 61. 
" Cour de Cassation, Chambre Criminelle, n"" March 2001, No. 1414. For a comment see, Zappala, 
"Do Heads of State in Office Enjoy Immunity from Jurisdiction for International Crimes? The Ghadaffi 
case before the French Cour de Cassation" (2001) 12 EJIL 595. 
" Audiencia Nacional, 4* March 1999, (No. 1999/2723). See also, H.S.A. et al v. S.A., Cass. 2e Civ., 
12"" February 2003, No. P.02.1139.F, where a Belgian court dismissed criminal proceedings for crimes 
against humanity and war crimes against the Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, on the grounds of 
immunity ratione personae. 
[2000] 1 A C 147. See, for example, the speech of Lord Browne-Wilkinson at 201-2. Recently, first 
instance courts have dismissed two applications brought in the U K for grave breaches of the Geneva 
Convention against the Israeli Minister of Defence in Mofaz, 12* Feburary 2004, unreported decision 
of Bow Street Magistrate; and acts of torture brought against the Zimbabwean Head of State in 
Mugabe, 14"" January 2004, unreported decision of Bow Street Magistrate, both on the grounds of 
immunity ratione personae. Both judgements are reproduced in (2004) 53 I C L Q 769. 
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to which he was a party and with his knowledge. When the UK Magistrates issued 
two provisional arrest warrants, Pinochet petitioned the High Court. The Divisional 
Court quashed these arrest warrants when finding that Pinochet enjoyed immunity 
from criminal procedure as the alleged offences were held to official acts that had 
been performed in the exercise of his function as a Head of State.^ ^ By a 3-2 majority, 
the House of Lords overturned the findings of the Divisional Court and held that 
Pinochet did not enjoy immunity from jurisdiction.^^ Lords Nicholls found that 
customary international law only accords immunity ratione materiae to a former 
Head of State for acts which it recognised as falling within the scope of an official 
function of a Head of State.^ ^ Lord Steyn endorsed this view and held that acts 
condemned by international law, such as torture and hostage-taking, cannot constitute 
official conduct said to be performed as a function o f a Head o f State.^ ^ Lord 
Hoffmann concurred with both of these judgements . In contrast. Lords Slynn and 
Lloyd both dissented from the majority when finding that because the alleged conduct 
had been exercised under colour of law, it had thus been performed in the execution 
of sovereign authority.^° Moreover, since it could not be shown that there was any 
express international convention. State practice or general consensus that the 
commission of international crimes constituted an exception to immunity ratione 
materiae, Senator Pinochet was therefore entitled to claim immunity for his official 
acts.^' 
The judgement was subsequently set aside when it was revealed that Lord 
Hoffmann should have been disqualified from sitting on the Appellate Committee of 
the House of Lords due to the ties that he had with Amnesty International who were 
" Re Augusta Pinochet Ugarte, 28 October 1998, unreported decision of the Divisional Court, 
reproduced in (1999) 38 I L M 68. 
R. V. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. I) [2000] 1 A C 
61. For a comment see, Fox, "The First Pinochet case: Immunity of a Former Head of State" (1999) 48 
ICLQ 207. 
" / W . , at 110-1. 
Ibid., ail 16. 
"/Wi/.,at 118. 
*° Lord Lloyd commented. Ibid., at 95, that, "where a person is accused of organising the commission 
of crimes as the head of the government... and carries out those crimes through the agency of the 
police and the secret service, the inevitable conclusion is that he was acting in a sovereign capacity and 
not in a personal or private one". 
Ibid., at 79,per Lord Slynn. 
74 
interveners in the case.^ ^ A new hearing was convened; this time before seven Law 
Lords. 
A six-member majority of the House of Lords arrived at the conclusion that a 
former Head of State does not enjoy immunity ratione materiae in criminal 
proceeding for the international crime of torture, but on profoundly different 
grounds." Where the majority in Pinochet (No. 1) had reached this conclusion by 
reasoning that the heinous crime of torture must always be construed as a personal 
act, the majority in Pinochet (No. 3), save Lord Hutton, based the denial of immunity 
on the Convention against Torture.^'' However, each Law Lord in the majority handed 
down a differing individual opinion whereby reliance was placed on the Torture 
Convention to a varying degree. 
Lord Brown-Wilkinson, the presiding Law Lord, held that both the definition 
of torture and the obligation to extradite or prosecute offenders laid down by the 
Convention is entirely inconsistent with any retention of immunity ratione materiae.^^ 
In his opinion, the very objective of the Torture Convention would have been 
frustrated i f State officials, who are by definition the only ones capable of committing 
the act, are granted immunity from suit: 
If the implementation of a torture regime is a public function giving rise to immunity ratione 
materiae, this produces bizarre results... Under the Convention the international crime of 
torture can only be committed by an official or someone in an official capacity. They would 
all be entitled to immunity. It would follow that there can be no case outside Chile in which a 
successful prosecution for torture can be brought unless the State of Chile is prepared to waive 
its right to its officials' immunity. Therefore the whole elaborate structure of universal 
jurisdiction over torture committed by its officials is rendered abortive and one of the main 
R. V. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte {No. 2) [2000] 1 A C 
119. 
R. V. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte {No. 3) [2000] 1 A C 
147. The academic literature on Pinochet {No. 3) is extensive. See generally: Barker, "The Future of 
Former Head of State Immunity after ex parte Pinochet" [1999] 48 I C L Q 937; Bianchi, "Immunity 
versus Human Rights: The Pinochet case" (1999) 10 EJIL 237; Black-Branch, Sovereign Immunity 
Under International Law: The Case q/"Pinochet, in Woodhouse, (eds.). The Pinochet case: A Legal and 
Constitutional Analysis, 2000, Hart Publishing; Chinkin, "Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan 
Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte {No. 3)" 93 AJIL 703 (1999); Denza, "Ex parte 
Pinochet: Lacuna or Leap?" [1999] 48 ICLQ 949; Fox, "Pinochet {No. 3)" [1999] 48 ICLQ 681, 
[hereinafter referred to as Fox {Pinochet {No.3))]; Hopkins, "Pinochet {No. 3) [1999] 58 C L J 461; 
Nicholls, "Reflections on Pinochet" 41 VJIL 140 (2000); Van Alebeek, "The Pinochet Case: 
International Human Rights Law on Trial" [2000] 71 B Y I L 29; and Warbrick, Salgado, and Goodwin, 
"The Pinochet cases in the United Kingdom" (1999) 2 Y B Int'l Hum L 91. 
*" GA Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOP, 39* Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1985) of 10* 
December 1984. [Hereinafter referred to as either the Torture Convention or the C A T ] . 
" Pinochet {No. 3) [2000] 1 A C 147, at 205. 
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objectives of the Torture Convention- to provide a system under which there is no safe haven 
for tortures- will have been frustrated.... The notion of continued immunity for ex-heads of 
State is inconsistent with the provisions of the Torture Convention.** 
In his judgement, Lord Browne-Wilkinson placed great emphasis on the fact that all 
three States were party to the Torture Convention and that immunity would only be 
denied once all three had ratified the Convention, the date when they agreed to 
exercise the obligatory extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over acts of torture.^^ Lord 
Saville, who based his conclusion entirely on the Torture Convention, similarly found 
that immunity ratione materiae could not co-exist with the terms of the Convention.^^ 
Lord Hope noted that although torture was regarded as an international crime by 
customary international law, it was not until Chile had ratified the Torture Convention 
that immunity ratione materiae could not be invoked.^^ 
The remaining majority took a broader approach. Lord Phillips held that 
customary international law denies immunity ratione materiae for international 
crimes where States have agreed by way of treaty for foreign domestic courts to 
exercise jurisdiction over them.^" Lord Millet was of the belief that all international 
crimes contrary to jus cogens are subject to universal jurisdiction under customary 
international law.^' In his opinion, the Torture Convention merely affirmed this and 
imposed the obligation on State parties to exercise jurisdiction over the c r i m e . I f 
immunity were accorded to a former Head of State then this would clearly be 
inconsistent with the obligations contained in the Convention.''^ Finally, Lord Hutton 
held that it was customary international law that denied immunity ratione materiae 
over the international crime of torture.^'* 
Lord Goff dissented and held that the denial of immunity for a former Head of 
State charged with the international crime of torture can only be achieved by way of 
express agreement and not implied into the Torture Convention like the majority had 
done. In his opinion: 
''Ibid. 
*' Ibid., at 204-5. 
*' Ibid., at 266-7. 
*' Ibid., at 247-8. 
'° Ibid., at 289. 
" Ibid., at 275. 
Ibid., at 276. 
" Ibid., at 277-8. 
Ibid., at 259. 
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How extraordinary it would be, and indeed what a trap would be created for the unwary, if 
State immunity could be waived in a treaty sub silentioJ^ 
According to Lord Goff, States that had become party to the Convention had not 
agreed to exclude immunity ratione materiae at the time of ratification and had they 
been aware of the contrary then the number of signatories would have been far 
smaller.^^ 
Despite the majority arriving at the same conclusion that Senator Pinochet was 
not entitled to claim immunity, the fact that each judgement relied to a different extent 
on the Torture Convention and customary international law prevents any common 
ratio decendi being drawn from the case. In addition, the individual judgements in 
Pinochet (No. 3) have been described as being rather convoluted with their treatment 
of many aspects of international law, sometimes to the point of incomprehensibility.^^ 
Accordingly, this lack of clarity when framing the legal issues thus inhibits any 
significant weight being attributed to the reasoning of the case in terms of establishing 
a precedent. Furthermore, the denial of immunity based on customary international 
law considerations, most notably by Lords Phillips, Millet and Hutton, were deployed 
with great confidence in the judgement,^* but at the time of the judgement there was a 
shortage of practice about the consequences which ensue from the violation of an 
international crime contrary to a norm of jus cogensJ^ When the judgement in 
Pinochet {No. 3) was delivered, some academics strongly contended that State 
immunity could no longer be invoked in any proceedings concerning an alleged 
violation o f a peremptory norm on the basis that such norms enjoyed the highest 
status within the international community and therefore prevailed over the rules of 
State immunity.^" However, subsequent to Pinochet {No. 3), both judicial decisions 
and academic opinion have formed the consensus that this simply is not the case. 
Significantly, the International Court in the Arrest Warrant case accepted that the 
" Ibid., at 223. 
Ibid., at 222. 
" Bianchi, supra n. 63, at p. 248; Warbrick, Salgado, and Goodwin, supra n. 63, at pp. 100, and 110-
11. 
" Fox (Pinochet (No.3)), supra n. 63, at p. 688. 
" Ibid.; Warbrick, Salgado, and Goodwin, supra n. 63, at p. 111. 
Thus, for example, Bianchi, supra n. 63, at p. 265, asserts that, "as a matter of international law, 
there is no doubt that jus cogens norms, because of their higher status, must prevail over other 
international rules, including jurisdictional immunities. See, further, the comments made at pp. 261-2; 
and Van Alebeek, supra n. 63, at p. 64. 
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commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity did not entail an exception to 
the rules on State immunity.*' 
In light of the above, it is submitted that the ratio to be drawn from Pinochet 
{No. S) may be confined, at the very least, to the facts of the case: accordingly, a 
former Head of State enjoys no immunity ratione materiae from the criminal 
jurisdiction of a State party to the Torture Convention in proceedings for acts of 
torture that are committed in an official capacity on behalf of a State which is also 
party to the Convention from when the Convention comes into force between the 
parties. The implied waiver of immunity from the extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction 
established by the Torture Convention is one of logic which would otherwise frustrate 
the underlying objectives of the Convention. As Lord Bingham rightly commented in 
Jones V. Saudi Arabia when reading Pinochet {No. 3): 
The essential ratio of the decision, as I understand it, was that international law could not 
without absurdity require criminal jurisdiction to be assumed and exercised where the Torture 
Convention conditions were satisfied and, at the same time, require immunity to be granted to 
those properly charged. The Torture Convention was the mainspring of the decision.^^ 
It is suggested, further, that the logic behind this implied waiver reasoning used by the 
House of Lords in Pinochet {No. 3) may be endorsed in future decisions involving 
other international crimes where there exists an obligation on domestic courts to 
exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction.*^ However, the International Court in the Arrest 
Warrant case has cast strong doubt on the likelihood of this happening when 
commenting that: 
ICJ Report, 2002, p. 3, at para. 58. Admittedly, although the International Court did not explicitly 
state that war crimes and crimes against humanity were jus cogens norms it is significant to note that 
the Separate and Dissenting Opinions found that they were, and that the Court has never made use of 
this term to date. See, further, the extensive discussion on whether peremptory norms of Jus cogens 
prevail over the procedural rule of State immunity considered infra at n. 210-233. 
Jones V. Ministry of the Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Lieutenant-Colonel Abdul Aziz; 
Mitchell, Walker and Sampson v. Ibrahim Al-Dali and Others [2006] U K H L 26, at para. 19. 
" Such a contention is supported by, Akande, supra n. 44, at p. 415; and Shaw, supra n. 2, at p. 658. In 
Hissene Habre, 20* March 2001, criminal proceedings were initiated in Senegal against the former 
Chadian Head of State under the Torture Convention for acts of torture carried out while the dictator 
was in office. Despite the Senegalese Supreme Court finding that it had no jurisdiction to hear the case, 
this was, significantly, on the grounds that the Torture Convention had not been fully implemented into 
domestic law and not on the grounds that the former Head of State enjoyed immunity ratione materiae. 
Moreover, no challenge was made to the Dutch court's jurisdiction in the first successful prosecution 
brought under the Torture Convention against a Congolese commander in Sebastien N., 7* April 2004, 
Rotterdam District Court. For a case comment on this decision see, Kamminga, "First Conviction under 
Universal Jurisdiction Provisions of the UN Convention Against Torture" (2004) N I L R 439. 
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The rules governing the jurisdiction of national courts must be carefully distinguished from 
those governing jurisdictional immunities: jurisdiction does not imply absence of immunity, 
while absence of immunity does not imply jurisdiction. Thus, although various international 
conventions on the prevention and punishment of certain serious crimes impose on States 
obligations of prosecution or extradition, thereby requiring them to extend their criminal 
jurisdiction, such extension of jurisdiction in no way affects immunities under customary 
international law... These remain opposable before the courts of a foreign State, even where 
those courts exercise such a jurisdiction under these conventions.^'' 
This comment made by the International Court was, strictly speaking, unnecessary 
since the Court was not considering the compatibility of Immunities from the 
obligatory extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction of a domestic court created by an 
international treaty, but Instead whether international crimes created an exception to 
immunity ratione personae in proceedings before a foreign domestic court. As such, 
and In light of the fact that this comment undermines the main thrust of the reasoning 
used by the House of Lords in Pinochet (No. 3) which, significantly, has received 
minimal criticism from other States^^ and has been supported by numerous 
commentators, the comment should be treated as obiter dicta. 
Following the reasoning of the House of Lords in Pinochet (No. 3), It remains 
a question of opinio juris as to whether immunity ratione personae wi l l be denied In 
criminal proceeding for torture between States that are party to the Torture 
Convention, despite the fact that all of the Lords in the majority held, obiter, that 
Senator Pinochet would have enjoyed immunity had he still been in office.*^ The 
difficulty with this contention Is that Immunity ratione personae Is just as inconsistent 
with the provisions of the Torture Convention as immunity ratione materiae is.^ ^ 
However, that even though Immunity ratione personae is, prima facie, inconsistent 
with the underlying objectives of the Torture Convention, this specie of Immunity Is 
only of limited temporal duration which ceases once the senior State official leaves 
office. Given that such an Individual wil l only enjoy immunity ratione materiae upon 
leaving office. It Is therefore suggested that immunity ratione personae may remain 
absolute without undermining the Torture Convention. Indeed, such a suggestion 
ICJ Report, 2002, p. 3, at para. 59. 
Sands, "International Law Transformed? From Pinochet to Congo...?" (2003) 16 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 37, at p. 50. 
See, for example, the speech of Lord Browne-Wilkinson at 201-2. 
" Fox (Pinochet (No. 3)), supra n. 63, at p. 700. 
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would accommodate the reasoning o f the International Court in the Arrest Warrant 
case where it was held that immunity ratione personae was subject to no exceptions.^^ 
Immunity Accorded in Civil Proceedings for the International 
Crime of Torture 
It is well established in international law that a foreign State enjoys absolute 
immunity in criminal proceedings held in the courts of a foreign State. However, in 
civil proceedings the matter is entirely different since the restrictive doctrine of 
immunity has made several inroads into the general rule of immunity. 
The discussion wi l l now consider whether a State enjoys immunity in civil 
proceedings where it is alleged to have committed the international crime of torture. 
The discussion wil l begin by considering the practice of domestic courts which have 
heard such disputes to ascertain whether there exists a customary exception to the 
general rule of immunity in civil proceedings for torture. Once having reviewed 
whether customary international law accords immunity to States in such proceedings, 
attention wil l then turn to consider whether a State may claim immunity on behalf of 
its officials who commit the acts of torture. The final part of the discussion assesses 
the doctrinal legitimacy of two separate challenges that have recently been made to 
the law of State immunity where immunity has been granted in civil proceedings for 
torture. The first considers whether the procedural right of access to a court in order to 
determine a civil dispute is violated when domestic courts bar their adjudicative 
jurisdiction by granting immunity; and the second considers whether the prohibition 
on torture which has acquired the status of a peremptory norm of international law has 
any consequential effect on the law of State immunity. 
Immunity Accorded to the State in Civil Proceedings for Torture: Current 
State Practice 
ICJ Report, 2002, p. 3, at para. 58. In Mugabe, January 2004, unreported, it was recently held by 
a U K first instance court that the Zimbabwean Head of State enjoyed immunity ratione personae in 
criminal proceedings for acts of torture. Zimbabwe, however, is not a party to the Torture Convention. 
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Current State practice in the form of national legislation on State immunity and the 
UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property 2004 wil l 
be examined to see whether immunity wi l l be granted in civil proceedings to a State 
where allegations of torture are made. A review wil l be made only of the UK State 
Immunity Act 1978, the Canadian State Immunity Act 1985 and the US Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act 1976, on the basis that all of these legislative provisions 
have been invoked to bar a claim against a State in civil proceedings for acts of torture 
committed in a foreign jurisdiction. 
The United Kingdom State Immunity Act 1978 
The UK State Immunity Act 1978 was enacted to codify the restrictive rule of State 
immunity recognised by the common law,^' and to enable the UK to ratify the 
European Convention on State Immunity.'" Section 1 of the Act lays down a general 
principle of absolute immunity that is subject to a number of exceptions contained in 
sections 2-11. The exceptions contained in the SIA include: commercial transactions 
and contracts to be performed in the UK (section 3); contracts of employment made in 
the UK (section 4); death, personal injury and loss of tangible property in the UK 
(section 5); ownership, possession and use of immovable property situated un the UK 
(section 6); patents, trademarks and copyrights (section 7); membership of a body 
corporate (section 8); arbitration (section 9); ships used for commercial purposes 
(section 10); and taxation and custom duties (section 11). 
In Al-Adsani v. Government of Kuwait, a dual Kuwaiti and British national 
was falsely imprisoned in a Kuwaiti State prison where he was violently tortured by 
government officials for several days. The applicant subsequently spent six weeks in 
hospital when returning to England where he was diagnosed with suffering from 
severe post-traumatic stress disorder. These psychological injuries were exacerbated 
further by threatening telephone calls that he received in London from the Kuwaiti 
ambassador and an anonymous individual. 
Trendtex Trading Copn. v. Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] 1 QB 529; / Congreso del Partido [1983] 
1 A C 244. 
64 I L R 221. For a comment see: Bowett, "The State Immunity Act 1978" (1978) 37 C L J 193; Fox 
{State Immunity), supra n. 2, at pp. 128-87; Mann, "The State Immunity Act 1978" (1979) B Y I L 43; 
and White, "The State Immunity Act 1978" (1979) 42 MLR 72. [Hereinafter referred to as the SIA]. 
The applicant initiated civil proceedings in the High Court against the 
Government of Kuwait for the acts of torture that had been committed by its officials. 
The High Court refused to allow the service of a writ against the Kuwaiti Government 
on the basis that it was entitled to claim immunity under section 1 SIA.^' A renewed 
application was made to the Court of Appeal where leave was granted to serve a writ 
against the Kuwaiti Government when it was held that the applicant had made a good 
arguable case that the Government should not be afforded immunity under the SIA for 
acts of torture which were contrary to public international law.'^ In addition, the Court 
of Appeal held that the physical and psychological injuries that the applicant had 
suffered in the UK, as well as the threatening telephone calls that the applicant had 
received, were to be regarded as a separate form of injury to the physical acts of 
torture that were inflicted in Kuwait.^^ Since s. 5 SIA provides an exception where 
personal injury was caused by a foreign State in the UK, it was found that the general 
rule of immunity was not applicable. 
The Kuwaiti Government challenged this writ in a separate action before the 
Court of Appeal.^'' The Court of Appeal accepted that international law prohibited 
torture, but found the SIA to contain no exceptions in proceedings where a foreign 
State is alleged to have violated a human right outside of the UK. Moreover, the Act 
was said to be comprehensive code that was not subject to any overriding 
considerations that may be implied into the statute: 
It is inconceivable, it seems to me, that the draughtsman, who must have been well aware of 
the various international agreements about torture, intended section 1 to be subject to an 
overriding qualification.'^ 
With regard to the personal injury exception contained in s. 5 SIA, it was held, 
contrary to the findings o f the previous Court o f Appeal, that the exception is only 
applicable where the act causing the personal injury is committed in the UK so as to 
not circumvent the SIA. Finally, it was held that the applicant had not adduced any 
" Al-Adsani v. Government of Kuwait and Others (1993) unreported decision of the High Court. 
Al-Adsani v. Government of Kuwait and Others [1994] 100 I L R 465. [Hereinafter referred to as Al-
Adsani {No. I)]. 
" Ibid., at 467, per Evans L J . 
Al-Adsani v. Government of Kuwait and Others [1996] 12"' March, CA; 106 I L R 536. For a 
comment see: Byers, "Al-Adsani v. Government of Kuwait" [1996] 67 B Y I L 537; and Marks, "Torture 
and the Jurisdictional Immunity of Foreign States" [1997] C L J 8. [Hereinafter referred to as Al-Adsani 
{No. 2)]. 
Ibid, at 542, per Stuart-Smith LJ . 
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evidence to the Court to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the threatening 
telephone calls made in the UK were attributable to the Kuwaiti Government. 
Accordingly, and on a simple application of the SIA, it thus followed that the there 
was no jurisdiction to serve proceedings against the Kuwaiti Government. 
In the recent decision of Jones v. Saudi Arabia^^ two separate civil actions 
were brought before the UK courts seeking damages for acts of torture that had been 
committed by State officials while the applicants were unlawfully detained in a Saudi 
Arabian prison. The House of Lords endorsed the findings made by the Court of 
Appeal in Al-Adsani {No. 2) and dismissed these actions on a straightforward 
application of the SIA on the grounds that there were no exceptions to the general rule 
of immunity contained in the provisions of the Act.^^ 
The Canadian State Immunity Act 1985 
Section 3 of the Canadian State Immunity Act 1985 accords immunity to foreign 
States in civil suits unless one of the exceptions contained in sections 5-8 of the Act 
applies.^* The exceptions to the general rule of immunity are similar to those found in 
the SIA, and no exception for violation of a human right is contained in the Act. 
In Bouzari v. Islamic Republic of Iran,^^ an Iranian national was forcibly 
abducted from his home, imprisoned for six months in Tehran without due process, 
and then brutally tortured by State officials during this period of detention. The 
applicant fled to Canada as an immigrant shortly after his release where he continued 
to suffer severe post-traumatic stress disorder, ongoing pain, and loss of hearing. He 
subsequently brought a civil action against Iran in a Canadian court for the acts of 
torture that he had suffered at the hands of its officials, where he argued, inter alia, 
that his continued suffering fell within the tort exception contained in section 6 of the 
Act and thus the general rule of immunity was displaced. The Court of Appeal for 
Ontario accepted that the tort exception could apply to physical and psychological 
injuries, but held that these injuries must occur within Canada. In giving no 
consideration to whether the continued suffering in Canada amounted to a separate 
Jones V. Ministry of the Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Lieutenant-Colonel Abdul Aziz; 
Mitchell. Walker and Sampson v. Ibrahim Al-Dali and Others [2006] U K H L 26. 
" Ibid., at para. 13, per Lord Bingham. 
R.S.C. 1985,C.S-18. 
[2004] OJ No. 2800; [2002] OJ No. 1624. 
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tort, the Court of Appeal held that both the physical and related psychological injuries 
had occurred in Iran.'°° Thus, with the acts of torture falling outside the scope of the 
exceptions contained in the Canadian State Immunity Act, the foreign State was 
accordingly immune from the jurisdiction of the domestic Canadian court.'"' 
The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976 
Section 1604 of the US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976 provides that a 
federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a claim against a foreign State 
unless the claim falls within one of the exceptions to immunity contained in sections 
1605-1607 which are broadly similar to those contained in the SIA."''^ The Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act specifically amended the FSIA in 1996 to 
allow civil claims to be brought against foreign States that have been designated as 
terrorist by the US Department of State who commit acts of terrorism, or provided 
material support and resources to an individual or entity who commit such an act, 
which results in the death or personal injury of a US citizen.'"^ 
In Amerada Hess,^^'^ a Liberian corporation brought an action against the 
Argentine Republic in a US District Court for damage to an oil tanker that its military 
aircrafts had caused during the Falkland War. The US Supreme Court accepted that 
the attack to the tanker amounted to a violation of international law, but held that the 
foreign State enjoyed immunity on the basis that, "cases involving alleged violations 
of international law do not come within one of the FSIA's exceptions".'"^ This 
reasoning was subsequently applied by the 9* Circuit Court of Appeals in Siderman 
de Blake^°^ to dismiss an application brought by an Argentinean national in a US 
District Court against the Republic of Argentina for acts of torture that had been 
committed by its State officials in Argentina. Despite the Court making the distinction 
from Amerada Hess in that this case involved a violation of a peremptory norm, it 
'"^  [2004] OJ No. 2800, at para. 47. 
Ibid., at para. 59. 
'"^  28 use § 1330. For a comment see: Brower, Bistline and Loomis, "The Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act 1976 in Practice" 73 AJIL 200 (1979); Delaume, "Three Perspectives on Sovereign 
Immunity" 71 AJIL 399 (1977); and Fox (Stale Immunity), supra n. 2, at pp. 187-208. [Hereinafter 
referred to as the FSIA] . 
28 U S C § 1605(a)(7). 
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corporation, 488 U.S. 428, 109 S Ct. 683 (1989). 
Ibid., at 435, per Rehnquist CJ. delivering the opinion of the Court. 
'"•^ Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965F 2d 688 (9* Cir. 1992). 
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nonetheless found there to be no exception In the FSIA to deny the foreign State 
immunity, and specifically commented that: 
Clearly, the FSIA does not specifically provide for an exception to sovereign immunity based 
on jus cogens...If violations of jus cogens committed outside the US are to be exceptions to 
immunity. Congress must make them so. The fact that there has been a violation of a jus 
cogens does not confer jurisdiction under the FSIA."" 
The US Supreme Court In Saudi Arabia v. Nelson^^^ has endorsed the decision made 
In Siderman de Blake, where it was similarly held that systematic acts of torture are 
not an exception contained In the FSIA. 
Section 1605(a)(5) FSIA removes the general rule of Immunity for personal 
injury caused by a foreign State that occurs in the US. In Princz v. Federal Republic 
of Germany,^^^ it was held that the lingering effect of a personal injury caused by a 
gross violation of a human right amounting to a norm of jus cogens does not fall 
within this exception i f the act took place abroad. 
The UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property 2004 
The United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their 
Property was adopted by the General Assembly in December 2004 following almost 
25 years of international negotiation."" Work began on the Convention with the 
International Law Commission, which lead to the 1991 Draft Articles on 
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property,'" and was then followed by 
further deliberations by an Ad Hoc Committee reporting to the Sixth Committee of the 
General Assembly. The Convention on State Immunity provides a comprehensive 
code which Is broadly reflective of national legislation and judicial decisions. 
Article 5 o f the Convention on State Immunity establishes the general rule that 
a State enjoys immunity from the jurisdiction of foreign domestic courts subject to the 
Ibid., at 56, per Fletcher J. giving the judgement of the Court. 
507 US 349, 113 S Ct 1471 (1993). 
""26F.3d 1166 (DC Cir. 1994). 
"° December 16 2004, UN G A Resolution 59/38. For a comment on the Convention see generally: 
Denza, "The 2005 UN Convention on State Immunity in Perspective" [2006] 55 I C L Q 395; Fox, "In 
Defence of State Immunity: Why the UN Convention on State Immunity is Important" [2006] 55 ICLQ 
399; and Stewart, "The UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property" 99 
AJIL 194 (2005). [Hereinafter referred to as the Convention on State Immunity]. 
" ' UN Doc. A/46/10. [Hereinafter referred to as the Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities]. 
85 
exceptions contained in Articles 10-17. Significantly, the Convention contains no 
provision providing an exception to the general rule in actions brought against a State 
seeking a civil remedy for violations of a human right committed outside the 
territorial jurisdiction of the forum State. Despite such an exception being considered 
twice during the negotiation stages, it was rejected on both occasions by the drafters 
of the Convention."^ 
Article 12 of the Convention on State Immunity provides an exception to the 
general rule in civil suits involving personal injury. However, this exception is subject 
to numerous requirements and thereby precludes recovery where the personal injury 
was committed outside of the forum. Article 12 reads: 
Unless otherwise agreed between the States concerned, a State cannot invoke immunity from 
jurisdiction before a court of another State which is otherwise competent in a proceeding 
which relates to pecuniary compensation for death or injury to the person... caused by an act 
or omission which is alleged to be attributable to the State, if the act or omission occurred in 
whole or in part in the territory of that other State and If the author of the act or omission was 
present in that territory at the time of the act or omission. 
It is clear from the text of Article 12 that the exception wil l only apply to personal 
injuries caused by an act that occurs in the territory of the forum State, in whole or in 
part, when the author of the act is present in the forum. These requirements render the 
exception extremely narrow, and in litigation involving a civil remedy for acts of 
torture committed in a foreign jurisdiction it is apparent that a foreign State party to 
the Convention on State Immunity wi l l be under an obligation to accorded immunity 
for such acts. 
Conclusion 
National legislation and the Convention on State Immunity provide clear evidence of 
a consistent international practice in which no exception is made to the general rule of 
immunity in civil proceedings against a foreign sovereign involving allegations of 
torture committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the foreign State. Significantly, 
the Convention on State Immunity provides a very recent and highly authoritative 
Hall, "UN Convention on State Immunity: The Need for a Human Rights Protocol" [2006] 55 ICLQ 
411, at p. 412. 
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endorsement of this view. In addition, all of the cases that have been brought before 
the courts of common law jurisdictions, which have domestic legislation codifying the 
restrictive rule of State immunity, seeking civil redress for acts of torture have all 
been dismissed. This, accordingly, suggests an opinio juris to the effect that 
customary international law at present does not recognise torture as providing an 
exception to the rules on State immunity."^ 
Immunity Accorded to State Officials in Civil Actions for the 
International Crime of Torture: The Official Nature of Torture 
The immunity accorded to a State can be distinguished from that accorded to the 
individuals through whom the State acts. Having drawn the conclusion that a State 
wi l l enjoy immunity in civil proceedings where it is alleged to have committed acts of 
torture, it wi l l now be considered whether a State is entitled to claim immunity on 
behalf of its officials who commit such acts. 
Immunity Ratione Personae in Civil Proceedings for the Commission of the 
International Crime of Torture 
In Tachiona v. Mugabe, civil proceedings were brought before a US District Court 
under the US Alien Tort Claims Act""* and the US Torture Victim Protection Act"^ 
against the Zimbabwean president, Robert Mugabe, seeking damages for, inter alia, 
torture. The District Court held that a serving Head of State enjoyed absolute 
immunity from the jurisdiction of a US domestic court and dismissed the 
application."^ Although the Court's reasoning focused primarily on both the wording 
of the US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the jurisprudence under the Act, the 
decision to accord a serving Head of State absolute immunity is consistent with the 
findings of the International Court in the Arrest Warrant case. This decision of the 
District Court was subsequently upheld by the Court of Appeals for the Second 
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, {Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of 
Germany/Netherlands), ICJ Reports, 1969, p. 3, at para. 77. 
"'' Judiciary Act 1789, Ch. 20, s. 9(b). [Hereinafter referred to as the A T C A ] . 
"^28 use § 1350. [Hereinafter referred to as the TVPA]. 
169 F.Supp. 2d 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
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Circuit"^ and endorsed i n ^ , B, C, D, E, F v. Jiang Zemin where civil proceedings 
brought against the Chinese president seeking redress for torture were similarly 
dismissed. 
Immunity Ratione Materiae in Civil Proceedings for the Commission of the 
International Crime of Torture 
In Jones v. Saudi Arabia, two separate civil actions were brought before the UK 
courts seeking damages for acts of torture that had been committed by State officials 
in Saudi Arabia. The first action was brought by a British national who was 
systematically tortured over a two-month period while unlawfijlly detained in a Saudi 
Arabian prison. The applicant brought his claim in tort for assault and battery, false 
imprisonment, torture and negligence, against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in its 
capacity as Ministry of the Interior, and the State official who was allegedly 
responsible for carrying out the acts of torture, Lieutenant-Colonel Abdul Aziz. The 
High Court refused leave to serve proceedings out of the jurisdiction against both 
defendants on the basis that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was entitled to claim 
immunity for itself under s. I SIA, and that it was entitled to claim immunity on 
behalf of its officials under s. 14 SIA."^ In the second action, two British and one 
Canadian national bought a civil claim against two captains in the Saudi Arabian 
police force and the deputy governor of a prison where it was alleged that they had 
been systematically tortured whilst falsely imprisoned. Again, the High Court struck 
out the claim on the same grounds. 
In a conjoined appeal, a unanimous Court of Appeal held that the Kingdom 
was entitled to claim immunity from the jurisdiction of UK domestic courts under s. 1 
SIA in respect of the allegations of torture.'^' However, with regard to the State 
officials who were alleged to have committed the acts of torture, the Court of Appeal 
Tachiona v. United States, 386 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2004). 
282 F.Supp. 2d 875 (N.D. 111. 2003). 
Jones V. Ministry of the Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Lieutenant-Colonel Abdul Aziz 
(2003) No. HQ020X01805. Unreported decision of the High Court. 
Mitchell, Walker and Sampson v. Ibrahim Al-Dali and Others (2004) No. HQ04X00431. 
Unreported decision of the High Court. 
Jones V. Saudi Arabia and Lieutenant-Colonel Abdul Aziz; Mitchell, Walker and Sampson v. 
Ibrahim Al-Dali and Others [2004] E W C A Civ. 1394, at paras. 10-27, per Mance L J . For a comment 
on the Court of Appeal's decision see: Fox, "Where does the Buck Stop? State Immunity from Civil 
Jurisdiction and Torture" [2005] L Q R 353; and Yang, "Universal Tort Jurisdiction over Torture?" 
[2005] 64 C L J 1. 
held that the Kingdom was not entitled to claim immunity on their behalf under s. 
14(1) SIA. Lord Jusfice Mance, giving the leading judgement of the Court, reasoned 
that although s. 14(1) SIA made no express reference to the position of individual 
officials, it was nonetheless established by Propend Finance that, "section 14(1) must 
be read as affording... officials of a foreign State protection under the same cloak 
[that] protects the State itself." '^ ^ However, because the principle in Propend Finance 
was not concerned with the immunity of State officials in respect of allegations of 
torture. Lord Justice Mance was of the belief that it was necessary to consider, as a 
matter of first principle, whether the cloak of State immunity could be accorded in 
such instances.'^^ On this matter he held that it was irrelevant that the individual 
defendants had been acting as agents of the Kingdom at all material times when 
carrying out the acts of torture. Systematic torture was an international crime 
prohibited by a peremptory norm of jus cogens and could not be regarded as an 
official function. Accordingly, the acts o f torture performed by the individual 
defendants must be regarded as outside the scope of any proper exercise of sovereign 
authority and could not be attributed to the State. Upon such reasoning, the Kingdom 
was therefore not entitled to claim immunity ratione materiae on behalf of its State 
officials alleged to have committed acts of torture.'^'' 
A unanimous House of Lords rejected this findings made by the Court of 
Appeal.'^^ The Lords began their analysis by noting that there was a wealth of 
international and domestic authority to show that a foreign State was entitled to claim 
immunity on behalf of its officials who carried out sovereign acts.'^^ They continued 
and found that it was not a requirement that the acts committed by the officials be 
lawful in order for a State to claim immunity as the Court of Appeal had suggested; 
but instead, that the acts were committed under colour of public authority.'^^ Since the 
alleged acts of torture were committed by public officials in a State prison during a 
prolonged interrogation procedure where the applicants were accused of terrorist 
Propend Finance Pty Ltd v. Sing, The Times, May 2"" 1997, CA; 111 I L R 611, at 699. 
[2004] E W C A Civ. 1394, at para. 45. 
Ibid., at para. 96. 
Jones V. Ministry of the Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Lieutenant-Colonel Abdul 
Aziz; Mitchell, Walker and Sampson v. Ibrahim Al-Dali and Others [2006] U K H L 26. For a comment 
on the House of Lord's decision see: Seymour, "Immunity for Torture: The State and its 
Representatives Reunited" [2006] 65 C L J 479; and Steinerte and Wallace, "Jones v. Ministry of 
Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia" 100 AJIL 901 (2006). 
Ibid., at para. 10, per Lord Bingham; para. 66, per Lord Hoffmann. 
Ibid., at paras. 12-13, per Lord Bingham; para. 74,per Lord Hoffmann. 
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activities. It was held that they were performed as part of an official function. 
Accordingly, they were said to be attributable to the Kingdom who was thus able to 
claim immunity for these acts under s. 14(1) SIA.'^* 
The Official Nature of Torture 
The Court of Appeal's reasoning in Jones when denying immunity to the State 
officials was that systematic acts of torture cannot constitute official conduct and 
therefore fall outside the scope of Immunity ratione materiae. The Court of Appeal 
drew a distinction between the actions that were brought in the torts o f assault and 
battery, false Imprisonment and negligence, with the actions that were brought in tort 
for torture; where the former were said to be official acts, and therefore subject to 
immunity ratione materiae, while the latter were not.'^^ 
The decision of the Court of Appeal that systematic acts of torture were not 
official acts was largely based upon US jurisprudence under the ATCA and TVPA, 
the reasoning of the House of Lords In Pinochet {No. 1), a series of obiter comments 
made in Pinochet (No. 3) supporting this decision, and a misunderstanding of the 
reasoning in Pinochet (No. 3). 
The US cases which have explicitly dealt with the Issue of State officials 
pleading immunity ratione materiae in civil proceedings for acts o f torture have all 
held that such acts could not be treated as a State function and were thus beyond the 
scope of the plea.'^° However, it is significant to note that this repeated view of the 
US Federal Courts is contrary to that of the Supreme Court in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson 
where it was held that systematic acts of torture committed by the police have long 
been understood as being sovereign In nature.'^' 
In addition, both Lord Justice Mance and Lord Phillips MR placed great 
emphasis on the ratio o f Pinochet (No. 1) and a series of obiter comments made in 
Pinochet (No. 3) to support their conclusion drawn. As stated above. Lords Nicholls 
and Steyn held in Pinochet (No. 1) that Senator Pinochet did not enjoy immunity on 
Ibid, at para. 35, per Lord Bingham; para. 102,per Lord Hoffmann. 
[2004] E W C A Civ. 1394, at para. 9S,per Mance L J . 
"° Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 
25 F.3d 1467 (1994), at 1470-1; Rios v. Marshall, 520 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), at 371-372; 
Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493 (1992), at 496-7; Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (1995), at 
175. 
507 US 349, 113 S Ct 1471 (1993), at para. 14. 
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the basis that customary international law regarded acts of torture to be outside the 
function of a Head of State, and that immunity ratione materiae was only accorded to 
those acts that were recognised as constituting an official function of a Head of 
State.'^ ^ It seems curious that the Court of Appeal placed such great emphasis on the 
reasoning of the Lords' decision in Pinochet (No. I) when this judgement was 
subsequently set aside thereby rendering it void of any binding legal authority. 
Nonetheless, similar views to the effect that torture cannot be said to be an official act 
were expressed by some members of the House of Lords in Pinochet (No. 3).'^^ 
However, these comments did not feature as part of the reasoning of the Lords' in 
their respective judgements and were, strictly speaking, obiter. Such a fact did not go 
unnoticed by Lord Justice Mance: 
The statements in Pinochet {No. 3)... were not, as I see it, necessary, even for these decisions 
of the three members of the House making them."" 
The greatest difficulty that the Court of Appeal faced when concluding that 
acts of torture could not be said to be official acts was that the definition provided by 
Article 1 of the Torture Convention clearly stipulates that torture must be, "inflicted 
by... a public official or other person acting in an official capacity". Moreover, the 
very facts of the case concerned acts of torture that had been performed by public 
officials, in a State prison, and for an official purpose. Lord Justice Mance, however, 
found there to be no inconsistency between the reference made to a public official in 
Article 1 CAT and that torture could be regarded as a non-official act: 
The requirement that the pain or suffering be inflicted by a public official does no more in my 
view than identify the author and the public nature context in which the author must be acting. 
It does not lend to the acts of torture themselves any official or governmental character in 
nature, or mean that it can in any way be regarded as an official function to inflict, or that an 
official can be regarded as representing the State in inflicting, such pain or suffering. Still less 
does it suggest that the official inflicting such pain or suffering can be afforded the same cloak 
of State immunity.'" 
[2000] 1 A C 61, at 110-1, per Lord Nicholls; and 116, per Lord Steyn. 
[2000] 1 A C 147, at 205, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson; 242-3, per Hope; and 260-1, per Lord 
Mutton. 
[2004] E W C A Civ. 1394, at para. 74. 
"'/Wc/., at para. 71. 
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It is submitted that this interpretation of Article 1 CAT seems most perverse since the 
requirement that torture be inflicted by a public official strongly suggests that all acts 
of torture must be performed in an official context to fall within the definition 
provided by the Torture Convention. In addition. Lord Hoffmann, in the House of 
Lords, disagreed with Lord Justice Mance's interpretation of Article 1 CAT: 
The acts of torture are either official acts or they are not. The Torture Convention does not 
'lend' them an official character; they must be official to come within the Convention in the 
first place. And if they are official enough to come within the Convention, I cannot see why 
they are not official enough to attract immunity.'^* 
Furthermore, Lord Hoffmann noted that that there would be a "striking asymmetry" i f 
it were held that an act o f torture was official for the purposes of the definition 
provided by the Torture Convention, yet non-official for the purposes of immunity.'^^ 
Both judgements handed down by the Court of Appeal found strong support 
for their conclusion that a State official does not enjoy immunity ratione materiae in 
civil proceedings for torture in Pinochet {No. 3), despite there being a number of 
obiter comments in this judgement suggesting otherwise.'^^ It is suggested that both 
judgements relied far too heavily on the outcome of Pinochet (No. 3) rather than the 
reasoning which led to Senator Pinochet being denied immunity ratione materiae. 
Lord Justice Mance read Pinochet (No. 3) as, "firmly establishing... that a State can 
claim no immunity in respect of an individual officer committing systematic torture in 
an official contexf .'^^ Lord Phillips MR endorsed this reading of Pinochet (No. 3), 
and held that it would be illogical to maintain any distinction between immunity 
ratione materiae in criminal and civil proceedings: 
Once the conclusion is reached that torture cannot be treated as the exercise of a State function 
so as to attract immunity ratione materiae in criminal proceedings against individuals, it 
seems to me that it cannot logically be so treated in civil proceedings against individuals.'"^ 
[2006] U K H L 26, at para. 83. 
lbid.,at para 79. 
[2000] 1 A C 147, at 264, per Lord Hutton; 273 and 278, per Lord Millet; and 280-1, per Lord 
Phillips. 
[2004] E W C A Civ. 1394, at para. 74. 
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Both judges clearly overlooked the fact that immunity ratione materiae had been set 
aside in Pinochet (No. 3) due to the extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction that had been 
established by the Torture Convention which would have been void of any meaning 
had immunity been granted. Remarkably, Lord Phillips MR overlooked this important 
issue despite the fact that he had himself sat in the Appellate Committee of the House 
of Lord in Pinochet (No. 3), where he had held that customary international law 
denied immunity ratione materiae in instances where States had ratified treaties 
obliging foreign domestic courts to exercise jurisdiction over international crimes.''*' 
Although the decision in Pinochet {No. 3) had been given effect to civil 
proceeding involving allegations of torture by the Court of Appeal, in no way was it 
possible for the reasoning of the Lords in Pinochet (No. 3) to be applied in civil 
proceedings. In his judgement. Lord Justice Mance had accepted that Article 14(1) 
CAT did not create any obligatory subsidiary universal civil jurisdiction like other 
provisions in the Torture Convention had created such criminal jurisdiction.'''^ Nor 
did he suggest that customary international law had created universal civil jurisdiction 
over the international crime of torture which was prohibited by a norm of jus cogens. 
Despite the fact that he had recognised that there was no obligation on domestic 
courts of foreign States to exercise extraterritorial civil jurisdiction over acts of 
torture. Lord Justice Mance nonetheless concluded that: 
There is the obvious possibility for anomalies if the international criminal jurisdiction which 
exists under the Torture Convention is not matched by some wider parallel power to 
adjudicate over civil claims. 
In an attempt to reconcile Pinochet (No. 3), Article 1 of the Torture 
Convention, and the House of Lords judgement in Jones, it is suggested that the 
following conclusion is to be drawn: systematic acts of torture are by definition an 
official function and therefore subject to immunity ratione materiae unless there 
exists an obligation on foreign States to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over the 
acts. Clearly, the Torture Convention establishes such an obligation in criminal 
[2000] 1 A C 147, at 289. 
'•"^  [2004] E W C A Civ. 1394, at para. 21. For a detailed discussion on this point see the commentary in 
chapter 2 at n. 136-168. 
'"^ Ibid., at para 79. 
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proceedings; however, as concluded in chapter 2, neither conventional nor customary 
International law creates such an obligation for civil proceedings. 
The Official Nature of all International Crimes 
Torture is distinct from other international crimes In that it is supported by an 
international convention which explicitly states that, by definition, the crime can only 
be committed in an official capacity. 
The International Court in the Arrest Warrant case commented, obiter dicta, 
that once a senior State official leaves office he wil l no longer enjoy immunity from 
the criminal jurisdiction of a foreign domestic court In respect of acts committed 
before or after his period in office, nor in respect of acts committed in a private 
capacity during his period in office.''*'' The comment made by the Court is Indeed 
correct as it recognises that a State official may be made the subject of foreign judicial 
proceedings for acts that are not performed on behalf of the sovereign State. However, 
this obiter comment has received widespread academic disapproval,'''^ as well as 
judicial disapproval from two Judges In the case,'''^ on the basis that It is unqualified 
and makes no reference to immunity in criminal proceedings for international crimes 
which, on two different grounds, are said to be committed only In an official capacity. 
Admittedly, the Court does not expressly stipulate in its judgement that International 
crimes committed by State officials are to be regarded as acts done in a private 
capacity, but the two Dissenting Opinions provided by Judges Van den Wyngaert and 
Al-Khasawneh have found this to be implicit from the decision.'''^ Furthermore, the 
Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooljmans and Buergenthal cited a 
growing State practice to the effect that International crimes cannot be regarded as 
official acts since they are not normal State functions.'''^ 
ICJ Report, 2002, p. 3, at para. 61. 
'"^  Cassese, (Senior State Officials), supra n. 29, at pp. 866-70; Spinedi, "State Responsibility v. 
Individual Responsibility for International Crimes: Terlium Non Datur?" (2002) 13 EJIL 895, at pp. 
895-9; Wirth, supra n. 22, at pp. 877-93; and Wouters, "The Judgement of the International Court of 
Justice in the Arrest Warrant case: Some Critical Remarks" (2003) 16 Leiden Journal of International 
Law 253, at pp. 262-3. 
See the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert, at para. 36; and the Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Al-Khasawneh, at para. 6. 
'''Ibid. 
At para. 85. The Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal made no 
comment as to the validity of this claim, but Higgins has suggested extra-judicially. The Role of 
Domestic Courts in the Enforcement of International Human Rights: The United Kingdom, in Conforti 
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Two arguments have been advanced strongly suggesting that international 
crimes committed by State officials cannot be regarded as acts performed in a private 
capacity. Firstly, both Cassese and Judge Van den Wyngaert recognise that 
international crimes can, for practical purposes, only be committed by individuals 
who make use of their official status to commit the crime through the mechanisms of 
the State by ordering other individuals, who themselves act in an official capacity, to 
perpetrate the c r i m e . M o r e o v e r , the commission of such crimes seldom are 
perpetrated on behalf of an individual, but instead as part of a State policy.'^° 
Secondly, Spinedi has found that i f international crimes were to be regarded as acts 
performed in a private capacity, this would therefore mean that such acts could not be 
attributed to the State.'^' The ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility o f States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts 2001 makes it clear in Draft Articles 4 and 7 that the 
conduct of any State organ shall be considered to be an act of the State even i f the acts 
are unlawful or unauthorised. However, the consequence of recognising that 
international crimes are performed in a private capacity, and thus cannot be attributed 
to the State at the international level, is that the rules on State responsibility cannot be 
invoked for them. As Spinedi rightly suggests, this "would produce a more negative 
outcome than the harm it was intended to remedy". 
Accordingly, it is concluded that international crimes performed by State 
officials are to be regarded as official acts. However, i f the obiter comment made by 
the International Court were to be taken literally, then it thus follows that State 
officials would be said to enjoy immunity ratione materiae in criminal proceedings 
for international crimes. In light of this, several academics have advanced the view 
that customary international law recognises an exception to immunity ratione 
materiae in criminal proceedings for all international crimes.'^^ Such a contention is 
well beyond the scope of the reasoning of the House of Lords in Pinochet (No. 3) 
where it was held that immunity ratione materiae wi l l be denied in criminal 
and Francioni, (eds.), Enforcing International Human Rights Before Domestic Courts, 1997, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, at p. 53, that, "acts in the exercise of sovereign authority {acta Jure imperii) are 
those which can only be performed by States, but not by private persons. Property deprivation might 
fall in this category: torture would not". 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert, at para. 36; Cassese (Senior State Officials), supra 
n. 29, at p. 868. 
''°Ibid. 
Supra n. 145, at pp. 895-899. 
Ibid., ax p. 898. 
Cassese (Senior State Officials), supra n. 29, at pp. 870-4; Cassese {International Criminal Law), 
supra n. 2, at pp. 267-271; Wirth, supra n. 22, at pp. 884-9; Zappala, supra n. 52. 
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proceedings for torture when there is an obligation on domestic courts to exercise 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over the crime. Given that the concern of this paper is with 
immunity in civil proceedings for the international crime of torture, the validity of this 
academic suggestion, which significantly finds no expression in any judicial authority, 
wil l not be considered in any detail. 
Immunity for Acts of Torture Committed in a Foreign Jurisdiction and 
the Right of Access to a Civil Court 
The right of access to a domestic court to determine civil disputes is widely 
recognised by international human rights law and expressed in various international 
and regional instruments. The inherent tension between State immunity and the 
procedural right of access to a court was recently considered by the European Court of 
Human Rights in three of its Grand Chamber judgments resulting from domestic 
courts barring their adjudicative jurisdiction in compliance with obligations imposed 
by the law of State immunity. Significantly, one of these decisions involved a torture 
victim being denied the right to seek civil redress against the foreign State which was 
alleged to have committed the acts of torture. 
Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights and State Immunity 
Following the Court of Appeal's dismissal of the civil action for damages in Al-
Adsani {No. 2), the applicant brought a case before the European Court of Human 
Rights alleging that the immunity granted to the Government of Kuwait under the SIA 
for acts of torture amounted to a violation of his rights under Article 3 ECHR, read in 
conjunction with Articles 1 and 13, and Article 6(1) ECHR.'^'' 
A Grand Chamber of the of the European Court of Human Rights accepted 
that Articles 1, 3 and 13 ECHR placed a number of positive obligations on contracting 
parties to provide redress for acts of torture; however, such obligations were said to be 
applicable only to acts of torture which were committed within the jurisdiction of the 
Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom (2002) 34 E H R R 11. For a case comment on the Strasbourg decision 
see: Bates, "Article 6: Right to a Fair Trial" (2002) E L R 157; Emberland, ''Al-Adsani v. United 
Kingdom" 96 AJIL 699 (2002); and Garnett, "State Immunity Trumps in the European Court of Human 
Rights" [2002] L Q R 367. 
96 
contracting party.'^^ Since the applicant did not contend that the acts of torture tooit 
place within the United Kingdom, nor that there was any causal connection between 
the acts of torture carried out by the Kuwaiti Government and the United Kingdom, 
the Grand Chamber unanimously held that that there had been no violation of Article 
3 ECHR.'^^ 
The applicant then alleged that his denial of access to a court by the SIA 
amounted to a violation of Article 6(1) ECHR which impliedly embodies this right. 
Article 6(1) provides that: 
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations... everyone is entitled to a fair and 
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established 
by law. 
The Court found that Article 6(1) was applicable to the proceedings in question given 
that there was a genuine dispute over civil rights.'^^ However, the Court then 
emphasised that the right of access to a court is not an absolute right and may be 
subject to limitations that are in pursuit of a legitimate aim and are proportionate to 
that aim.'^^ With regard to whether the limitation was in pursuit of a legitimate aim, 
the European Court found that granting immunity pursues the legitimate aim of 
complying with international law to promote comity and good relations between 
States.'^ ^ The Court then assessed whether this restriction was proportionate to the 
aim pursued. On this matter, the Court gave consideration to the fact that State 
immunity was a well recognised principle of public international law which the 
European Convention, as a human rights instrument, must take into account and be 
construed in harmony with where possible.'^*' In addition, the Court gave 
consideration to the universal prohibition on torture and accepted that it had achieved 
the status of a peremptory norm in international law;'^' but concluded that: 
Notwithstanding the special character of the prohibition of torture in international law, the 
Court is unable to discern in the international instruments, judicial authorities or other material 
'"/Wrf.,atpara.38. 
Ibid., at paras. 40-41. 
Ibid., at para. 49. 
'^^ Ibid., at para. 53. 
^^"^ Ibid., at para. 54. 
"° Ibid., at para. 55. 
atpara. 60. 
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before it any firm basis for concluding that, as a matter of international law, a State no longer 
enjoys immunity from civil suits in the courts of another State where acts of torture are 
alleged."*^ 
Accordingly, the Grand Chamber held, by a bare majority of nine votes to eight, that 
granting the Kuwaiti Government immunity in civil proceedings for acts of torture 
which were committed outside the forum State was not an unjustified restriction 
violating the applicant's right of access to a court embodied in Article 6(1) ECHR. '" 
The Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Rozakis and Caflisch, joined by 
Judges Wildhaber, Cabral Barreto, Costa and Vajic, held that the applicant was 
unduly deprived of his right of access to a court. The minority held that once it had 
been accepted that the prohibition of torture had crystallised into a jus cogens norm 
the procedural bar of State immunity was automatically lifted given that, ''jus 
cogens... deprives the rule of sovereign immunity of all its legal effects".'^'* The 
validity o f this dissenting view wil l be considered in detail below."'^ Judge Ferrari 
Bravo similarly found that there had been a violation of Article 6(1), and held that the 
Court should have endorsed the House of Lords' judgement in Pinochet (No. 3), to the 
effect that immunity wi l l be denied in criminal proceedings involving allegations of a 
peremptory norm, rather than drawing an unnecessary distinction between criminal 
and civil proceedings. It is suggested, for reasons that have already been detailed 
above, that such a reading of Pinochet (No. 3) by Judge Ferrari Bravo is wrong on the 
basis that the jus cogens nature of torture was not the reason why Senator Pinochet 
was denied immunity from criminal jurisdiction.'^^ Instead, the distinction drawn by 
the Court between the facts of the present case and Pinochet (No. 3) is viewed as 
correct; as the Court rightly commented, albeit indirectly, the Pinochet (No. 3) 
argument could not be applied in civil proceedings where acts of torture are alleged 
because international law, at the time, did not provided the same firm basis for such a 
conclusion as it did in Pinochet (No. 3). Finally, Judge Loucaides held that any form 
of blanket immunity that is applied by a court in order to block completely the judicial 
determination of a civil right without balancing the competing interests is a 
disproportionate limitation on Article 6(1) ECHR. 
Ibid., at para. 6\. 
Ibid., at paras. 66-67. 
"^ ^ At para. 4. 
See the discussion infra at n. 211-233. 
See the discussion supra at n. 77-83. 
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The reasoning that Strasbourg had employed in Al-Adsani was applied 
identically in the Grand Chamber judgements of Fogarty v. United Kingdom'^^ and 
McElhinney v. Ireland^^^ that were handed down on the same day, which similarly 
concerned the relationship between Article 6(1) and State immunity.'^^ In both 
judgements the Court held, by different majorities, that the grant of immunity to bar a 
civil claim did not amount to a violation of Article 6(1).'^° Subsequently, the 
European Court has affirmed these three Grand Chamber judgements in its 
admissibility decision of Kalogeropoulou v. Greece and Germany^^^ arising out of a 
civil claim seeking war reparations for the Distomo Massacre that was barred on the 
grounds of immunity.'^^ More recently, the Grand Chamber unanimously held 
inadmissible an application brought against France following the French Court of 
Cassation's decision that it had no jurisdiction to hear a civil action brought against 
Colonel Ghadaffi alleging his complicity in murder in Association SOS v. France.^^^ 
Despite the legal submissions dealing with the international rules on State immunity 
at length, the European Court in Association SOS chose not to deliberate on this 
issue'^* thus suggesting that both the reasoning employed and the decision reached in 
Al-Adsani have become established principles of Convention jurisprudence.'^^ 
Is Article 6(1) ECHR Engaged when State Immunity bars a Civil Claim? 
The European Court of Human Rights held in all three of its Grand Chamber 
judgements that Article 6(1) was applicable on the basis that granting immunity to bar 
a suit created a serious and genuine dispute over civil rights. This view of the Court 
(2002) 34 E H R R 12. 
(2002) 34 E H R R 13. 
In Fogarty, the applicant alleged that the United Kingdom had denied her right of access to a court 
when granting immunity to the US in an employment dispute. In McElhinney, the applicant brought a 
claim against Ireland for granting immunity to the United Kingdom in a personal injuries dispute. 
'™ Fogarty by a majority of 16 votes to 1; and McElhinney by a majority of 12 votes to 5. 
App. No. 50021/00, 12'^ December 2002, unreported. 
™ The facts of the Distomo Massacre case are considered infra at n. 205. 
Association SOS Attendtats and de Boery v. France, App. No. 76642/01, 4* October 2006, 
unreported. For a comment see, "Civil Procedure: Civil Action brought against Colonel Ghadaffi on 
behalf of Families of Victims of Bomb Attacks on an Aeroplane" [2007] E H R L R 93. 
Ibid., at p. 95. 
Following the House of Lords decision in Jones, the alleged victims of torture have made an 
application to Strasbourg: see, "Victims lose Saudi Torture case" The Guardian, 14* June 2006. 
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concerning the applicability of Article 6(1) is significantly different to that taken by 
Lord Millet in Holland v. Lampen-Wolfe.^^^ 
In Holland v Lampen-Wolfe, a US national brought a claim for defamation 
before the UK courts against an employee of the United States Department of 
Defence, and argued that i f the courts were to deny jurisdiction on the grounds of 
immunity this would amount to a violation of Article 6(1) ECHR. The House o f Lords 
upheld the dismissal of the claim on the grounds that the defendant enjoyed immunity 
from suit. Regarding the alleged violation of Article 6(1), Lord Millet, with whom 
three other Law Lords agreed with, held that while Article 6(1) protects the right of 
access to a court in order to determine civil disputes, the recognition of immunity by a 
State party to the European Convention cannot involve a violation of this guaranteed 
right in situations where customary international law requires immunity to be granted. 
According to Lord Millet, in order for Article 6(1) ECHR to be engaged the 
"contracting States [must] have the powers of adjudication necessary to resolve the 
issues in d i s p u t e " . L o r d Millet drew a distinction between internal limitations 
provided by domestic law on the adjudicative jurisdiction of a court that are self-
imposed by a State, with State immunity which is prescribed by international law and 
thus an external "limitation imposed from without upon the sovereignty of [a 
State]".'^^ Because Article 6(1) does not confer on contracting States adjudicative 
powers that they do not possess. Article 6(1) cannot be applicable in instances where 
international law denies jurisdiction. Therefore, where international law imposes the 
obligation on States to accord immunity, it cannot be said that they have denied 
access to their courts. Lord Bingham in Jones endorsed this view when commenting 
that, " I do not understand how a State can be said to deny access to its court i f it has 
no access to give".'^^ 
It is submitted that the reasoning of Lord Millet in Holland v. Lampen-Wolfe 
concerning the applicability of Article 6(1) ECHR when immunity is granted to a 
foreign State in civil proceedings is to be preferred to that of the European Court of 
Human Rights in its three Grand Chamber judgements. Indeed, the reasoning of Lord 
[2000] 1 W L R 1573. For a case comment see, Fox, "Access to Justice and State Immunity" [2001] 
117 L Q R 10. [Hereinafter referred to as Fox (Access to Justice)] 
'"/6W.,atl588. 
Ibid. 
[2006] U K H L 26, at para. 14. 
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Millet has been read with approval in favour to that of Strasbourg by the House of 
Lords in Jones^^^ and several academics.'^' 
Does barring a Civil Claim under the Doctrine of State Immunity pursue a Legitimate 
Aim that is Necessary in a Democratic Society? 
Having suggested that Article 6(1) ECHR wil l only be engaged in situations where 
international law does not deny a contracting party adjudicative jurisdiction over a 
civil dispute involving a foreign sovereign; the possibility thus arises of establishing a 
fair balance between the law of State immunity and the procedural right of access to a 
court in instances where a contracting State accords immunity beyond the 
requirements of customary international law. 
In each of its Grand Chamber judgments, Strasbourg held that Article 6(1) was 
applicable despite the fact that customary international law required immunity to be 
granted in each situation. Having found that there was a prima facie interference with 
a Convention right came the question of establishing whether this interference was in 
pursuit of a legitimate aim, and, i f so, whether this restriction was proportionate to 
that aim. In all three cases, Strasbourg held that granting immunity to bar a civil claim 
pursued "the legitimate aim of complying with international law to promote comity 
and good relations between States through the respect of another State's 
sovereignty".'^^ Indeed, such an approach suggests that Strasbourg did not intend to 
bring the Convention into conflict with international law. When determining whether 
the restriction on Article 6(1) was proportionate to the legitimate aim of complying 
with international law, the Court held in each case that: 
Measures taken by High Contracting Parties which reflect generally recognised rules of public 
international law on State immunity cannot in principle be regarded as imposing a 
disproportionate restriction on the right of access to court as embodied in Article 6(1)."' 
"° Ibid., per Lord Bingham; and para. 64, per Lord Hoffmann. 
Fox (Access to Justice), supra n. 176, at p. 14; Jones, "Article 6 and Immunities Arising in Public 
International Law" [2003] 52 ICLQ 463, at pp. 469-70; Voyiakis, "Access to Court v. State Immunity" 
2003] 52 ICLQ 297, at pp. 309-10. 
Al-Adsani, at para. 54; Fogarty, at para. 34; and McElhinney, at para. 35. 
Al-Adsani, at para. 56; Fogarty, at para. 36; and McElhinney, at para. 37. 
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Such reasoning of the Court when conducting the proportionality test may be 
criticised on the basis that it makes no attempt in balancing the legitimate aim of 
complying with international law against the restriction placed on the applicant's right 
of access to a court.'^ "^ Somewhat strangely, the Court reasoned that restrictions which 
are taken to comply with international law cannot, in principle, be regarded as 
disproportionate to the legitimate aim of complying with international law. As has 
rightly been suggested by Voyiakis, the Court appears to have conflated the concept 
of proportionality with that of whether the restriction pursued a legitimate aim in its 
reasoning, and thus rendered them both void of any meaning.'^^ Indeed, such a 
misapplication of the proportionality test may have been deliberate as it inevitability 
leads to the resuh that the Court did not have to assume the role of deciding on 
whether a rule o f international law, which came into direct conflict with the 
Convention, was a proportionate restriction on Article 6(1).'^^ 
Despite these shortcoming in Strasbourg's applicafion of the legitimate aim 
and proportionality tests, the House of Lords in Jones nonetheless employed this 
reasoning of the European Court when considering the compatibility of the SIA with 
Article 6(1) ECHR which had been incorporated into domestic law by the Human 
Rights Act.'*^ Accordingly, both Lords Bingham and Hoffmann focused exclusively 
on whether international law denied a foreign State from being accorded immunity in 
civil proceedings where allegations of torture were made. After reviewing 
conventional and customary international law, judicial decisions and the writing of 
publicists, both drew the conclusion that there was no such exception to the general 
rule of immunity.'*^ This conclusion was then directly applied to the reasoning of the 
European Court where it had been decided that restrictions which comply with 
international law cannot be regarded as disproportionate; it was thus held that the SIA 
did not impose a disproportionate restriction on Article 6(1) ECHR.'^^ 
For reasons that wi l l be clearly reached at the end of this chapter,'^ "^ it is 
suggested that the findings of the House of Lords in Jones to the effect that 
'^ •^  A similar view is taken by Jones, supra n. 181, at p. 471; and Voyiakis, supra n. 181, at pp. 311-2. It 
was this matter that Judge Loucaides dissented on in all three decisions. 
'^^rtW., at pp. 311-2. 
Jones, jMprci n. 181, at pp. 471-2. 
Despite expressing strong reservation on the matter. Lords Bingham and Hoffmann both proceeded 
on the assumption that Article 6(1) was engaged as suggested by the European Court. 
[2006] U K H L 26, at para. 28, oer Lord Bingham; and para. 64, pe/- Lord Hoffmann. 
''"Ibid. 
See the discussion infra at n. 234. 
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international law accords immunity in civil proceedings for acts of torture committed 
in a foreign jurisdiction is correct. However, by endorsing Strasbourg's application of 
the legitimate aim and proportionality tests, the House of Lords similarly failed to 
give any due consideration to the applicant's right under Article 6(1), assuming, of 
course, that it was applicable in the first place. It is suggested that the correct 
approach to be taken when a contracting State bars a civil claim by according 
immunity to a foreign State is, firstly, to employ the reasoning of Lord Millet in 
Holland v. Lampen-Wolfe concerning whether Article 6(1) is applicable; and in 
situations where the Convention Article is properly engaged, to, secondly, conduct a 
meaningful proportionality test where the restriction on the applicant's right of access 
to a court is balanced against the legitimate aim which this restriction pursues. Given 
that customary international law imposes the obligation on States to grant immunity in 
civil proceedings where a foreign State is alleged to have committed acts of torture, 
the victim's right of access to a court embodied in Article 6(1) wi l l not be applicable 
in instances where domestic courts bar their adjudicative jurisdiction over the dispute. 
With the Convention Article not being engaged, there would thus be no need to apply 
the legitimate aim and proportionality tests in order to determine whether there had 
been a violation of the Convention right. 
State Immunity and the Prohibition of Torture as a Jus Cogens Norm 
Having firmly concluded in chapter 2 that torture has acquired the status of a jus 
cogens norm'^' the discussion wil l now consider whether this entails any consequence 
on the law of State immunity. Two arguments have been made in civil proceedings 
seeking redress for the violation of jus cogens norms, and each wil l now be 
considered in turn. 
The Implied Waiver of State Immunity 
The argument that a State which violates a peremptory norm impliedly waives its 
right of enjoyment to immunity was first advanced by Belsky, Merva and Roht-
See the discussion in chapter 2 at n. 238-41. 
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Arriaza'^^ following the US Supreme Court's decision in Amerada Hess. The scholars 
argued that the denial of immunity for such conduct could fall within section 
1605(a)(1) FSIA which provides that a foreign State wi l l not be immune from 
jurisdiction in any case "in which the foreign State has waived its immunity either 
explicitly or by implication". The argument is predicated on the assumption that the 
violation of a jus cogens norm cannot constitute a sovereign act and therefore cannot 
attract any of the incidental benefits of sovereignty.'^^ According to such a view, the 
violation of a peremptory norm impliedly waives the enjoyment o f any right to 
immunity. 
While the existence of peremptory norms cannot be disputed, their exact scope 
and nature in international law, beyond rendering incompatible treaties void ab 
initio}^'^ is still being explored.'^^ It is therefore suggested that, at present, it is 
uncertain whether one of the effects of peremptory norms is to render the conduct that 
violates the norm as non-sovereign despite the fact that a recently published 
monograph has concluded otherwise.'^^ Indeed, it appears that the better view may be 
that a State does not cease to be sovereign when violating a peremptory norm of 
customary international law.'^^ More significantly, however, the implied waiver 
argument has been described as inherently contradictory in the sense that it 
presupposes an entirely fictitious implied waiver o f immunity in circumstances where 
a State would not be likely to have expressly waived its immunity.'^^ Although the 
implied waiver argument has received some judicial support in first instance 
decisions, it has consistently been rejected on appeal. 
The argument has been made twice before US courts and on each occasion has 
been rejected. In Siderman de Blake, the 9"' Circuit Court of Appeals accepted that 
torture was a peremptory norm, but dismissed the argument that the FSIA impliedly 
waives sovereign immunity for violations of such norms. Similarly, in Princz a 
"Implied Wavier Under the FSIA: A Proposed Exception to Immunity for Violations of Peremptory 
Norms of International Law" 77 Cali L Rev 365 (1989). 
Ibid., at pp. 390-4. 
Article 53 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. 
Brownlie, supra n. 2, at p. 490. 
Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law, 2006, OUP, at pp. 322-7. 
This was the finding of the German Federal Supreme Court in Greek Citizens v. Federal Republic of 
Germany, (The Distomo Massacre case), 26* June 2003, 111 ZR 245/98. The facts of the Distomo 
Massacre case are considered supra at n. 205. 
Brohmer, supra n. 2, at p. 191; Caplan, "State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: A 
Critique of the Normative Hierarchy Theory" 97 AJIL 751 (2003), p. 744, at ft. 14, 
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majority of the Court of Appeal'^^ rejected the findings of the District Court^'"' which 
held that it had jurisdiction over a civil claim seeking damages for slave labour 
performed during World War Two. Judge Ginsburg, writing for the majority, accepted 
that a foreign State may waive its immunity by way of implication under the FSIA, 
but held that the violation of a jus cogens norm could not in itself be considered as 
constituting an implied waiver of immunity. In his opinion, an implied waiver of 
immunity under the FSIA, "depends upon the foreign government having at some 
point indicated its amenability to suit".^'^' Judge Wald, however, dissented from the 
majority and held that violations of jus cogens should be considered to be an implied 
waiver of immunity within section 1605(a)(1) FSIA. 
The Court of Appeal in Al-Adsani {No. 2) cited with approval this US 
jurisprudence and found that that there was no room for any implied exceptions to the 
SIA for violations of peremptory norms. Lord Justice Ward was of the opinion that 
the SIA was "as plain as can be" and thereby rejected the argument that the term 
'immunity' from sovereign acts within section 1 must be interpreted to 'immunity 
from sovereign acts that were in accordance with international law'.^°^ The implied 
waiver argument was slightly modified when presented in the post-Human Rights 
Acts decision oi Jones. The applicants argued that the duty under section 3(1) HRA 
on UK domestic courts requiring them to interpret legislation, so far as is possible, 
compatibly with the European Convention required an implied exception to be 
introduced into s. 1(1) SIA. Given that the House of Lords had reached the firm 
conclusion that granting immunity in civil proceeding for acts of torture did not 
violate Article 6(1) ECHR, i f indeed Article 6(1) was engaged at all, the argument 
was accordingly dismissed. Lord Hoffmann noted that even i f a violation of Article 
6(1) had been found by the Court, then it would not have been possible under s. 3(1) 
HRA to have read the implied exception into s. 1(1) SIA as suggested by the 
applicants; instead, a s. 4 HRA declaration of incompatibility would have been made 
in the circumstances.'^"^ 
The implied waiver argument has thus been dismissed in common law 
jurisdictions where the restrictive rule of State immunity has been codified into 
'^'26F.3d 1166{D.C. Cir. 1994). 
'""SISF.Supp. 26(D.D.C. 1992). 
26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994), at 1174. 
106 ILR 536, at 549. 
[2006] U K H L 26, at para. 64. 
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domestic legislation. Arguably, this may be unsurprising since the legislation attempts 
to provide a comprehensive code o f the instance when exceptions are to be made to 
the general rule of immunity and is thus not subject to any overriding considerations. 
The courts in both Siderman de Blake and Al-Adsani {No. 2) found themselves bound 
by the clear terms o f the legislation when rejecting the implied waiver argument, and 
suggested that it was for the legislator to expressly provide an exception to the general 
rule of immunity for violations of jus cogens norms.^°'* 
Not only has the implied waiver argument been dismissed by courts in 
common law jurisdictions when undertaking a literal approach to the terms of the 
domestic legislation that codifies the restrictive rule of State immunity, but also by 
courts in civil law jurisdictions which have a more flexible uncodified rule. The facts 
of Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany arose out of a compensation 
claim brought against Germany for the massacres that had been committed by 
occupying forces during the Second World War in the village o f Distomo. The Court 
of First Instance of Levadia held that violation of a jus cogens norm could not be 
regarded as a sovereign act and therefore could not be characterised as an act de jure 
imperii.^^^ Accordingly, the Court held that the Greek courts had adjudicative 
jurisdiction to hear this civil case on the grounds that Germany had impliedly waived 
its right to immunity. On appeal, the Greek Supreme Court effectively confirmed the 
decision o f the Court o f First Instance that Germany did not enjoy immunity for the 
massacres that had been committed in Distomo; but, despite the fact that the Supreme 
Court approved the reasoning of the Court of First Instance, immunity was denied on 
a different ground.^°^ The reasoning of the Supreme Court was not that Germany must 
be deemed to have waived its right to immunity by violating a peremptory norm, but 
that there existed a clear customary rule providing an exception to State immunity in 
instance where a foreign State has committed a tort in the territory o f the forum State 
and it was the breach of the peremptory norm that constituted the tort?°^ As evidence 
Siderman de Blake, 965F 2d 688 (9* Cir. 1992), at 56, per Fletcher J.; Al-Adsani {No. 2), 106 ILR 
536, at 542, per Stuart-Smith L J . 
30* October 1997, Case No. 137/1997, Court of First Instance of Levadia, Greece. For a case 
comment see Bantekas, "Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany" 92 AJIL 765 (1998). 
May 4* 2000, Case No. 11/2000, Areios Pagos, Hellenic Supreme Court. For a case comment see 
Gavouneli and Bantekas, "Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany" 95 AJIL 198 (2001). 
This important point has been overlooked by some of the academic literature: McGregor, "State 
Immunity and Jus Cogens" [2006] 55 ICLQ 437, at p. 440; and Orakhelashvili, supra n. 196, at p. 327. 
Cf the correct reading made by de Wet, "The Prohibition of Torture as an International Norm of Jus 
Cogens and its Implications for National and Customary Law" (2004) 15 E J I L 97, at pp. 108-9; and De 
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for the existence o f this customary rule the Court cited Article 12 of the 1991 ILC 
Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities, Article 11 of the European Convention on 
State Immunity 1972, and similar provisions contained in domestic legislation. 
Furthermore, the Court held that immunity could not be retained in situations 
involving armed conflict against innocent citizens, despite the fact that both the Draft 
Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities and the European Convention on State 
Immunity expressly provide that immunity is to be granted in such instances. The 
Special Supreme Court of Greece subsequently held that Germany was entitled to 
claim immunity in this civil case involving war reparations on the basis that the torts 
had been committed by its armed forces.^"* 
The implied waiver argument has thus received a notable lack of judicial 
support. In keeping with this trend, the Italian Court of Cassation in Ferrini v. Federal 
Republic of Germany recently rejected the theory when commenting that, "a waiver 
cannot... be envisaged in the abstract, but only encountered in the concrete''^^'^ 
The Normative Hierarchical Status of Jus Cogens Norms 
The suggestion that the rules on State immunity would be invalidated by a peremptory 
norm of international law in proceedings where a foreign State was alleged to have 
violated such a norm was introduced into the academic community well over a decade 
ago and has since been the subject of an ensuing lively debate.^'" The premise of the 
argument is that jus cogens norms enjoy the highest-ranking normative status within 
the legal order and therefore prevail over the rules on State immunity which rank 
lower in the hierarchy of international norms. Following the House of Lords 
judgement in Pinochet (No. 3), this argument gained further academic support when it 
was suggested that the denial of immunity was based on the normative status of the 
prohibition on torture.^" Admittedly, several of the Lords in the majority referred to 
jus cogens in their judgement, but for the reasons already suggested above it is 
Sena and De Vittor, "State Immunity and Human Rights: The Italian Supreme Court Decision on the 
Ferrini Case" [2005] 16 E J I L 89, at pp. 96-7. Significantly, this misreading of the Supreme Court's 
decision was similarly made by Lord Hoffmann in Jones [2006] U K H L 26, at paras. 55 and 62. 
Federal Republic of Germany v. Miltiadis Margellos, if^ December 2002, Case No. 6/17-9-2002. 
(Cass. Sez. Un. 5044/04) 87 Rivista du Diritto Internazionale 539 (2004), at para. 8.2. (Original 
emphasis). 
Bianchi, "Denying State Immunity to Violators of Human Rights" (1994) 46 Austrian J Pub Int'I L 
195, at p. 219. 
^'' See the discussion, and citations, supra at n. 80. 
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submitted that the superior status of peremptory norms was not part of the ratio 
decendi?^^ The normative hierarchical theory has since received some judicial 
endorsement in the Dissenting Opinions of two International Courts, and, more 
significantly, the Italian Court of Cassation. 
As wi l l be recalled, a large eight-member dissenting minority of the European 
Court in Al-Adsani firmly held that, 'jus cogens... deprives the rule of sovereign 
immunity of all its legal e f f ec t s " . ^ In addition, a similar view was taken by the 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Al-Khasawneh in the Arrest Warrant case who was of 
the belief that, "when the hierarchically higher [jus cogens] norm comes into conflict 
with the rules on immunity, it should prevail".^''' More recently, the Italian Court of 
Cassation fully upheld the normative hierarchical argument in Ferrini v. Federal 
Republic of Germany?^^ 
The case of Ferrini involved an Italian national bringing a civil action against 
Germany for being deported from Italy to Germany where he was forced to work in 
the war industry. At first instance the applicant's claim for war reparations was 
dismissed on the grounds that Germany enjoyed immunity from suit, and this finding 
was subsequently upheld on appeal.^The Court of Cassation however reversed this 
decision when finding that a foreign State is not entitled to claim immunity in respect 
of civil proceedings where it is alleged to have violated a peremptory norm of 
international law. The Court reached this conclusion by, firstly, defining both 
deportation and forced labour as a jus cogens norm;^'' and, secondly, claiming that 
there was no doubt that jus cogens norms "prevail over all other norms, either 
statutory of customary in nature, and therefore over norms concerning immunity".^'^ 
In supporting this conclusion, the Court cited with approval the dissenting opinion of 
the European Court in Al-Adsani, which similarly held that priority must be granted to 
the higher-ranking norm. By finding that jus cogens norms override State immunity 
due to their status in the hierarchy of norms, the Court was thus of the opinion that it 
'^^  C/Orakhelashvili, supra n. 196 at p. 355. 
'^^  The Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Rozakis and Caflisch, joined by Judges Wildhaber, Cabral 
Barreto, Costa and Vajic, at para. 4, endorsed by Judges Ferrari Bravo and Loucaides. 
At para. 7. 
(Cass. Sez. Un. 5044/04) 87 Rivista du Diritto Internazionale 539 (2004). For a comment see: 
Bianchi, ''Ferrini v. Federal Republic of Germany" 99 AJIL 242 (2005), [hereinafter referred to as 
Bianchi {Ferrini)]; and Focarelli, "Denying Foreign State Immunity for Commission of International 
Crimes: The Ferrini Decision" [2005] 54 ICLQ 951. 
Corte App. Firenze, 14* Jan 2002. 
(Cass. Sez. Un. 5044/04) 87 Rivista du Diritto Internazionale 539 (2004), at para. 7. 
Ibid., at para. 9. 
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need not show the existence of an explicit customary rule providing that a foreign 
State wil l be denied immunity when it is alleged to have violated a peremptory norm. 
In addition, the Court of Cassation drew a material distinction between the 
facts of Ferrini from those of Al-Adsani (No. 2) and Bouzari on the basis that the torts 
in these decisions had taken place outside the jurisdiction of the forum State.^'^ It 
appears somewhat strange that the Court of Cassation placed any reliance on the fact 
that the applicant was captured on and deported from Italian territory to draw a 
distinction between those decisions where the domestic courts had held that a foreign 
State enjoyed immunity in civil proceedings when alleged to have violated a jus 
cogens norm. It is suggested that it would have been much more preferable for the 
Court to have denied immunity on the basis of the clearly recognised customary 
exception to the general rule of immunity in instances where a foreign State has 
committed a tort in the territory of the f o r u m H a d the Court adopted such 
reasoning then it would have been unnecessary for it to have drawn the doubtful 
conclusions that deportation and forced labour constitute peremptory norms,^^' and 
that such norms take precedence over the rules on State immunity.^^^ 
Despite the Italian Court of Cassation's endorsement o f the normative 
hierarchal theory in Ferrini, it is suggested that this decision alone cannot be seen as 
conclusive of the matter. Not only does the decision stand in isolation to a number of 
cases where the argument has been rejected;^^^ but, and more significantly, the theory 
has correctly been criticised by numerous academics on the basis of being 
conceptually flawed.^^'' This criticism of the normative hierarch theory was explicitly 
endorsed by both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in JonesP'^ 
^ " a t para. 10. 
This, however, is on the basis that the customary exception does not apply in armed conflicts. See, 
further, on this point Gattini, "War Crimes and State Immunity in the Ferrini Decision" (2005) 3 JICJ 
224. Given that this point is well beyond the scope of this paper no attempt shall be made to consider it. 
See further on this point, De Sena and De Vittor, supra n. 207, at pp. 97-100. 
Similarly, it would have been unnecessary for the Court to have held that it had jurisdiction over the 
events under the universal civil jurisdiction principle, but instead under the widely accepted subjective 
territorial principle. See further the discussion of this point in chapter 2 at n. 254-2. 
Most notably by the International Court in the Arrest Warrant case, ICJ Report, 2002, p. 3, at para. 
58. 
Caplan, supra n. 198, at pp. 771-2; de Wet, supra n. 207, at pp. 109-10; Fox (State Immunity), supra 
n. 2, at pp. 524-5; Gattini, supra n. 220, at pp. 236-7; Voyiakis, supra n. 181, at pp. 320-2; 
Zimmermann, "Sovereign Immunity and Violations of International Jus Cogens- Some Critical 
Remarks" 16 Mich J Int'l L 433 (1994), at p. 438. C/Orakhelashvili, supra n. 196, at pp. 340-57. 
^" Respectively: [2004] E W C A Civ 1394, at para. 17 per Mance L J . ; [2006] UK.HL 26, at para. 24, per 
Lord Bingham; and paras. 44-5, per Lord Hoffmann. 
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I f peremptory norms are to override the rules on State immunity under the 
normative hierarchy theory then it is necessary to show that the norms are in conflict 
with one another. State immunity is a procedural rule that is concerned with the 
judicial power of a State and bars domestic courts from exercising adjudicative 
jurisdiction in disputes which involve foreign sovereigns. The rules o f State immunity 
are not concerned with the substantive question of whether a State is responsible for 
its acts in a given situation, but with the procedural question of which forum shall be 
used in order to resolve the dispute.^^* Accordingly, it may be said that State 
immunity is not a plea that provides a substantive defence exonerating a foreign State 
from liability. In contrast, peremptory norms are primarily concerned with 
substantively prohibiting the violation of the norm. 
The Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal in 
the Arrest Warrant case recently commented that, "immunity is never substantive";^^'' 
and the strictly procedural nature of immunity was similarly emphasised by the 
International Court.'^ ^^ Lord Hoffmann rightly commented in Jones that a domestic 
court which accords immunity to a foreign State "is not proposing to torture anyone. 
Nor is the... [foreign State], in claiming immunity, justifying the use of torture".^^' 
Consequently, with the obligations of State immunity not affecting substantive law, 
the norms can never be in conflict at their level of substance. 
For peremptory norms to displace the rules on State immunity under the 
normative hierarchy theory it is thus necessary for the theory to show that peremptory 
norms create procedural obligations, and that such obligations conflict with the rules 
on State immunity. Accordingly, it must be shown that peremptory norms create a 
procedural right of access to foreign domestic courts which allow an individual to 
seek civil redress for violation of the norm. On this matter, Bianchi has suggested that 
State immunity comes into conflict with the values which underlie jus cogens norms, 
and thus should be overridden when applying this to the normative hierarchy 
•^^ ^ See, further, on this point, Yang, "State Immunity in the European Court of Human Rights: 
Reaffirmation and Misconceptions" [2004] 74 B Y I L 333, at pp. 342-3. 
At para. 74. 
ICJ Report, 2002, p. 3, at para. 60. The I C T Y Appeals Chamber has held in Prosecutor v. Blaskic, 
{subpoena), Judgement of 29 October 1997, (Case No. IT-95-14-AR 108 bis.), at paras. 38-41, that 
immunity ratione materiae is a substantive defence enjoyed by State officials. This finding has been 
approved by Cassese {International Law), supra n. 2, at pp. 110-3; but rightly been criticised by Fox, 
Some Aspects of Immunity from Criminal Jurisdiction of the State and its Officials: The Blaskic case, 
in Vohrah, et al., (eds.), Man's Inhumanity to Man, 2003, Kluwer Law International. 
[2006] U K H L 26, at para. 44. 
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theory.^^° Moreover, in a recent and comprehensive study on the subject of 
peremptory norms, Orakhelashvili has claimed that international law has endowed 
peremptory norms with 'inherent consequential effects' so that they may be 
practically applied, and that the enforcement of the norm is similarly jus cogem?^^ 
According to Orakhelashvili, "a norm that cannot be enforced is not a norm".^^^ 
At a time when there is great uncertainty surrounding the legal consequences 
which ensue from the violation of a jus cogens norm, the Court of Appeal for Ontario 
has commented in Bouzari that: 
The extent of the prohibition against torture as a rule of jus cogens is determined not by any 
particular view of what is required i f it is to be meaningful, but rather by the widespread and 
consistent practice of States."^ 
It is submitted that, at present, the consistent practice yielded by international law is 
that peremptory norms do not possess any enforcement obligations, and this is clearly 
reflected by the fact that customary international law does not provide an exception in 
civil proceedings seeking redress for violations of jus cogens norms. With there being 
no conflict between the procedural rules of State immunity and the, non-existent, 
procedural obligations of jus cogens, the normative hierarchy theory may thus be said 
to be conceptually flawed. 
Conclusion 
It is thus concluded that customary international law obliges States to accord 
immunity to foreign States in civil proceedings seeking redress for acts of torture 
committed in a foreign jurisdiction. Moreover, since the commission of torture has 
been concluded to be an official act, and therefore attributable to the sovereign State, 
immunity is similarly to be granted to foreign State officials. Despite Pinochet {No. 3) 
denying immunity ratione materiae in criminal proceedings for acts o f torture 
committed in a foreign jurisdiction, it has strongly been argued that the reasoning of 
" ° Bianchi (Ferrini), supra n. 215, at p. 247. 
" ' 5 « p r a n . 196, at p. 341. 
Ibid., at p. 349. 
[2004] OJ No. 2800, at para. 90. Significantly, both the International Court in the Arrest Warrant 
case, ICJ Report, 2002, p. 3, at para. 58, and the European Court of Human Rights in Al-Adsani (2002) 
34 EHRR 11, at para. 61, referred to State practice when determining the consequences that ensue from 
the violation of a jus cogens norm. 
I l l 
the House of Lords in Pinochet (No. 3), to the effect that international law does not 
grant immunity in instances where it obliges extraterritorial jurisdiction to be both 
assumed and exercised, cannot be applied in civil proceedings following the 
conclusions drawn in chapter 2 in that international law, at present, does not establish 
such obligatory universal civil jurisdiction for torture. Finally, the doctrinal legitimacy 
of the separate legal arguments that granting immunity in civil proceedings for acts of 
torture violates the right of access to a civil court and is inconsistent with the 
peremptory status of the norm have both been rejected. 
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Chapter 4 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
It is to the law of the lex loci deliciti to which the defendant owed obedience at the decisive moment, 
and it is by that law that his liability, if any, should be measured.' 
The Relationship Between the Different Fields of 
International Law 
The relationship between public and private international law is a highly complex 
issue that has evaded most of the mainstream academic literature which tends to treat 
the two fields of international law as entirely separate bodies of law.'^  However, this 
relationship is of great significance in transnational human rights litigation where 
legal issues are raised in both fields of law and thus must be considered. 
Public international law is primarily concerned with regulating the legal rules 
which govern inter-State relations; where as, in contrast, private international law is 
primarily concerned with regulating the rules which govern the resolution of private 
law relations involving a foreign element. Thus, by way of definition, it may be said 
that the different species of international law are complementary to one another. 
Public international law itself does not contain any detailed rules regulating the 
procedural norms that determine how a private law dispute involving a foreign 
' Cheshire, Private International Law, 6* ed., 1961, at p. 277. 
^ For the most extensive comments on the relationship between public and private international law 
see: Akehurst, "Jurisdiction in International Law" (1972) 46 BYIL 145, at pp. 216-31; Lowe, "Public 
International Law and the Conflict of Laws: The European Responses to the United States Export 
Administration Regulations" [1984] 33 ICLQ 515, at pp. 521-3; Mann, "The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in 
International Law" (1964) I I I Hague Recueil, reprinted in Mann, Further Studies in International 
Law, 1990, Oxford: Claredon Press, at pp. 10-15 and 43-51, [hereinafter referred to simply as Mann]; 
Mann, "The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law Revisited After Twenty Years" (1984) 186 
Hague Recueil 9, at pp. 26-33, [hereinafter referred to as Mann (Revisited)]; Maier, "Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection between Public and Private International Law" 76 AJIL 
280 (1982); Maier, Jurisdictional Rules in Customary International Law, in Messon, (eds.), 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Theory and Practice, 1996, Kluwer Law International, at pp. 79-81; and 
Scott, Translating Torture into Transnational Tort: Conceptual Divides in the Debate on Corporate 
Accountability for Human Rights Harms, in Scott, (eds.). Torture as Tort, 2001, Hart Publishing, at pp. 
51-3. 
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element is to be dealt with by a domestic legal system.^ However, in his seminal work 
on the doctrine o f jurisdiction, Mann has noted one exception whereby public 
international does in fact have a limiting function in relation to private international 
law.'* According to Mann, all of the regulatory rules of private international law have 
to stand the test of the public international law doctrine of jurisdiction: 
If jurisdiction directs that in given circumstances a person, thing or act may be made subject to 
the law of a given State... it is the municipal law of that State and possibly of other States that 
makes the person, thing or act so subject. If the doctrine of jurisdiction defines the States 
enjoying, in given circumstances, the international right of regulation, private international 
law decides which of several laws enacted in the exercise of such right shall prevail in a given 
country.^ 
Thus, the function of jurisdiction, when used as doctrine of public international law, is 
to define a State's competence when enacting rules o f private international law: " i f 
jurisdiction provides the frame or limit, the conflict rule fills it in".^ So long as these 
rules do not exceed the customary limits of jurisdiction, public international law wil l 
be indifferent to them. 
Private International Law and Transnational Human Rights Litigation 
Any transnational human rights litigation seeking civil redress raises two procedural 
issues that must be considered by a domestic court before it may deal with any issues 
concerning substantive liability. Firstly, the domestic court must determine whether it 
has jurisdiction to hear the dispute; and i f so, it must, secondly, determine which 
system of law wi l l be applied when adjudicating the dispute. Each domestic legal 
system wi l l have its own body of private international law rules which determine 
these procedural issues of jurisdiction and choice of law, and in some situations States 
may have entered into bilateral treaty arrangements with one another which provide 
the rules determining these issues. The discussion wi l l now briefly examine each of 
^ This is, however, not to say that States may not enter into international conventions which provide 
regulatory rules of private international law such as, for example, the Brussels Convention on 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement in Civil and Commercial Matters 1968. See further on this point, Scott, 
ibid., at p. 52. 
Mann, supra n. 2, at pp. 12-3; Mann (Revisited), supra n. 2, at pp. 31-2. 
^ Mann, ibid., at p. 12. 
" Ibid 
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these private international law issues in the context of them being faced by an alleged 
victim of torture bringing civil proceedings against a foreign defendant before an 
English court.^ 
Jurisdiction 
The question of whether a domestic court has jurisdictional competence over a private 
law dispute is concerned with whether both the cause of action and the litigants to the 
dispute have a sufficiently close connection with the forum. Although this test of 
jurisdiction is same which determines the existence of jurisdiction in public 
international law,^ the grounds for the exercise of jurisdiction under private 
international law are not the same as those grounds in public international law. With 
respect to the former, specific subjects may be regulated in terms of domicile or 
residence, but such grounds would not found jurisdiction where public international 
law matters are concerned.^ 
In the UK, the usual basis for determining whether a court has jurisdiction to 
hear a private law dispute involving a foreign defendant is whether the applicant is 
able to serve a writ upon the defendant.'" I f the defendant is physically present in 
England, and the writ is properly served upon him, the common law provides that the 
individual is automatically subject to the jurisdiction o f the court even i f this presence 
in England is merely transient. Where a writ cannot be served upon a defendant who 
is not physically present in England, it is still possible for the court to exercise 
jurisdiction over the defendant i f the civil claim falls within one of the categories 
recognised by the Civil Procedure Rules 1998" and the court then grants permission 
to serve the writ extraterritorially. This latter situation wi l l be applicable in instances 
where the defendant in civil proceedings is a foreign State.'•^ 
' For a detailed and comprehensive guide see, generally, REDRESS, Challenging Impunity for Torture: 
A Manual for Bringing Criminal and Civil Proceedings in England and Wales for Torture Committed 
Abroad 2000, published by the REDRESS Trust, at pp. 125-176. See, further, International Law 
Association Human Rights Committee, "Report on Civil Actions in the English Courts For Serious 
Human Rights Violations Abroad" [2001] EHRLR 129, at pp. 139-49 and 158-62. [Hereinafter referred 
to as ILA Report on Civil Actions]. 
' Mann (Revisited) supra n. 2, at p. 31. 
' Shaw, International Law, 5* ed., 2003, CUP, at pp. 573-4. 
In civil law countries the usual ground for jurisdiction is the habitual residence of the defendant in 
the forum State. 
" As amended at T' October 2005. 
See s. 12 of the State Immunity Act 1978 which details how writs are served on foreign States. 
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Civil Procedure Rule 6.20(8)(a) wi l l be the most relevant in determining 
whether a claim form may be served outside of the jurisdiction in tort actions seeking 
civil redress against a foreign defendant alleged to have committed acts o f torture in a 
foreign Sta te .Rule 6.20(8)(a) provides that leave can be granted to serve a claim 
form outside of the jurisdiction in an action for tort where the damage was sustained 
in England. In Al-Adsani {No. 1), the Court of Appeal held that the consequential 
psychological damage suffered by the applicant when returning to England was to be 
regarded as a separate form of injury to the physical acts of torture that were inflicted 
by the State officials in Kuwait.'" Accordingly, the Court granted leave to serve the 
claim form on the foreign State outside the jurisdiction. 
In cases where proceedings have properly been served upon the defendant, the 
court retains an inherent competence to stay the proceedings on the grounds of forum 
non conveniens. Under this doctrine, the court wi l l stay proceedings where it "is 
satisfied that there is some other available forum, having competent jurisdiction, in 
which the case may be tried more suitably for the interest of all the parties and the 
ends of justice".'^ Factors that wil l be relevant when deciding whether to decline 
jurisdiction for any transnational human rights litigation seeking civil redress for 
torture include whether the claimant has legitimate fears for his personal safety i f 
returning to the foreign jurisdiction,'^ and whether the foreign court wil l award low 
damages.'^ 
Choice of Law 
Once a domestic court has concluded that it has jurisdictional competence to hear a 
private law dispute, it must next determine which system of law shall be applied to the 
dispute. In criminal proceedings, domestic courts wi l l always apply the law of the lex 
fori regardless of whether the conduct was committed extraterritorially; however, in 
civil proceedings, a domestic court may apply either the law of the lex fori or the law 
of the lex loci delicti. A majority of States have adopted the principle in their 
respective rules on private international law that the law of the lex loci delicti shall be 
" REDRESS, supra n. 7, at pp. 138-9; ILA Report on Civil Actions, supra n. 7, at p. 142. 
"* Al-Adsani v. Government of Kuwait and Others [1994] 100 ILR 465, at 467 per Evans LJ. 
" Spiliada Maritime Corporation v. Cansulex Ltd [1987] 1 AC 460, at 482, per Lord Goff 
Oppenheimer v. Louis Rosenthal & Co. [1937] 1 All ER 23. 
" The Adhiguna Meranti [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 384. 
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applied when adjudicating civil actions brought in tort.'^ Thus, for example, in the 
UK, s. 11(1) of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 
provides the general rule that an English courts is to apply the law of the country in 
which the events constituting the tort occurred.'^ 
Where the action in tort relates to death or personal injury, and the elements of 
those events constituting the tort occur in different countries, section 1 l(2)(a) PIL Act 
provides that the applicable law is the law of the country where the individual was 
when he sustained the injury. Since personal injury, for the purposes of the Act, 
includes any impairment of physical and mental condition,^" and, as already stated 
above, the Court of Appeal in Al-Adsani (No. 1) recognised that the psychological 
damage suffered by a victim of torture is to be regarded as a separate form of injury to 
the direct physical acts, it is thus possible to argue that English law be applicable in 
cases where post-traumatic stress disorder is suffered in the UK as a result of acts 
torture carried out in a foreign jurisdiction.^' However, it is suggested that the better 
view may well be that the psychological damage suffered by the victim of torture can 
no longer be regarded as a separate form of injury since this argument has been 
dismissed in litigation subsequent X.o Al-Adsani {No. I) where the applicant has sought 
to invoke the recognised exception that immunity wi l l not be available where personal 
injury is caused within the forum State.^ ^ Accordingly, it is concluded that in a tort 
action seeking civil redress for acts of torture committed in a foreign jurisdiction the 
law of the lex loci delicti wi l l , prima facie, be applicable unless one of the exceptions 
contained in the PIL Act is applicable. 
For the tort action seeking civil redress for acts of torture committed in a 
foreign jurisdiction to be successful, it is necessary that the lex loci delicti recognise 
civil liability for torture. In this regard, it is not necessary that the lex loci delicti 
specifically recognise a tort of torture, but that it recognise some form of civil liability 
for the acts such as assault and battery which may capture at least some aspects of the 
tort.^'' However, in situations where the lex loci delicti recognises that the acts 
Mann (Revisited), supra n. 2, at p. 47. 
" For a comment see, Morse, "Torts in Private International Law: A New Statutory Framework" 
[1996] 45 ICLQ 888. [Hereinafter referred to as the PIL Act]. 
^''S. 11(3) PIL Act. 
'^ REDRESS, supra n. 7, at pp. 173-4. 
Al-Adsani v. Government of Kuwait and Others (No. 2) [1996] 106 ILR 536; Bouzari v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran [2004] OJ No. 2800. 
See, further, on this point, Virgo, Characterisation, Choice of La^v and Human Rights, in Scott, 
(eds.), Torture as Tort, 2001, Hart Publishing, at pp. 325-36. 
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complained of are lawful, such as, for example, where the tortious conduct of public 
officials cannot give rise to civil claims or amnesty laws have been enacted, then the 
action wi l l fail. 
Section 14(3)(a)(i) PIL Act provides one exception to the general rule 
contained in s. 11(1) which wil l be relevant in transnational human rights litigation of 
the sort envisaged in this paper. According to s. 14(3)(a)(i), English courts are not to 
apply the law of the lex loci delicti where this would conflict with a principle of 
public policy. In Oppenheimer v. Cattermole, the House of Lord held that English 
courts would disregard a foreign law where this would represent a serious 
infringement to human rights.^'* Thus, i f the lex loci delicti is disregarded in favour of 
English law because it does not recognise civil liability for torture then, in the absence 
of any tort of torture recognised by English law,^^ the court wi l l apply the English law 
of assault and battery. 
Under the UK's rules on private international law it thus remains possible that 
an English court may provide a civil remedy for acts of torture committed in a foreign 
jurisdiction, even in situations where the lex loci delicti does not recognise civil 
liability for such acts. 
[1976] AC 249, at 263, per Lord Hailsham. 
" Cf Jones V. Saudi Arabia [2004] EWCA Civ. 1394 where the judgement made in the Court of Appeal 
by Mance LJ. implicitly assumes that the common law does recognises a tort of torture. 
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